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A CAVEAT (OR, A PREFACE IN PROSE) 
 
I sense I should start this text with a confession. This is, after 
all, a study about autobiographical writing and it is only fair that I 
should insert myself into the work. So here it goes: this research 
followed a mind of its own. Not that that is a bad thing. The more I 
talked to other fellow academics about my conundrum, about how my 
initial project had slowly but steadily turned into something completely 
different from what I had initially envisioned and, in a lot of ways, out 
of my control, the more they supported me in this regard. “This is how it 
should be, really,” they said. At some point I knew the most professional 
thing for me was to let it (the research, that is) go its own way. So I did. 
I let (it) go. And it was both scary and exciting at the same time. Maybe 
I should use the present tense here, as those feelings continue even as I 
write this.  
It turned out that the more I tried to narrow down my research 
of graphic memoirs and autobiographies, the more it kept pointing to the 
interesting ways in which disability kept consistently surfacing in my 
investigations of graphic memoirs. That was not in my original plan, but 
it was surprising to see how often the graphic memoirs that I came in 
contact with dealt, in one way or another, with disability. Some of them 
portrayed disability as one element among many others in the narrative: 
such as Alison Bechdel’s Fun Home: A Family Tragicomic (2006); 
Laurie Sandell’s The Impostor’s Daughter: A True Memoir (2009); 
Nicole G. Georges’ Calling Dr. Laura: A Graphic Memoir (2013); 
Jeffrey Brown’s Funny Misshapen Body (2009); Lucy Knisley’s French 
Milk (2007); Julia Wertz’s The Infinite Wait and Other Stories (2012); 
Phoebe Potts’ Good Eggs: A Memoir (2010). Others had disability as the 
central point of the story, such as Ellen Forney’s Marbles: Mania, 
Depression, Michelangelo & Me: A Graphic Memoir (2012); David 
Small’s Stitches: A Memoir (2009); David B.’s Epileptic (2005); Harvey 
Pekar and Joyce Brabner’s Our Cancer Year (1994); Marisa Acocella 
Marchetto’s Cancer Vixen: A True Story (2006); Miriam Engelberg’s 
Cancer Made Me a Shallower Person (2006); Clem Martini and Olivier 
Martini’s Bitter Medicine: A Graphic Memoir of Mental Illness (2010); 
Darryl Cunningham’s Psychiatric Tales: Eleven Graphic Stories About 
Mental Illness (2010); Al Davison’s The Spiral Cage (2003); John 
Porcellino’s The Hospital Suite (2014); Joyce Farmer’s Special Exits 
(2014); Brian Fies’ Mom’s Cancer (2003-04); Sarah Leavitt’s Tangles: 
A Story About Alzheimer's, my Mother, and Me (2012); Frederick 
Peeters’ Blue Pills: A Positive Love Story (2008). The sheer amount of 
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occurrences was noteworthy, but that was not all. In a lot of works, such 
as Stitches and The Infinite Wait, art and illness went hand in hand in the 
narrative: an artistic drive directly spawned from disability. In others, 
such as Marbles and Cancer Vixen, disability was a catalyst to question 
whether it was possible to (continue to) be an artist while dealing with 
the effects of an illness.  
As many others, I have had to deal with disability in my family, 
both in the past and in the present. Those experiences shaped part of my 
childhood and how I relate to disability today. Writing this dissertation 
meant confronting my past, while rethinking anxieties about the present. 
However, it is important to state that I, at the moment, do not have a 
disability, and this invariably impacts my perspective, whether I intend 
to or not.  
On another level, the amazing works I got to read because of 
this research have inspired me to continue to pursue artistic endeavors of 
my own. After years of neglecting (or should I say stifling) this side of 
my life, throughout the process of researching and writing this work I 
increasingly found myself wanting to pick up a pencil and paper and 
draw again. I had forgotten how incredible the feeling of artistic creation 
is and, if for nothing else, I will forever be thankful that this project took 
an unexpected turn so I could just remember how much I enjoy making 
art, be it for myself or for others. The comics preface of this dissertation 
was the culmination of this new found artistic urge. It was composed 
during a week-long workshop at the Fine Arts Work Center, in 
Provincetown (MA), with Alison Bechdel as a tutor. Working closely 
with one of my favorite comics author, one whose work is included in 
the corpus of this dissertation, producing my own art under her guidance 
was, for lack of a less tackier expression, a dream come true. In sum, 
this research followed a mind of its own, and I am glad it did.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
This research focuses on the representation of disability and 
embodiment in the contemporary generation of graphic memoirs, 
starting in the mid 2000s till present day 2015. These I call “graphic 
body memoirs.” This dissertation is divided into two larger sections: the 
first section is dedicated to the investigation of the graphic memoirs 
Calling Dr. Laura: A Graphic Memoir (2013), by Nicole Georges, and 
Fun Home: A Family Tragicomic (2006), by Alison Bechdel, and what 
Sharon Snyder and David Mitchell define as “narrative prosthesis.” In 
their definition of the term, disability works in literary discourse as a 
narratological device that functions as a metaphor for a given character’s 
unconventionalities in literary works. The questions I ask in this section 
are: how does this concept work within the non-fictional context of life 
narratives and, more specifically, of graphic memoirs? How is it that this 
metaphorical use of disability functions in texts where the disabled body 
is not necessarily a narrative ploy to convey the uniqueness of a 
character? In which way is the materiality of the disability metaphor 
affected by the dual visual and textual discourses of the comics 
medium? The analyses carried out throughout this section suggest that 
metonym appears to be a much more suitable trope as one looks at 
graphic memoirs and disability. Metaphor is just one of the ways in 
which disability is presented in these graphic memoirs, but it does not 
account for how it is also constitutive of the self that narrates it. 
Metonym, on the other hand, works through repetition and it does not 
provide the directness between signified and signifier entailed in 
metaphor. Disability as metonym can be seen as a process, rather than a 
direct association of signifiers. The symbolic meaning of disability has 
to be read as part of a larger system of construction of meaning and 
subjects in autobiography. Instead of the closure of metaphor, I propose 
the continued open-endedness of metonym in relation to disability and 
autobiographical narratives. The second section of this dissertation is 
dedicated to the analysis of visual metaphor in Tangles: A Story about 
Alzheimer’s, my Mother, and Me (2012), by Sarah Leavitt, Epileptic 
(2005), by David B., and Bitter Medicine: A Graphic Memoir about 
Mental Illness (2010), by Clem Martini and Olivier Martini. Visual 
metaphor is understood here mostly through George Lakoff and Mark 
Johnson’s theory of conceptual metaphor, as a figure speech that evokes 
sensory effects on the body. Whereas the first section deals with 
narratives where the narrator is the character with a disability, in this 
second section I focus more on graphic memoirs that represent disability 
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in others. My questions here are: how does the portrayal of disability in 
others complicate the idea of self-representation and disability? How 
does visual metaphor impacts the experience of representing others with 
disability? In what ways is visual metaphor employed to reinforce the 
stigmatization of those characters and in what ways it is used to subvert 
it? What the analyses of Tangles and Epileptic suggest is that graphic 
memoirs that deal with the representation of disability of someone other 
than the narrator run the risk of appropriating that person’s story in the 
process of telling their own. Visual metaphor, with a few exceptions, 
emphasizes the spectacle of disability in others, adding to an already 
alienating process of stigmatization related to the representation of that 
disability. Bitter Medicine, conversely, serves as an example of a 
narrative in which the representation of disability cannot be 
characterized by an ableist gaze. In Bitter Medicine, the narrative offers 
some insight into the potential of graphic memoirs as a genre wherein 
one can represent disability polysemically and not just as a narrative 
device in the establishment of able-bodied autobiographical subjects. 
 
Keywords: autobiography; disability; comics; metaphor 
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RESUMO 
 
Esta pesquisa se concentra na representação de deficiência e de 
corporificação na geração contemporânea de graphic memoirs, com 
início nos anos 2000 até a presente data em 2015. Chamo essas obras de 
“graphic body memoirs.” Esta tese está dividida em duas grandes partes: 
a primeira parte é dedicada à investigação das graphic memoirs Calling 
Dr. Laura: A Graphic Memoir (2013), de Nicole Georges, e Fun Home: 
Uma Tragicomédia Familiar (2006), de Alison Bechdel, e o que Sharon 
Snyder e David Mitchell definem como “prótese narrativa.” Na sua 
definição do termo, deficiência funciona em discurso literário como um 
recurso narrativo que funciona como uma metáfora para a não 
convencionalidade de um dado personagem. As perguntas que faço 
nessa seção são: como esse conceito funciona no contexto não ficcional 
de narrativas de vida e, mais especificamente, de graphic memoirs? 
Como o uso metafórico da deficiência funciona em textos onde o corpo 
deficiente não é necessariamente uma tática narrativa para demonstrar o 
lado único de um personagem? De que maneira a materialidade da 
metáfora da deficiência é afetada pela dualidade discursiva dos 
quadrinhos? As análises realizadas nessa seção sugerem que metonímia 
parece ser um termo mais apropriado quando se olha para graphic 
memoirs e deficiência. Metáfora é apenas mais uma das maneiras em 
que deficiência é apresentada nessas graphic memoirs, mas não dá conta 
da maneira em que é também constitutiva do eu que as narra. 
Metonímia, por outro lado, trabalha através da repetição e não 
proporciona a relação direta entre significado e significante da metáfora. 
Deficiência como metonímia pode ser vista como um processo, ao invés 
da direta associação de significantes. O valor simbólico da deficiência 
precisa ser lido como parte de um sistema maior de construção de 
significados e sujeitos na autobiografia. Ao invés do fechamento da 
metáfora, eu proponho a contínua abertura da metonímia em relação à 
deficiência e narrativas autobiográficas. A segunda seção dessa tese é 
dedicada à análise da metáfora visual em Tangles: A Story about 
Alzheimer’s, my Mother, and Me (2012), de Sarah Leavitt, Epiléptico 
(2005), de David B., and Bitter Medicine: A Graphic Memoir about 
Mental Illness (2010), de Clem Martini e Olivier Martini. Metáfora 
visual é entendida aqui, em sua maior parte, através da definição de 
George Lakoff e Mark Johnson e sua teoria da metáfora conceitual como 
uma figura de linguagem que evoca sensações e produz efeitos no corpo. 
Onde a primeira seção lida com narrativas em que o narrador é o 
personagem com deficiência, nessa segunda seção eu foco mais em 
 14 
graphic memoirs que representam deficiência em outros. Minhas 
questões aqui são: como a representação de deficiência em outros 
complica a idéia de auto-representação e deficiência? Como metáfora 
visual é empregada para reforçar a estigmatização daqueles personagens 
e como é usada para subvertê-la? As análises de Tangles e Epiléptico 
sugerem que graphic memoirs que lidam com a representação de 
deficiência de outros que não seus narradores correm o risco de se 
apropriarem da estória dessa pessoa durante o processo. Metáfora visual, 
salvo algumas exceções, enfatiza o espetáculo da deficiência em outros. 
Bitter Medicine, por outro lado, serve como um exemplo de narrativa em 
que a representação da deficiência não pode ser caracterizada como 
tendo um olhar capacitista. Em Bitter Medicine, a narrativa oferece um 
novo insight sobre o potencial de graphic memoirs como um gênero 
onde se pode representar deficiência polisemicamente e não apenas 
como um recurso narrativo no processo de estabelecimento de sujeitos 
autobiográficos não deficientes.  
 
Palavras-chave: autobiografia; deficiência; quadrinhos; metáfora 
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THE FRAME(WORK) 
 
“[. . .] metaphor is never innocent” 
 (Jacques Derrida) 
  
“The concept of disease is never innocent”  
(Susan Sontag) 
  
 
 
In broad terms, this research focuses on the representation of 
disability and embodiment in the contemporary generation of graphic 
memoirs, starting in the mid 2000s till present day 2015. These I call 
“graphic body memoirs.” In the following pages I will first try to define 
the terms of “autobiography” and “graphic memoir,” and then I will 
situate how disability, in my view, figures in that context.  
 
1.1. Autobiography and its discontents 
 
The term “autobiography” was first used in the eighteenth 
century, in the preface to a collection of poems by Ann Yearsley, 
although, according to most critics, the anglicizing of the three Greek 
words was done as late as 1809, by Robert Southey (Smith and Watson 
Autobiography 2). Taken literarily, autos means “self,” bios means 
“life,” and graphe means “writing” in Greek, which amounts to “self life 
writing.” Incidentally, that definition can be somewhat misleading as, it 
turns out, “life writing” and “autobiography” are today two related but 
different things. Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson differentiate between 
them as such: life writing > life narrative > autobiography. For them, 
“life writing” is a broad term that refers to several forms of writing that 
focus on life as its subject; “life narrative,” on its turn, “is a somewhat 
narrower term that includes many kinds of self-referential writing, 
including autobiography” (Autobiography 3).  
Generally speaking, the starting point when discussing 
autobiography in any circle is the assumption that it is a narrative 
connected to veracity, or real life events, particularly the author’s own 
life events or the author’s own perspective to a series of real life events. 
That is in fact how some scholars choose to define the genre, such as G. 
Thomas Couser, who specifies the memoir primarily by what it is not, 
i.e. fiction (Memoir 15). Couser chooses to focus more specifically on 
the memoir, citing the latter as a modern day version of autobiography, 
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at least in the understanding of the editorial market: “we have not 
experienced an autobiography boom, but a memoir boom,” he claims 
(18). For him, both the memoir and the autobiography are forms of life 
narratives, their main difference lying in the cultural contexts in which 
they are employed. He argues that, nowadays, the memoir “has eclipsed 
‘autobiography’ as the term of choice for a certain kind of life narrative” 
and, in this sense, the two terms can be used interchangeably (3). On the 
other hand, he notes, sometimes “memoir” is also used on the other end 
of the autobiography/biography spectrum, indicating then that it is a 
work about someone else’s life, and not the author’s (18). This type of 
discrepancy advances the political debate around the terminology 
concerning life narratives. My goal in this section of the chapter is, 
therefore, to approach and delineate the setting of this debate, point out 
some of the implications of the terms and illustrate why some of the 
critics that I will make reference to throughout this dissertation use 
different terms to refer to the same works.  
Couser chooses to place the term “memoir” somewhere in the 
middle of a continuum with autobiography at one end and biography at 
the other, and concludes that most of the times it is the context that will 
clarify its use (18). According to him, in the simplest terms, “memoir is 
not fiction. Memoirs are not novels. As a nonfiction genre, memoir 
depicts the lives of real, not imagined, individuals” (Memoir 15). 
Although there is some consensus around that definition, such 
supposedly clear-cut lines can (and will) be questioned, both by authors 
themselves and by critics.  
The problem with this type of definition is that it commits not 
only to a delimited subject matter–the “real, not imagined, individual”—
but also to a certain way of narration and narrative techniques. For 
Couser, this limitation on both content and how it can be presented is 
precisely what makes the genre of the memoir stand out and, 
subsequently, make an impact in the world (16). Whereas such 
definition certainly works within the tradition of autobiography and its 
canon, it can be rather limiting when discussing works that challenge 
those traditions in the first place. Those works are particularly relevant 
to this study, but first it is important to clarify what exactly constitutes 
this tradition of autobiography being challenged by them.  
If “life narrative” is a somewhat more fluid term that stands for 
a series of “self-referential practices that engage the past in order to 
reflect on identity in the present,” “autobiography,” on the other hand, 
has been established since the Enlightenment as a specific form of life 
narrative, focused on one particular individual, the epitome of the 
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sovereign self (Smith and Watson Autobiography 3). As Leigh Gilmore 
argues, the writers that became the basis for the definition of 
autobiography comprise “a set of ‘exemplary’ literary, political, and 
military men; they have been seen (and this view persists) as singular 
figures capable of summing up an era in a name: Augustine, Rousseau, 
Franklin, Henry Adams” (11). Those writers embodied what early 
scholars of autobiography—such as Georg Misch, in his influential work 
for the field of autobiography studies, A History of Autobiography in 
Antiquity, published originally at the turn of the century—deemed a 
representativeness of their time, a rather crucial characteristic that 
defined autobiography as a genre (Smith and Watson 113, Misch 12). 
For Misch, these subjects of autobiography were not only known 
personalities in their time period, but they were also a part of the public 
sphere in a broader sense: they had themselves “played a part in the 
forming of the spirit of [their] time” (13). This definition of the subject 
of autobiography upgraded its status as a work of art and supported the 
claim that the genre was, in reality, a part of high culture. In contrast to 
the high culture status proposed by Misch to the autobiography, the 
memoir was relegated to a more common denominator: the latter was 
the product of “mere observers” of history, who could only watch 
passively in the sidelines as the action unfolded (15). The memoir, for 
Misch, is a genre of witnesses of events in history, whereas the 
autobiography is a genre made up of protagonists (15). Those “mere 
observers” would eventually step out of the margins and become 
protagonists themselves, through postcolonial, feminist, Marxist, 
psychoanalytic and poststructuralist lenses. This is yet another example 
of how the terms “autobiography” and “memoir” can be used in 
contradictory ways by different scholars at different times, such as seen 
in Misch’s and Couser’s definitions. Despite the fact that Misch himself 
states that the boundaries of autobiography are more fluid than those in 
other genres, such as poetry or drama, he is categorical when assigning 
authorship of autobiography exclusively to those that are “representative 
of their time period,” intellectuals and people of influence (12).  
In the context of autobiography studies at the turn of the 
twentieth century, marginalized writers who were not seen as prominent 
people in their time, but were nevertheless engaged in different forms of 
life narrative, did not have their work valued or understood as part of the 
autobiography tradition. How could they, after all? Since the status of 
the autobiographical subject was, evidently, not easily conceded (or at 
all) to writers who were not of the “proper” gender, class, race, and 
political ranking. The idea of being representative of a particular time is 
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invariably linked to normative and naturalized assumptions about that 
particular society. Consequently, life narratives of women, colonial 
subjects, sexually “deviant” individuals, or slaves, just to name a few 
examples, were seen as “lesser” kinds of writing. Of course the value 
granted upon the life narrative is directly subjected to the value granted 
upon the individual, which is “necessarily enmeshed with the politically 
charged and historically varying notion of what a person is” (Gilmore 
17). In dealing with the limits of autobiography, thus, one must assess in 
what ways value is given to the autobiographer and in what ways the 
discourses that both produce and reinforce identities work within the 
autobiographical text and within a given context.  
In recent years, a number of postmodern, postcolonial, and 
feminist critics have been challenging the history of the term 
“autobiography” and its celebration of the autonomous Enlightenment 
subject in favor of a broader understanding of life narrative (Smith and 
Watson 4, Gilmore 11). The field of autobiography studies has, since 
then, expanded to encompass not only works that deal with master 
narratives of sovereign individuals, but to how the technologies of self-
representation function in the construction of identity, authority, and 
truth. The notion of a sovereign subject, adopted by early critics within 
the field of autobiography studies, was challenged throughout the course 
of the twentieth century due to influences of theories such as Marxism 
and psychoanalysis, for instance, which questioned the autonomy and 
unity of the individual in society (Smith and Watson 124). On another 
front, the assumed uncomplicated relation between language and what it 
seeks to represent became increasingly problematized by linguists such 
as Saussure and the Russian Formalists, which led to the questioning of 
the supposed equivalence of truth and self-representation (124). These 
questionings collaborated to put pressure on the idea of the autonomous 
autobiographical individual and its connection to telling and 
representing of the truth of the self.  
Eventually, critics, in what Watson and Smith refer to as the 
second wave of autobiography studies, began to problematize the idea of 
truthfulness and, instead of a monolithic definition of autobiography, 
saw “life narrative [. . .] as process through which a narrator struggles to 
shape an ‘identity’ out of an amorphous experience of subjectivity” 
(125). Scholars such as Georges Gusdorf, who published “Conditions 
and Limits of Autobiography” in 1956, and Francis R. Hart, who wrote 
“Notes for an Anatomy of Modern Autobiography” in 1970, challenged 
the idea of autobiography as a historical writing of the past and turned 
their attention to the artistic and creative features inherent to life 
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narratives, thus allowing them to recast autobiography as a literary genre 
(128). But despite having revisited the conception of truth in 
autobiography, those critics still retained much of the ideas around the 
autonomous self and its representativeness that informed the previous 
generation (128). Additionally, as they favored works that best 
embodied the idea of autobiography as a literary genre, life narratives 
that did not fit into the proposed definition of “high” art were mostly 
sidelined (128). The consequence was again, as with the first generation 
of critics in the Autobiography Studies field, a marginalization of life 
narratives of disenfranchised writers such as ex-slaves, women, or 
colonial subjects.  
In response, a third wave of critics—influenced by the theories 
of poststructuralism, deconstruction, postcolonialism, feminism, queer, 
and cultural studies–sought new ways to explore the field of 
autobiography and encompass other modes of life narrative (137). 
Gilmore, for example, proposes the term “autobiographics” when 
dealing with the limits of autobiography within a feminist context. For 
her,  
a text’s autobiographics consists in the following 
elements in self-representational writing, or 
writing that emphasizes the autobiographical I: an 
emphasis on writing itself as constitutive of 
autobiographical identity, discursive 
contradictions in the representation of identity 
(rather than unity), the name as a potential site of 
experimentation rather than contractual sign of 
identity, and the effects of the gendered 
connection of word and body. (42)  
 
Gilmore’s proposed term is emblematic of the shift within 
autobiography studies, from an understanding of autobiographical 
writing as a representation of the self to a practice of discovery (and 
concomitant construction) of the self. The ontological status of the 
autobiographical I is, thus, called into question by this third wave of 
criticism, as the self is regarded as an effect of autobiographical 
discourse, instead of a starting point (Smith “Performativity” 109). In a 
reframing of Judith Butler’s theories on the performativity of gender, 
Sidonie Smith, for instance, argues that the “autobiographical speaker 
becomes a performative subject” (108). If reiteration is key to the 
construction of the subject, the autobiographical discourse works as a 
reiteration of a reiteration, which effectively subdues and/or confirms 
identities through performativity.  
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Those are just two examples of the type of criticism involved in 
contemporary Autobiography Studies. Overall, this generation is 
engaged primarily with issues around performativity, positionality, and 
heteroglossic dialogism in the rhetoric of life narratives (Smith and 
Watson 143). Smith and Watson sum up the theoretical approaches of 
the critical writing that makes up the third wave of autobiography 
studies in the following manner:  
 
Theorizing performativity contests the notion of 
autobiography as the site of authentic identity. 
Theorizing positionality, with an emphasis on 
situatedness, contests the normative notion of a 
universal and transcendent autobiographical 
subject, autonomous and free. And theorizing 
dialogism contests the notion that self-narration is 
a monologic utterance of a solitary, introspective 
subject. All of these concepts enable more flexible 
reading practices and more inclusive approaches 
to the field of life narrative. (146) 
 
Of course this is a rather broad summary of a vast range of studies, some 
of which will definitely figure into more detail throughout this 
dissertation, but the goal at this point in the text was merely to pave the 
way for these further explorations. Suffice to say now that this small 
detour into the history of Autobiography Studies was necessary in order 
to situate this study within an understanding of life narrative that views 
the autobiographical subject as a being constructed through the practice 
of self writing. At the same time, as we enter further into the field of the 
graphic memoir, it will become clear that the initial conception of the 
representativeness necessary to define the autobiographical writing, as 
seen by the first and second waves of Autobiography Studies critics, 
does not apply to the writers responsible for the majority of life 
narratives in comics.  
 
 
 
1.2. Life narrative gets graphic 
 
We turn now to the graphic memoir, another genre that is as 
diverse as the myriad of terms used to define it. In basic terms, the 
graphic memoir could be seen as the comics version of the memoir. The 
specificities of the genre, such as the duality of visual and written 
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language of comics, undoubtedly allow for its own reading of the 
construction of the autobiographical I. First, however, it is important to 
understand a little of the history of graphic memoir and its rise in 
popularity, both among the general public as well as among critics in 
academia.  
The precursors of graphic memoir most commonly cited belong 
to the generation of underground comics artists of the 1960s and 1970s 
in the United States, most notably Justin Green (Binky Brown Meets the 
Holy Virgin Mary, 1972), Robert Crumb (Zap Comix, 1968-1978), 
Harvey Pekar (American Splendor, 1976-2008), and Aline Kominsky-
Crumb (Wimmen’s Comix, 1972-1974; Twisted Sisters, 1976, 1994, 
1995) (Beaty 230, Chute 20).1 The early underground comics were part 
of the counterculture of San Francisco. They were mostly “self-
published or published by loose collectives, and [were] distributed 
through nontraditional channels for an exclusively adult audience” 
(Chute 14). They were crude, deeply personal, and, more often than not, 
sexually explicit. In sum, they were everything that the mainstream 
comics of the time, and their compliance to the Comics Code Authority,2 
were not.  
The underground comics of those times inspired a future 
generation of comics artists that delved further and further into 
autobiographical narratives. That generation included Art Spiegelman, 
author of the celebrated Maus: A Survivor’s Tale (1980-1991), a 
landmark work that would set the tone for much of the graphic memoirs 
that followed it. Maus, a two-volume book that is usually regarded as 
part biography and part autobiography, tells both the story of Art’s 
father as a survivor of the Holocaust and of Art’s process of retrieving 
this part of his family’s history while creating a graphic memoir about it. 
One cannot overstate the importance of Maus for the genre of graphic 
memoir: it was the first comics work to win a Pulitzer Prize (1992) and 
to receive critical acclaim outside the context of the comics industry.  
In Europe, cartoonists were also influenced by the underground 
comics movement of the 1960s in California (Beaty 230). Their interest 
                                               
1 In that select list of often cited “forefathers” of the graphic memoir, Hillary Chute, in Graphic 
Women (2010), points out the frequent absence of women, despite the fact that a lot of women 
artists were involved in the underground comics scene at the time. A number of titles came out 
during the 1970s, accompanying the second wave of feminism (It Ain’t Me Babe: Women’s 
Liberation; Wimmen’s Comix; Tits’n’Clits;Twisted Sisters), as women cartoonists strived to 
create their own space within the underground comics scene of the time. 
2 A set of regulations self-imposed by big comics publishers during the 1950s that worked 
similarly to Hollywood’s Production Code. Among other things, the Code forbade the 
depiction of sex, nudity, graphic violence, and homosexuality. 
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in life narratives can be seen by the number of autobiographical works 
published by the collective publishing house L’Association, for example, 
which includes Marjane Satrapi’s Persepolis (2001-2003) and David 
B.’s L’Ascension du Haut Mal (1996-2003, published in English under 
the title Epileptic and a part of the corpus chosen for this dissertation). 
Bart Beaty suggests that the influence of the 1960s underground comics 
and their ventures into autobiographical storytelling provided the 
European artists with the means to legitimate their work within a larger 
context. Beaty claims that “the insertion of the self into the aesthetic and 
business practices of the underground movement suggested new 
possibilities for the promotion of the field of comics as an art 
movement” (230). In Europe, while the debate in literature was focusing 
on the death of the author, a debate sparked by poststructuralists Michel 
Foucault and Roland Barthes, what was happening in the comics context 
was in fact the opposite: the birth of the author, the comics author (230). 
It was precisely the use of autobiographical writing that helped 
legitimate both comics as a serious medium and their creators as 
established and respected authors (230). Despite the fact that Beaty 
centers his argument on Europe and uses mostly French examples to 
support it, it is fair to say that a similar, though most likely less 
organized, process of legitimation of comics through self writing also 
occurred in other countries, such as in the Unites States with the 
publication of Maus.  
I have just used the term “self writing,” but in reality what 
happens in comics goes beyond the level of written language. A defining 
feature of comics is the dual discourse of the narrative, one that takes 
place through the conversion and tension of images and words. Scott 
McCloud, in his influential Understanding Comics (1993), defines 
comics as a “dance of the seen and the unseen. The visible and the 
invisible” (92). In this dance, McCloud claims, both the creator and the 
reader must actively participate (92). Although groundbreaking in a lot 
of ways—the entire work is composed in the comics format, for 
example—one cannot help but critique his claim of an exceptionalism of 
comics in terms of reader participation. Regardless of that, McCloud’s 
work was instrumental in viewing comics as more than a “mere hybrid 
between graphic arts and prose fiction. What happens between these 
panels is a kind of magic that only comics can create” (92). It is 
interesting to see how, in a possible Freudian slip, he conflates “prose” 
with “fiction” as though the two were intrinsically tied. It is perhaps 
revealing of how in the early 1990s, when Understanding Comics was 
written, little attention was being given to non-fiction comics works. It 
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was only in the following decade that the number of graphic memoirs 
published would soar and a number of academics would focus on the 
peculiar characteristics of comics in terms of memory and storytelling.  
I choose to use the term “graphic memoir” to describe those and 
other works throughout this dissertation, even though there is a heated 
debate around terminology in this context as well. A lot of the times, 
book length works in comics are referred to simply as “graphic novels,” 
regardless of whether they are fictive or non-fictive, biographical or 
autobiographical. Thomas Couser, for example, is appalled at the fact 
that, apparently, graphic novel “has come to be the accepted term for 
any narrative, fictional or not, that is drawn in the manner of comic 
book” (Memoir 16). He points out that even a volume of essays by the 
Modern Language Association has adopted “this misleading usage” of 
the term (16). The confusion is understandable though, once one looks 
into how the term came to be popularized.  
Will Eisner’s A Contract with God (1978) was the first comics 
work to be labeled a “graphic novel,” and its wide commercial success 
may be a reason why the term would later be used to refer to any book 
length graphic work as well. Similarly to the movement of 
Autobiography Studies scholars to lend legitimacy to the term 
“autobiography” at the turn of the century, the term “graphic novel” 
began to be employed by marketers and publishing companies to 
validate comics as a medium. The subsequent rise in popularity of 
comics marketed as “graphic novels” in the mid 1980s has led to some 
interesting scenarios. Under the category of “graphic novels,” you may 
find titles as diverse as Alan Moore’s Watchmen (a take on the 
superhero story that is revealing of cold war tensions), or one of Frank 
Miller’s Sin City volumes (a gritty crime noir series), right alongside 
Alison Bechdel’s Fun Home: A Family Tragicomic (a graphic memoir 
about Alison’s relationship with her father, his alleged suicide, and their 
sexualities). The bundling of all sorts of “more serious” comics works 
under the “graphic novel” umbrella is favored by publishing companies, 
but, at the same time, it has generated criticism among some of the 
writers. Alan Moore, for example, is a harsh critic of the term:  
 
It’s a marketing term. I mean, it was one that I 
never had any sympathy with. The term “comic” 
does just as well for me. The term “graphic novel” 
was something that was thought up in the ‘80s by 
marketing people [. . .] The problem is that 
“graphic novel” just came to mean “expensive 
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comic book” and so what you'd get is people like 
DC Comics or Marvel comics - because “graphic 
novels” were getting some attention, they’d stick 
six issues of whatever worthless piece of crap they 
happened to be publishing lately under a glossy 
cover and call it The She-Hulk Graphic Novel, you 
know? (Kavanagh) 
 
But if the term “comic” did just as well for Moore, the adoption of 
“graphic novel” to differentiate between serialized and book length 
comics is something very much to be desired by others. In 2003, Art 
Spiegelman, the author of Maus, and Chris Oliveros, publisher of Drawn 
and Quarterly, managed to get the BISAC (Book Industry Standards 
Advisory Committee), a committee that decides on subject headings for 
the book industry3, to officially adopt the “graphic novel” category, with 
various subsections (graphic novel/literature, graphic novel/humor, 
graphic novel/science fiction, etc) (McGrath). It was a victory for them 
in terms of recognition, but it only increased the confusion of readers 
and critics in the case of autobiographical comics. As a result, the term 
“graphic novel” continues to be used, even when its inaccuracy is almost 
oxymoronic, such as when works are described as “non fictional graphic 
novel” or “autobiographical graphic novel.”  
Some authors choose to simply acknowledge the shortcomings 
of the term, while continuing its use. In the cover story for the New York 
Times Magazine dedicated to the “graphic novel,” Charles McGrath 
conceded that “the term ‘graphic novel’ is actually a misnomer,” since a 
lot of most famous works, such as Satrapi’s Persepolis and 
Spiegelman’s Maus, are nonfiction. McGrath concludes the issue in the 
following manner: “but for want of a universally agreed-on alternative, 
the graphic-novel tag has stuck,” citing the resolution of the book 
industry committee as an “official sanction”.  
Hillary Chute, on the other hand, chooses to call the comics 
works she studies in Graphic Women (2010) “graphic narratives,” as she 
deems the term “graphic novel” to be somewhat “less-inclusive” (2). 
Initially, she defines “graphic narrative” in the same terms as the 
“graphic novel”: “a book-length work composed in the medium of 
comics” (3). Chute’s reservation with “graphic novel,” however, is not 
its widespread use. Her problem is that the works she focuses on, 
 
                                               
3 It is nowadays known as the BISG’s (Book Industry Study Group) Subject Codes Committee. 
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the most riveting comics texts coming out right 
now—from men and women alike—are not novels 
at all. Instead, even as they deliberately place 
stress on official histories and traditional modes of 
transmitting history, they are deeply invested in 
their own accuracy and historicity. They are texts 
that either claim nonfiction status or choose, as 
Lynda Barry’s invented term 
‘autobifictionalography’ well indicates, to reject 
the categories of nonfiction and fiction altogether 
in their self-representational storylines. (3) 
 
Although I do agree with Chute’s problematization of the term “graphic 
novel,” I am not particularly partial to her choice of “graphic narratives” 
as a replacement. While the latter does work better than the former in 
referring to works dealing with trauma and testimony, it, nevertheless, 
still suggests a rather broad and somewhat vague range of texts and my 
focus on this dissertation is specifically with works that do claim a 
nonfictional status.  
Gillian Whitlock chooses to coin a new term for the number of 
autobiographical narratives written in the medium of comics. She calls 
them “autographics,” an expansion of Leigh Gilmore’s 
“autobiographics” cited previously in this chapter. Whitlock defines her 
choice of term as such:  
 
By coining the term ‘autographics’ for graphic 
memoir I mean to draw attention to the specific 
conjunctions of visual and verbal text in this genre 
of autobiography, and also to the subject positions 
that narrators negotiate in and through comics—
features of discursive frameworks that Leigh 
Gilmore discusses in terms of ‘autobiographics’. 
(966) 
 
In Autobiographics, Gilmore analyzes the discourses that produce truth 
and identity in autobiographical writing and the representations of 
selfhood in works that push some of the boundaries of the traditional 
autobiography. Whitlock’s view is that Gilmore’s considerations are 
specifically relevant in the context of autobiographical comics, and the 
particularities of the medium justify the need for a terminology of their 
own. I do not disagree with her.  
Despite the fact that those other terms, and their justifications, 
are perfectly valid, throughout this dissertation I will simply use 
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“graphic memoir” to describe autobiographical works in the comics 
medium. My choice is grounded on a couple of reasons: first, it is the 
choice term for a number of authors and a frequent subtitle to their 
works (Marbles: Mania, Depression, Michelangelo and Me: a Graphic 
Memoir; Calling Dr. Laura: A Graphic Memoir; Need More Love: A 
Graphic Memoir). Second, I feel the term “graphic memoir” simply and 
aptly describes both the genre, “memoir,” and the medium “graphic,” 
i.e. comics, and, therefore, fulfills its epistemological duty. Not only 
does it favor the term “memoir” over “autobiography,” a choice that 
underlies a less canonical approach within Autobiography Studies, but it 
also emphasizes the peculiarities of the narrative in comics form.  
 
 
1.3. Disability and the deviant body 
 
As with the other concepts in this research, the term “disability” 
requires some defining. As a starting point, Lennard Davis claims that 
“to understand the disabled body, one must return to the concept of the 
norm, the normal body” (3). Actually, as Davis’s text shows, one must 
return even further, one must look into the concept that preceded the 
“normal,” i.e. the “ideal”: an unobtainable characteristic or body that 
goes back as early as Greek mythology (4). In this context, the ideal 
would belong exclusively to the gods and mythological figures, while 
the rest of the population would always be less than that ideal. And this 
was fine, because the ideal was never meant to be achievable anyway. 
The common people belonged much more to the sphere of the 
grotesque, with its transgressively democratic attributes (4).  
In comes the notion of “normal” in the nineteenth century. And, 
soon afterwards, the “normal” becomes “normative”. The concepts of 
“norm” and “average” spurred with the development of the science of 
statistics and its impact in terms of population control (4). As Michel 
Foucault recalls, it was the cataloguing of citizens and their illnesses, 
births, deaths, height, weight, etc, that provided a way for governments 
to manage their populations (Sexuality 118). Indeed, it provided them 
with the larger concept of a “population,” something that was more than 
just the sum of its citizens and represented the future of the nation 
(Davis 6). This “normalization,” as Foucault calls it, was not about 
making people “normal,” it was about assessing individuals against a set 
of “norms,” transforming it in “one of the great instruments of power at 
the end of the classical age” (Discipline 184). This technology of power, 
or biopower, was intrinsically related to the medical institution and its 
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view of the body. The instrument of examination and its “normalizing 
gaze” helped classify, hierarchize, and rank bodies according to their 
degrees of normalcy (184). So, if through the course of the nineteenth 
century bodies began to be classified according to their degrees of 
normalcy, what of the ones that fell outside the curve?  
In comes the so-called deviant body. In a society where the 
concept that regulates the body is that of the “norm,” those that do not fit 
in are considered a problem. A problem that has to be resolved, for the 
“good of the nation.” It is interesting to note that the spread of the 
normalization of the body went hand in hand with the rise in popularity 
of eugenics as well. Davis calls the relation between eugenics and 
statistical science “symbiotic,” for “both bring into society the concept 
of a norm, particularly a normal body, and thus in effect create the 
concept of the disabled body” (6). People with disabilities were, then, in 
the way of the betterment of the nation, in the eugenicists’ point of view 
(9).  
The “problem” in terms of a national fitness, for the eugenicists, 
was not restricted to people with disabilities, however. The eugenicists 
project in the nineteenth century, Davis points out, tended to group 
together all sorts of “undesirable” traits besides the deviant body that 
included pauperism (low income was related to feeblemindedness and 
inefficiency), certain ethnic groups (specifically the ones typically 
associated with pauperism), criminal activities, sexual license, and so on 
(9). One of Davis’s points is that, because of the eugenics discourse, for 
a long time people with disabilities were associated with those other 
categories, particularly with depravity (9). The idea of a “defective 
class” that hindered the progress of the body politic was comprised 
primarily of disability and depravity (9). Davis maintains that, since 
then, disabled people have been trying to separate themselves from the 
legacy of that association.  
As the deviant body was categorized in relation to the “norm,” a 
number of terms were used to describe it: “crippled,” “handicapped,” 
“disabled” (Linton 161). As the debate around disability rights emerged 
in the 1990s, the latter term has gained support in relation to the others. 
Simi Linton points out that despite the medical origins of the term 
“disability,” it is used today as a “marker of identity” (162). The process 
of appropriation of the medical term helped reclaim a status of 
community for people with disabilities, Linton explains (162). The 
coalition of people that subscribe to this identity is incredibly diverse. It 
is comprised of individuals with “significant impairment, people with 
behavioral or anatomical characteristics marked as deviant, and people 
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who have or are suspected of having conditions, such as AIDS or 
emotional illness, that make them targets of discrimination” (162). There 
is no easy answer to the question of who falls into the status of disabled. 
In a lot of the times it is through the performative process of self-naming 
that a subject can claim their status as a disabled person and reclaim the 
status of disability as a marker of identity. Of course, this recasting of 
disability can only occur due to the historical circumstances that made 
that term a site of contestation in the first place.  
One of the contexts that made such recasting of the category of 
disability possible was the advent of the social model of disability, 
which began in the 1970s in the United Kingdom through the work of 
the activists in the Union of Physically Impaired Against Segregation 
(UPIAS) (Shakespeare “Social Model” 197). In their view, “it is society 
which disables physically impaired people. Disability is something 
imposed on top of our impairments, by the way we are unnecessarily 
isolated and excluded from full participation in society” (qtd in 
Shakespeare Disability Rights and Wrongs 12). Their focus on the 
socially constructed aspects of disability was a departure from the 
previous medical model that relied primarily on the medicalization of 
disabled people and on the individual aspects of disability (“Social 
Model” 197). This British social model became later known, through the 
works of authors such as Michael Oliver in the 1990s, as the “strong 
social model,” for it proposed a stark distinction between disability and 
impairment—disability being a result of social exclusion and 
oppression, part of the public sphere, and impairment being a biological 
disadvantage, part of the private sphere—and the prioritizing of social 
transformation, such as the removal of barriers, over rehabilitation 
strategies (Rights 12). Critics of this model, such as Tobin Siebers, claim 
that social constructionism does not account “for the difficult physical 
realities faced by people with disabilities” (Siebers “Disability in 
Theory” 175). Tom Shakespeare also argues that by reinforcing the 
binary of disability/impairment, the strong social model artificially 
divides the social and biological aspects of the experience of disability, 
relegating impairment, in turn, to an essentialist biology (Rights 23).  
Another, more moderate, version of the social model is what 
Shakespeare terms Cultural Disability Studies (47). This model follows 
some tenets of the social model, such as the emphasis on the social 
oppression of people with disabilities, focusing, however, on the cultural 
representations of those people and the ways in which that 
representation cements inequality (47). Critics belonging to this model 
investigate the discursive construction of disability in areas such as 
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cinema and literature and argue that the symbols and connotations they 
convey are central to the experience of people with disabilities across 
different cultures (50).   
If the strong social model reinforces dichotomies and relegates 
physical impairment to the periphery, according to Shakespeare, 
Cultural Disabilities Studies scholars rely too often on the discursive 
features of disability while neglecting to pay attention to its material 
impact on people’s lives (52). In response to the shortcomings of these 
models, Tom Shakespeare suggests an approach based on the social 
mediation of disability. Shakespeare defines what he calls Critical 
Realist Perspective as a way of thinking that  
 
accept[s] an external reality: rather than resorting 
to relativism or extreme constructionism, critical 
realism attends to the independent existence of 
bodies which sometimes hurt, regardless of what 
we may think or say about those bodies. (73) 
 
Similarly, Tobin Siebers calls for an approach that takes into account the 
bodies that hurt, that feel a real pain which cannot be reduced to social 
oppression or discursive constructions (Disability Theory 61). Pain, for 
Siebers, is at the crux of the challenges for Disability Studies today, not 
because it is synonymous with disability, but because of the “few 
images of pain acceptable to current body theory, [. . .] none of them is 
realistic from the standpoint of people who suffer pain daily” (61). 
Siebers’ realism of the body understands it as an entity capable of 
influencing and changing social perspectives and discourse in a 
reciprocal manner (68).  
 The reader will notice that a lot of the authors brought forth in 
the theoretical discussions that will follow in the upcoming chapters 
(such as Sharon Snyder and David Mitchell, Robert McRuer, Fiona 
Kumari Campbell, Rosemarie Garland Thomson, and Lennard Davis) 
are situated within the Cultural Disabilities Studies spectrum. According 
to Shakespeare, the most important contribution of that school of 
thinking is the notion that the way a given society perceives disability is 
heavily informed by “cultural imagery” and, as such, representation 
should be a major concern (49). That is also, ironically, its most striking 
shortcoming, for, in his view, these authors are “more likely to write 
about representations than they are about material conditions” of people 
with disabilities (52). Shakespeare concedes that the lack of empirical 
research among Cultural Disability Studies authors is primarily due to 
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the fact that they are, for the most part, in the humanities and not in the 
social sciences, a factor for which they cannot be considered at fault 
(53).  
 As a humanities scholar myself, I cannot help but abide by his 
criticism and acknowledge that this research is also mostly interested in 
matters of discourse in relation to disability. This dissertation is, after 
all, concerned with representation. I do wish to point out, however, that I 
have tried to keep the material implications of disability mentioned by 
Shakespeare and Siebers in sight throughout this research, particularly 
through the choice of investigating graphic memoirs that focus precisely 
on those material implications. However, I do take some solace in 
Shakespeare’s advice to scholars such as myself, when he suggests 
“academics who want to make comments about the impact of 
impairment [. . .] might do well to base their analysis on empirical 
evidence about how disabled people feel about their embodiment” (67). 
Within the realm of literature, autobiographical writing seems optimal if 
one seeks to investigate how people with disabilities feel about their 
embodiments from their own perspectives. The visual component of 
graphic memoirs adds to that scenario, as people with disabilities are in 
charge of representation about their own embodiments in visual as well 
as in written terms.  
Thomas Couser, in Signifying Bodies: Disability in 
Contemporary Life Writing (2009), describes the recurrence of the 
subject of disability in autobiographies published in the last quarter of a 
century or so. He calls this boom in autobiographies focused on 
disability the “some body memoir” (3). Couser is actually expanding 
Lorraine Adams’ definitions of the “somebody memoir” and the 
“noboby memoir,” which distinguish autobiographies written by authors 
that are previously known to their audience, such as celebrities and 
public figures, and the ones written by unknown authors, respectively 
(1). Couser’s argument is that the latter, the “nobody memoir,” is a lot of 
times not just the memoir of a heretofore anonymous somebody, but 
more specifically the “memoir of some body,” a work that primarily 
focuses on the narration of the experience of living with a certain kind of 
embodiment (2, original emphasis). Couser, in sum, claims that “the 
nobody memoir is often about what it’s like to have or to be, to live or 
as, a particular body—indeed, a body that is usually odd or anomalous” 
(2, original emphasis).   
Couser argues that the disability autobiography “may be 
regarded as postcolonial–indeed, an anticolonial–phenomenon,” 
borrowing Mary Louise Pratt’s concept of “autoethnography,” in that it 
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appropriates and subverts the colonizer’s terms to create a representation 
of oneself as a colonial subject (7). For Couser, disabled populations, 
like colonized ones, are forced to live under arbitrary rules of others that 
claim authority over them, and, like “other colonized subjects, disabled 
people are beginning to produce texts [. . .] that explore the creation of 
identity within particular subcultures and texts that contest the way the 
author’s community is characterized from the outside” (95). In disability 
memoirs this is seen most notably in the engagement of medical 
discourse throughout the narrative. Susanna Kaysen’s Girl, Interrupted 
(1993) is one of the examples cited by Couser (8). In Kaysen’s account, 
the narrative is composed of a non-linear juxtaposition of her 
experiences in a mental institution, along with those of her fellow 
patients, and meditations about the terminology of her diagnosis of 
borderline personality disorder. By using the very Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders [DSM] to question the terms of 
her diagnosis, she confronts the validity of the psychiatric discourse that 
effectively creates her status as a disabled person.  
Although not cited by Couser, another example that comes to 
mind is Daphne Scholinski’s The Last Time I Wore a Dress (1997), also 
a memoir that narrates the experience of being an inmate at a mental 
institution. Scholinski, not unlike Kaysen, confronts a medical discourse 
that pathologizes her gender expression as an “inappropriate female” 
through the use of hospital records and reports of her interviews in the 
midst and in contrast to the narrative. The same medical tools that are 
used to literally exclude and stigmatize the subjects in these narratives 
end up being challenged through the way they are woven into the text. 
This is the case when Scholinski describes being raped by another 
patient right after receiving a favorable psychiatric report from her 
doctor stating that  
 
overall she has shown a definite and positive 
attachment both to her therapist and to the overall 
treatment program here. [. . .] She also has had 
some concerns with her femininity and has formed 
appropriate male peer relationships although she is 
not sexually active. (161)  
 
The irony of the enthusiasm of Daphne’s doctors in her newfound (and 
obviously faked to their benefit) interest in the opposite sex and the 
subsequent sexual violence enacted by that same opposite sex is hard to 
miss. Scholinski’s memoir is a good example of the ways in which the 
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construction of a deviant body is also associated with a deviant 
sexuality. At this point, one cannot help but recall the problematics of 
Davis’ suggestion that disabled people are still to this day trying to 
distance themselves from being associated with depravity and sexual 
license. Scholinski’s account, as well as Davis’ suggestion, is 
emblematic of the need for an intersectional approach in studies, where 
issues of disability, gender, sexuality, class, and race are inextricably 
woven together.  
 
 
1.4. The “graphic body memoir” 
 
Taking Couser’s concept into consideration, it can be said then 
that the same phenomenon described by him, the “some body memoir” 
boom, is seen in the graphic memoir genre, where a number of works 
showcase the experience of living with a certain kind of body. What I 
propose is that in the realm of autobiographies in the comics form, the 
graphic memoirs, the phenomenon Couser refers to could be termed the 
“graphic body memoir”—a concept that could be applied to all the 
works analyzed in this dissertation.  
The idiosyncrasies of the comics medium justify, in my view, 
the need for a more specific theoretical framework in terms of graphic 
memoirs and disability, one that addresses how disability is figured not 
only in its written narrative, but also within the textual/visual tension 
characteristic of comics. Another question specific to the cross-
discursive medium of comics would be in terms of how the visible/non-
visible interaction within frames and sequences of frames causes an 
impact in the characterization of different types of embodiments. How, 
one should ask, are these bodies, which have been historically either 
hidden from sight or shown as grotesquely exaggerated for narrative 
purposes, given form through the authors’ own artwork? What kind of 
agency is entailed in this type of control over the representation of one’s 
own disability? As Couser warns, “visual representation of visible 
disability offers new opportunities but also presents new risks and 
potential pitfalls, because the visual images may overpower verbal cues” 
(49). Comics may offer even more diverse ways of representation for 
disability. At the same time, this cross-discursive medium can add a 
whole new array of dangers in terms of discursive traps. Do these 
graphic memoirs subvert the usual stigmatizing rhetoric of disability or 
do they just reinforce it? These are some of the questions to be asked in 
this investigation of “graphic body memoirs”. My hypothesis is that in 
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these “graphic body memoirs” the visual element of the narrative brings 
forth a literal visibility to disability. Not only do they literally make their 
disability visible, but through their drawing they also take control of the 
aesthetics of that disability. How each of the narratives explores that 
visibility is one of the main concerns of this research.  
This dissertation is divided into two larger sections: the first 
section is dedicated to the investigation of the graphic memoirs Calling 
Dr. Laura: A Graphic Memoir (2013), by Nicole Georges, and Fun 
Home: A Family Tragicomic (2006), by Alison Bechdel, and what 
Sharon Snyder and David Mitchell define as “narrative prosthesis.” In 
their definition of the term, disability works in literary discourse as a 
narratological device that “lends a distinctive idiosyncrasy to any 
character that differentiates the character from the anonymous 
background of the ‘norm’” (47). Disability functions, then, as a 
metaphor for a given character’s unconventionalities in literary works. 
The questions I am asking in this section are: how does this concept 
work within the non-fictional context of life narratives and, more 
specifically, of graphic memoirs? How is it that this “metaphorical use 
of disability [that brings forth] the materiality of metaphor” functions in 
texts where the disabled body is not necessarily a narrative ploy to 
convey the uniqueness of a character (48)? In which way is the 
materiality of the disability metaphor affected by the dual visual and 
textual discourses of the comics medium? Both Fun Home, through the 
protagonist’s experience with an obsessive-compulsive disorder, and 
Calling Dr. Laura, through the protagonist’s account of dealing with 
encopresis, portray, in my view, disability as emblematic of other 
aspects of the narrative.  
Nicole Georges’ graphic memoir is about her search for the 
biological father she thought dead, the complicated relationships she has 
with her mother and girlfriend, and her difficult childhood, which is 
permeated by her experience with encopresis—a difficulty in controlling 
bowel movements that affects children with emotional problems. The 
critical literature concerned with Calling Dr. Laura is sparse, despite its 
wide success and awards such as the 2014 Lambda Literary Award. The 
focus of most reviews is her story with her long lost father and her 
identification as a lesbian, rather than the experience of disability, which 
is rarely, if ever, mentioned. Francisca Goldsmith’s review, for example, 
even compares Georges’ graphic memoir with Alison Bechdel’s Are You 
My Mother?, commenting on the similarities of both lesbian narrators 
and their complicated relationships with their mothers, but, again, failing 
to even mention the character’s experience with disability as a child 
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(36). Other reviews, while acknowledging encopresis as part of her 
account, do so only in passing: “[a]s a child, Georges suffers from a 
stomach malady that complicates her thorny relationships with her 
mother and her stepfather” (Gimenez Smith). This research, on the other 
hand, will focus specifically on the graphic memoir’s depiction of 
encopresis and its many discursive implications throughout the 
narrative.  
Fun Home is about Alison’s relationship with her closeted 
father, her own coming out process, and the struggles of growing up in a 
turbulent environment. Filled with metanarrative references, the 
character’s obsessive-compulsive disorder is presented as a response to 
that turbulent environment and as the initial spark in her 
autobiographical impulse. A recent recipient of the McArthur “genius” 
grant, Alison Bechdel has also received a number of awards for Fun 
Home: the GLAAD Media Award (Outstanding Comic Book), 
Stonewall Book Award (non-fiction), Lambda Literary Award (Lesbian 
Memoir and Biography), and the Eisner Award (Best Reality-Based 
Work), among others. Hillary Chute, in Graphic Women (2010), for 
example, dedicates an entire chapter to the analysis of Fun Home. She 
argues that Bechdel’s ouvre can be seen as feminist in the sense that it 
“claims a space for openly sexual female bodies,” mostly in the ways in 
which it focuses on subject constitution (177). Despite not discussing 
disability specifically, Chute places embodiment, through both theme 
and form, at the heart of the narrative in Fun Home (200). Ann 
Cvetkovich, on the other hand, refers specifically to Alison’s OCD as 
part of the process of archiving feelings, mostly through journal 
keeping: “Bechdel’s childhood diaries are an especially poignant 
document in her archive because they also show early signs of her 
‘obsessive compulsive’ impulse to document or witness and its relation 
to creative autobiography” (120). These two examples, Chute and 
Cvetkovich, illustrate how critical attention has been more focused on 
the queer aspects of Bechdel’s text rather than its portrayal of disability.  
The second section of this dissertation is dedicated to the 
analysis of visual metaphor in Tangles: A Story about Alzheimer’s, my 
Mother, and Me (2012), by Sarah Leavitt, Epileptic (2005), by David B., 
and Bitter Medicine: A Graphic Memoir about Mental Illness (2010), by 
Clem Martini and Olivier Martini. Visual metaphor is understood here 
mostly through George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s theory of conceptual 
metaphor, as a figure speech that evokes sensory effects on the body 
(235). Whereas the first section deals with narratives where the narrator 
is the character with a disability, in this second section I focus more on 
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graphic memoirs that represent disability in others. My questions here 
are: how does the portrayal of disability in others complicate the idea of 
self-representation and disability? How does visual metaphor impact the 
experience of representing others with disability? In what ways is visual 
metaphor employed to reinforce the stigmatization of those characters 
and in what ways it is used to subvert it? 
 Leavitt’s graphic memoir tells the story of her mother’s and her 
family’s relation with Alzheimer’s. Set mostly in Canada, it develops 
over a period of six years, from her mother’s diagnosis, in 1996, to her 
death. The critical history of Tangles is meager, despite the fact that, up 
until now, it has been the only full-length graphic memoir published on 
the subject of Alzheimer’s (Cornog 66). Similarly to Calling Dr. Laura, 
the parallels between Alison Bechdel’s work and Tangles in relation to 
the depiction of parental relationships and loss are abundant in the 
criticism of the latter. David Ulin remarks, for example, that  
 
whereas Bechdel is interior, obsessive, always 
turning her story back on itself, Leavitt is more off 
the cuff, using a series of short, almost standalone 
fragments to frame a collage-like portrait of the 
effects of early-onset Alzheimer’s. (Ulin) 
 
Despite pointing the similarities between both authors, critics do not 
perceive disability as a common element in the narratives of Bechdel, 
Georges, and Leavitt. When critics do discuss the issue of disability in 
Tangles, more specifically, they frequently resort to the use of 
euphemistic metaphors (“Once the uninvited guest of illness trespasses 
and enters a household [. . .]”) and Manichaeism (“No diagnosis is as 
evil as Alzheimer’s”), for example, to describe Alzheimer’s (Eisenstein, 
Thompson).  
 David B.’s graphic memoir, Epileptic, is about his experience 
as well as his brother’s with the latter’s epilepsy. Set in France in the 
late 1960s, it covers David and Jean Christophe’s childhood, a period in 
which they had a strong relationship, until their early twenties when they 
had drifted apart. Widely acclaimed by critics and public, the graphic 
memoir has received the 2000 Angoulême International Comics Festival 
Prize for Scenario and the 2005 Ignatz Award for Outstanding Artist. A 
lot has been written about Epileptic, particularly in respect to its use of 
surrealism and visual metaphors. Stephen E. Tabachnick, for example, 
states “there is no other autobiography quite like Epileptic because of 
Beauchard’s ability to meld realism and dream,” whereas Andrew 
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Arnold claims the author “visualizes the invisible” (105, Arnold)4. In the 
graphic memoir, Jean Christophe’s seizures are the invisible, or, as 
Bruce Dadey claims, they are “a text the family cannot read; his seizures 
are visible signs without any determinable significance” (18). This 
dissertation focuses, therefore, on what kind of significance is attributed 
to Jean Christophe’s disability once it is represented through visual 
metaphor.  
 Bitter Medicine is also about two brothers and their relation 
with disability. It is, however, differently from Epileptic, written in 
conjunction: Clem authors the written sections whereas Olivier is 
responsible for the visual ones. Winner of the 2011 Calgary Book 
Award, the joint graphic memoir is about both their experiences with 
schizophrenia: first, as they deal with their youngest brother Ben’s 
diagnosis and subsequent suicide, and second, as they cope with 
Olivier’s own diagnosis of schizophrenia. Set in Canada, in the late 
1990s, the graphic memoir also cover the difficulties of accessing 
mental health care in a failing system. As Sara Ritchie points out, 
“[w]hat resonates in this book is the frustration that the Martini’s feel at 
the hands of [the Canadian] health system and the bond that his family 
forges” in face of that (52). Bitter Medicine portrays, therefore, not just 
the narrators’ private accounts of dealing with disability, but also the 
public sphere concerning people with mental health issues in that 
particular society.  
Although I did try to achieve a certain level of diversity in the 
works chosen as the corpus for this research, I cannot fail to account for 
the fact that they compose a white middle-class selection. Otherwise, the 
corpus includes works by authors within a range of disability status, 
sexuality, gender, age, and nationality. I have looked for works that 
would be emblematic of the issues analyzed here (namely narrative 
prosthesis and visual metaphor), and that was, for the most part, my 
primary concern in selecting them.  
                                               
4 David B. was born Pierre-François Beauchard, but, as the author chooses to sign his work as 
David B. I have elected to refer to him through his chosen name throughout this dissertation. In 
Epileptic, the narrator explains the reasons behind this choice, and this will be further explored 
in the chapter corresponding to David B.’s work in this dissertation.  
 41 
NARRATIVE PROSTHESIS AND THE GRAPHIC MEMOIR: 
CALLING DR. LAURA AND FUN HOME 
 
 
2.1. David T. Mitchell and Sharon S. Snyder’s Narrative Prosthesis 
 
 This chapter is grounded on the concept coined by David T. 
Mitchell and Sharon S. Snyder, “narrative prosthesis,” which refers to 
the discursive reliance on disability found in literature (47). In Narrative 
Prosthesis, Mitchell and Snyder focus on the symbolic meanings of 
representations of disability in literature (1). According to them, if we 
look at some of the major works in literature, we will see that “disability 
pervades literary narrative, first, as a stock feature of characterization, 
and, second, as an opportunistic metaphorical device” (47). In their 
understanding of narrative prosthesis, disability oftentimes works as a 
narrative device to provide a distinct layer of idiosyncrasy to literary 
characters, in a way that effectively differentiates them from the 
“anonymous background of the ‘norm’”(47). They argue that 
 
[w]ithin literary narratives, disability serves as an 
interruptive force that confronts cultural truisms. 
The inherent vulnerability and variability of 
bodies serves literary narratives as a metonym for 
that which refuses to conform to the mind’s desire 
for order and rationality. Within this schema, 
disability acts as a metaphor and fleshy example 
of the body’s unruly resistance to the cultural 
desire to ‘enforce normalcy.’ [. . .] The body’s 
weighty materiality functions as a textual and 
cultural other–an object with its own undisciplined 
language that exceeds the text’s ability to control 
it. (48-49) 
 
This is exemplified and analyzed by Mitchell and Snyder in several 
literary works, such as Oedipus, Richard III, and Moby Dick, to name a 
few. The narrative device of disability is used in literature and other art 
forms, therefore, to convey the uniqueness of a certain character and, 
more often than not, as an embodiment of that character’s peculiarities, 
they argue. In this context, Oedipus’ lack of insight and reason can be 
seen as represented in his blindness, for example, Richard III’s filmic 
adaptations emphasizing deformity as a testament to his character, the 
symbolic limitations of Ahab’s prosthetic leg being intrinsically related 
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to his demise, and so on (10, 95, 137).  
 My effort in this chapter is to expand the implications of the 
concept of “narrative prosthesis” into non-fictional works such as 
graphic memoirs. Some initial questions have guided this inquiry: how 
can one account for the metaphorical implications of disability in works 
that are explicitly grounded on real life experiences? Where does the 
metaphor of disability figure, then? In autobiographical texts, the 
deviant body is not necessarily a narrative ploy to convey the uniqueness 
of a character, as it happens in Mitchell and Snyder’s theory. Life 
narratives deal with real life disability, something that definitely 
complicates an assumption of disability as a narratological device in 
those works. At the same time, one cannot dismiss the discursive effects 
of disability even in those narratives. In other words, what I propose to 
discuss in this chapter is: how does effective disability interrupt 
narrative prothesis in contexts of metaphorical disability? Furthermore, 
as this dissertation focuses on the genre of graphic memoirs, one 
important question to be posed is related to the visual component of 
comics within the discussion of narrative prosthesis. In what ways is the 
materiality of the disability metaphor transposed to the visuality of 
comics? Since the visual component in comics allows for a literal 
visibility of discourse, how is this played out in narratives about 
disability? My main hypothesis in this chapter, in relation to narrative 
prosthesis, is that to conceive of disability as a metaphor in those 
autobiographical contexts may be reductionist whereas working with the 
trope of metonymy would entail a more complex relation between 
disability and its symbolical and literal meanings.  
 To explore the implications of this concept in relation to 
graphic memoir and disability in this chapter, I will first delve a bit 
further into Mitchell and Snyder’s theory of “narrative prosthesis”. They 
start their work by discussing the ways in which the discursive creation 
of deviant bodies constitutes a “baseline of cultural undesirability,” a 
mapping out of abject embodiments in society (3). One of their main 
arguments is, therefore, that “the tradition of negative portrayals [of 
disability] is tethered to inciting the act of meaning-making itself” (6). 
As such, Mitchell and Snyder focus their research in a myriad of literary 
texts that aid in this construction of disability as a sign of inferiority in 
itself. These texts, they argue, are immersed, then, in a dual process: at 
the same time that they bring disability to the fore, granting visibility to 
the issue, they also “produce a form of discursive subjugation,” through 
the constant reinforcement of notions of normalized and deviant 
embodiments (6).  
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 The first example Mitchell and Snyder bring up of figures with 
disabilities in an artistic medium is particularly relevant to this 
investigation as it consists of a visual one: the drawing of “Cripples and 
beggars” (1550-55) (Figure 1), attributed to Pieter Brueghel (1523/1530- 
1569) and reproduced on the cover of their book. A contemporary of 
artists who favored a more classical aesthetic, such as Raphael and 
others, Brueghel chose instead to work with subjects that were decidedly 
not embodiments of symmetry or nobility. The focus on peasant scenes 
and cripples that would later set the artist apart from his contemporaries 
is evident in a quick look on some of his most renowned paintings: Mad 
Meg (1562), The Blind Leading the Blind (1568), The Peasant Woman 
(1568), and The Beggars (also known as The Cripples) (1568) (Figure 
2).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: “Drawing of Cripples and Beggars” (Brueghel) 
Figure 2: “The Beggars” (Brueghel) 
  
 Mitchell and Snyder argue that Brueghel’s paintings focus on 
the potential of the representations of deformity and disability to 
highlight concealed facets of life within classicism (4). The theme of the 
“human condition” is, therefore, brought to the fore through the 
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saturated display of deviant bodies in Brueghel’s works (4). Instead of 
longing for the ideal proportions, for the ideal human figure, as his 
classicist contemporaries were prone to, Brueghel’s paintings hinted that 
the singularity of human life lies within the crudeness of its form, in its 
perceived (and constructed) flaws. Brueghel’s works appear to be an 
early example of disability being used as a narrative tool with which to 
convey particular meaning, i.e. the uniqueness of the common people, or 
to bestow a type of “artistic integrity” or prestige to a work of art. 
Defiant of classicism, Brueghel is, therefore, emblematic of a moment of 
transition in the artistic tradition, Sharon and Mitchell argue.  
 Yet Brueghel is also emblematic of the “contradictory aspect of 
[Mitchell and Snyder’s] conceptualization of narrative prosthesis: he 
detailed ‘crippled’ differences faithfully while simultaneously 
metamorphosing those differences into social satires” (5). In other 
words, at the same time that disabled people became subjects of artistic 
endeavor, they were also used to convey allegorical meaning through 
their embodied deviance. The page dedicated to the painting “The 
Beggars” on the Louvre’s website, for example, corroborates this 
reading and explicitly emphasizes the allegorical nature of the bodily 
deviance imagery related to the political situation at the time: “the work 
would be a satirical parody, with the beggars representing the different 
classes of society on the road to ruin” (Adeline). Mitchell and Snyder’s 
argument is that the conflation of disability with degraded humanity, 
while innovative in the sense of questioning artistic tradition at the time, 
did little to challenge conventions about disability however much it 
provided a new artistic tool for Brueghel and others that followed him 
(5).  
 Brueghel’s ambiguous use of disability, as an artistic novelty 
imbued with links to social deviance, can be seen reflected in many of 
the works discussed by Mitchell and Snyder (5). In terms of 
representation, they argue, people with disability have not experienced a 
lack of visibility about them in literature, film, or other forms of art (6). 
On the contrary, the exclusion of people with disabilities has occurred 
through and because of their widesapread visibility, from Brueghel’s 
time till today (6). In Mitchell and Snyder’s view, this apparent 
oxymoronic scenario is part of a larger process in which the narration of 
disability is, in fact, “an attempt to bring the body’s unruliness under 
control” (6). The use of disability as a narratological device and 
metaphor is, thus, part of the ongoing process of normalizing of the 
body while appropriating the allegorical meanings associated with 
deviance.  
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 Mitchell and Snyder’s concept is grounded on the meaning of 
prosthesis, a term they argue is already embedded within an “unsteady 
rhetorical stance” (6). If a body is deemed lacking or dysfunctional, a 
prosthesis functions as a means to amend that, as a compensation of 
sorts that seeks to restore it to the closest degree of normalcy as 
possible. In sum, a prosthesis functions as an illusion that corroborates 
and reinforces the assumption of a normalized bodily experience (6). 
And, as an illusion, it will inevitably fail at its task to normalize 
differences. Of course the idea of the normal body is also an illusion in 
itself and Mitchell and Snyder refer to Lennard Davis’ work on 
normalcy to reiterate that. As the normal body and the norm are 
unattainable, the prosthesis serves as a measuring rod from which to set 
apart the abnormal bodies (7). The discursive creation of disability is 
necessary, thus, to produce the difference that delineates the context for 
normalcy. Borrowing Judith Butler’s work on the construction of the 
abject, it is the force of exclusion and the creation of these “‘unlivable’ 
zones” of existence that make it possible to regulate the normal (3). The 
use of prosthesis could be seen, in this context, as an identificatory 
practice that materializes bodily difference and reiterates the concept of 
acceptable normalcy and non-acceptable deviance.  
 The concept of a narrative prosthesis follows these parameters 
in literature. Mitchell and Snyder state that “narrative prosthesis is first 
and foremost about the ways in which the ruse of prosthesis fails in its 
primary objective: to return the incomplete body to the invisible status 
of a normative essence” (8, original emphasis). The failure of the 
illusion of normalcy inherent in a prosthesis works in literature in a way 
that discloses the purposes of that very illusion. In narrative prosthesis, 
the ironic outcome is primarily the exposure of difference instead of its 
concealment in favor of the norm.  
 The transgressive potential of exposing the illusion of the 
prosthetic relation to the body in literature is, nevertheless, unfulfilled, 
Mitchell and Snyder argue. The authors question the real world 
implications of narrative prosthesis for populations with disabilities: 
 
While disability’s troubling presence provides 
literary works with the potency of an unsettling 
cultural commentary, disabled people have been 
historically refused a parallel power within their 
social institutions. In other words, while literature 
often relies on disability's transgressive potential, 
disabled people have been sequestered, excluded, 
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exploited, and obliterated on the very basis of 
which their literary representation so often rests. 
Literature serves up disability as a repressed 
deviation from cultural imperatives of 
normativity, while disabled populations suffer the 
consequences of representational association with 
deviance and recalcitrant corporeal difference. (8)  
 
Whilst Mitchell and Snyder state that this paradox between the artistic 
and the historical cannot be reconciled, I wonder if the contemporary 
trend in what I refer to as “graphic body memoirs” could be seen as an 
appropriation of this discursive use of disability that could, perhaps, 
unsettle this statement.  
 As this study is not meant to be a comprehensive review of 
disability in comics in general, or even in graphic memoirs for that 
matter—although it would indeed be an interesting research topic to be 
pursued in the future—two key texts were chosen for analysis. They 
were defined primarily on how the representations of disability within 
them can be looked at through an autobiographical and a narrative 
prosthesis lens. By that I understand texts that are inserted within the 
autobiographical genre, that have disability as a relevant element in the 
story, and that that element could be seen as constructed both literally 
and metaphorically in the overall narrative. The two graphic memoirs 
chosen to be analyzed in this chapter are Nicole S. Georges’ Calling Dr. 
Laura: A Graphic Memoir (2013) and Alison Bechdel’s Fun Home: A 
Family Tragicomic (2006). Georges’ graphic memoir interweaves the 
author’s troubled childhood alongside her experiences with encopresis, 
an illness in which the child has issues related to the control of bowel 
movements most likely due to stress. Bechdel’s work revolves around 
her relationship with her father, Bruce, and how his violent and 
flamboyant personality disrupted the family life. As a child, Alison went 
through an obsessive compulsive phase, most likely related to her 
unstable home environment, the narrator suggests (139). Despite the fact 
that both works describe real life experiences of the authors with 
disability, their narratives also point to disability as allegoric of 
problems within the family life.   
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2.2. Calling Dr. Laura: “I didn’t tell you this part about the stomach 
pains [. . .]” 
 
 Nicole S. Georges’ Calling Dr. Laura: A Graphic Memoir, at 
first sight, centers on the author’s search for her biological father, whom 
she thought dead, but the narrative revolves around many other topics: 
the difficulties of growing up in an unstable home, the ins and outs of 
her relationship with another woman, and the implications of coming out 
to her overbearing mother. Throughout the narrative, the narrator 
repeatedly alludes to the difficulties of her childhood, more specifically 
to the way her mother’s parade of bad boyfriends, later turned into 
unsuited father figures, had an impact on her early years and on their 
mother-daughter relationship. Most of the narrative set in Nicole’s 
childhood years revolves around the violent repercussions of her 
mother’s harmful relationships, for example. The narrative suggests that 
such lack of stability in the family life eventually takes a toll on the 
child Nicole, physically speaking. The use of narrative prosthesis in 
Georges’ graphic memoir can be seen, thus, in the metaphorical 
implications of the character’s physical illness with her unstable home 
environment.  
 As a child, the narrator tells, Nicole is frequently afflicted by 
what she describes as “stomach pains”—a misnomer, since the pains 
have more to do with the lower digestive system and the control of 
bowel movements than with the stomach per se. The need to wait out 
the urges to go to the toilet and the techniques Nicole comes up with to 
deal with the issue are the focus of many chapters:  
 
I didn’t want to go to the bathroom. I just didn’t. [. 
. .] It was important to wait until the feeling 
passed before standing up or moving around. [. . .] 
Because if I didn’t wait and control my urge to 
go… My bowels couldn’t control themselves. (41-
44) 
  
The issue of “stomach pains” first comes up in a homonymous chapter, 
with the adult narrator describing the feeling associated with going to 
the bathroom while the visual narrative portrays the child Nicole 
practicing the exercise of controlling the urge in the middle of a playdate 
(Figure 3).   
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Figure 3: Calling Dr. Laura (41) 
 
The subsequent pages continue the depiction of the playdate, with 
the girls dancing and singing along to music while taking turns wearing 
a tutu. The apparent joy of the scene is countered by the voice of the 
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narrator conveying the sense of shame and guilt for soiling and ruining 
the “prized tutu” towards the end of the chapter (45).  
The “Stomach pains” chapter is a good example of the way in which 
cross-discursiveness in comics works: visual and written narratives are 
juxtaposed in the structure of frames and pages, exposing the 
discrepancies of each voice. The visual narrative in this chapter is set in 
the character’s childhood, during a playdate, while the written language 
on the top of the frames signals the narrator’s voice, set in the “present” 
and radically different in both tone and style. We see in the page two 
versions of the narrator’s self, the adult self as the narrator’s voice and 
the child self, visually represented. Hillary Chute refers to this 
characteristic of autobiographical comics as the “inbuilt duality of the 
form,” a feature in which the “double narration [. . .] visually and 
verbally represents the self, often in conflicting registers and different 
temporalities” (5). In graphic memoirs, one effect from the tension 
arising from the conflicting discourses in comics is the denaturalization 
of notions of authority in autobiography, for example. The ontological 
status of the autobiographical I is called into question as it visually splits 
between narrating I and subject I, with the contrasting perspectives 
contributing to the representation of a constructed and fragmented self. 
In the page shown previously (Figure 3), the plurality of 
autobiographical voices is evident. On the one hand the young character 
is represented as trying to avoid going to the bathroom. On the other 
hand, the reader receives this information only through the voice of the 
adult narrator. The constructedness of the autobiographical narrative is 
exacerbated through this fragmentation of representation of the 
narrator’s self and her memories.  
 Additionally, Calling Dr. Laura makes use of another resource 
available to comics, such as visually differentiating the narrative set in 
the present and the narrative set in the past. Since all of the references to 
encopresis occur in the chapters set in her childhood, it is important to 
understand how they are differently conceived within the overall 
narrative. In Georges’ work, the chapters set in the “present” are more 
realistically drawn, the characters have more nuanced features, the 
setting is detailed and composed of a palette of different shades and 
textures of grey, black and white. The scenes that take place in the 
author’s childhood period are, on the other hand, more simple in style, 
almost cartoonish, and colored only in black and white. The drawing of 
the chapters set in the past is minimalistic, with an abundance of blank 
space in the frame, which further emphasizes the sense of loneliness of 
the character—a significant feature in the use of narrative prosthesis in 
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Calling Dr. Laura, as further analysis will point out. The following 
images (Figures 4 and 5), taken from each type of chapter, illustrate the 
difference between styles: 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Calling Dr. Laura (28) 
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Figure 5: Calling Dr. Laura (30) 
 
 The discrepancy between drawing styles can also be seen as a 
visual indicator of the complexities of memory. As Thomas Couser 
argues, “memory is not a stable, static record that could ground a 
reliable written narrative; rather, it is itself a text under continuous 
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unconscious revision” (Altered Egos 17). The further back one goes in 
re-collecting life events, especially traumatic ones, the more difficult it 
is to re-construct the minutiae about them. At the same time that 
memory serves as “both a source and authenticator of autobiographical 
acts,” it is elusive in its constant re-creation of the past (Smith and 
Watson 16). In terms of traumatic memories, specifically, this re-
construction is often more fragmented or even obsessive (21-22). 
Autobiographical writing is, then, used by some subjects as one method 
of trying to retrieve these fragmented memories and consolidate them 
into a (somewhat) coherent narrative (22). Graphic memoirs, on their 
turn, can offer unique ways to explore the nuances entailed in the 
process of re-creating the past. In Calling Dr. Laura, the difference of 
style between chapters illustrates the particularities of negotiating the re-
creation of recent and of old memories, staging a contrast that mimics 
the different types of memories being recalled.  
 The contrast between past and present is also emphasized in the 
overall structure of the narrative, with short chapters set in adulthood 
and in childhood interspacing each other. The themes of each chapter 
suggest how the events of Nicole’s childhood relate to the ones in her 
adult life, without, however, indicating a direct causal relation between 
them. One example of the connection between past and present chapters 
can be seen in the way Nicole interacts with animals and sees herself as 
a caregiver. In the chapter “Edmondo,” set in the past, for instance, the 
child character is shown clutching her new stuffed animal and promising 
to protect it from the fight between her mother and stepfather going on 
in the other room (Figure 6). The narrator explicitly refers to the violent 
environment in one of the frames: “I can’t recall there ever being 
peaceful middle ground in Florida, only conflict” (31). The abuse 
described by the narrator is also perceived through the visual narrative, 
as some frames appear to be taken over with word balloons filled with 
indicators of trash talk and onomatopoeic signs such as ‘Slap’ and ‘thud’ 
(31). Apparently helpless, young Nicole is portrayed seeking refuge in 
bed, alone, and scared. At the same time, the character talks to and 
comforts the stuffed animal, reassuring it: “I’ll take care of you” (31). 
This nurturing action is echoed later in the narrative, when Nicole, as a 
grown-up, takes care of the wounded pet chicken Mabel (Figure 7). As 
an adult, being a vegan and an animal lover are two characteristics of 
Nicole’s personality that are constantly reinforced in the narrative. 
When finding out that her other pet chickens had hurt the newly adopted 
Mabel, Nicole’s words even resemble the ones of her childhood chapter. 
She promises: “I will heal you” (74). The importance of this action can 
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be visually perceived through the distribution of frames in the page and 
throughout the chapter, which is mostly about Mabel’s injury. Almost an 
entire page is dedicated to the scene where Nicole holds and reassures 
Mabel, for example, while the healing chicken occupies the final frame 
of the chapter and the biggest frame of the page.  
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Figure 6: Calling Dr. Laura (31) 
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Figure 7: Calling Dr. Laura (74) 
 
The dialogue between present and past, therefore, constantly informs the 
weaving of the narrative as a whole. Nicole’s references to encopresis, 
although restricted to the chapters set in her childhood, influence the 
narrative set in the present. Through the juxtaposing of chapters, one can 
then infer the extent of which the issues related to the extreme need for 
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control, associated with her stomach pains as a child, pervade the 
narrative taking place in the “present” time. The experience with 
encopresis can be seen, then, as haunting the work through its use of 
narrative prosthesis. Not encopresis per se, but the allegory of it as it 
resurfaces throughout the story.  
 The first reference to the stomach pains already points to their 
allegorical tone within the story: “my stomach pains started around the 
time mom & Ray got together” (41). The allusion to encopresis is, from 
the beginning, intrinsically tied to her home environment and her 
mother’s influence on it. A few pages earlier, in another chapter about 
her childhood, the narrator describes the context of stress and abuse that 
surrounded her mother’s relationship with Ray at the time (30-1). So, 
from the start, the narrative suggests that these pains are related to larger 
issues in the child’s life and not something isolated. In another chapter 
we learn the medical term for her stomach pains, ‘encopresis,’ and some 
of the factors that may trigger it, according to medical literature (Figure 
8). The chapter entitled “I didn’t tell you this part about the stomach 
pains” begins with a full-page frame that epitomizes the use of narrative 
prosthesis in Georges’ graphic memoir.  
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Figure 8: Calling Dr. Laura (58) 
 
 The frame presents the juxtaposition of a medical definition of 
Encopresis and a series of traumatic situations in young Nicole’s life 
that could be associated with the emotional stresses considered triggers. 
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The composition of this particular image is rather unique in relation to 
the rest of the narrative. The narrator addresses the reader directly 
through the title, for example. The black background contrasts this 
frame to the other ones in chapters set in the author’s childhood, which 
are predominantly abundant with white/blank space. A hand—whose 
owner remains unidentified in the frame, but presumably is the adult 
narrator’s, as it is more realistically drawn—holds a paper with clinical 
definitions of encopresis and illustrations of a large intestine and a pair 
of soiled underpants. The realistic drawing of the hand is contrasted to 
the more simple, almost child-like, depictions of a toilet, a bottle, a 
bucket, and a pair of panties in the background. Throughout the 
narrative, this frame marks one of the only moments in which the two 
styles, the minimalistic and the detailed, share space. The two 
contrasting drawing styles again establish the relation between past and 
present time in the narrative and here they indicate as to how differently 
perceived the stomach pains were then to the child Nicole to how 
encopresis is seen now by the adult narrator.  
 The visual elements of the past are strewn in the frame, 
unorganized and scattered, for example. The two pairs of panties are 
emblematic of this difference in perspective: they are similar and one 
could even presume them to be the same one, with the first being clean 
and the second being soiled. The one in the background is related to the 
childish memories, right next to the bottle and the bucket; the other one 
is shown inside the paper being held by the adult hand and appears to be 
within a photograph, not just drawn onto the paper. To further the 
distinction between past and present perspectives, the first is shown 
loose within the background while the latter appears labeled and 
categorized as “ex. 2” in the paper with the medical definition of 
encopresis.  
 The contrast between past and present perspectives in the 
subject of encopresis can be seen in the language related to it as well. As 
a child, Nicole is portrayed as having problems articulating the causes of 
her discomfort with the stomach pains or why she would choose to 
avoid the toilet at all. In another moment in the narrative, her mother 
asks her if she avoids going to the bathroom because it hurts, to which 
Nicole only vaguely replies with another question: “Kind of?” (59). The 
narrative constantly alludes to the lack of control of the character 
regarding her own life as a child, while also emphasizing the lack of 
linguistic skills to describe her situation. If as a child, Nicole has 
difficulty articulating her situation, as an adult, the narrator chooses to 
borrow medical language to communicate the roots of the stomach 
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pains. The appropriation of a medical voice that is not her own to 
describe the causes and treatments of encopresis is visually emphasized 
through the use of a different font in this specific frame. The serifed 
typeface shown in this full-page frame visually distances this discourse 
from the voice of the narrator used elsewhere. Another, perhaps more 
obvious, way is the attribution of the definition to a specific medical 
source.   
 The quote from Ron Huxley’s Childhood Encopresis: Causes 
and Treatment explains that children who deal with encopresis often 
avoid going to the toilet because of the suffering associated with it, 
which in turn stretches the colon and rectum (58). Constipation is, 
therefore, both a cause and an effect of encopresis and a common result 
is the loss of sensitivity to bowel movements, ending in stool accidents. 
In the following page, the narrator quotes yet another medical source, 
this time from the American Academy of Pediatrics, which explains that 
children who are “anxious or emotionally distraught over some aspect of 
[their] life over which [they have] little control, such as family conflicts 
[. . .],” are prone to experience fecal soiling (59). As socially taxing as 
the stool accidents may be, and Nicole retells several of them throughout 
the narrative, the child’s need for control is greater, explain the several 
medical sources.  
 The image of young Nicole, crouched down, “exhaling” 
memories–of her mother with different boyfriends, like Faisal and Ed, of 
her mother being abused by those men, and of her mother returning that 
abuse onto her–reaffirms emblematically this feeling of loss of control 
mentioned by the medical literature on encopresis. Consequently, the 
illness is constructed by the narrative as a projection, or, better yet, an 
internalization of the turmoil surrounding the character’s life, adding a 
new layer of complexity to her childhood account. It is not just that 
Nicole was immersed in a stressful and sometimes violent context; she 
embodied those conflicts.  
 The metaphor of that illness permeates the accounts of her 
childhood. Several situations of her narrative as a child revolve around 
Nicole having no control of her own life: she hides from her violent 
stepfather under a blanket, inside a closet; she is commanded to give up 
her dog when her mother and stepfather break up; she is forced to move 
several times according to the lives and jobs of her mother’s boyfriends; 
she is “converted” to Catholicism when her mother marries a Catholic 
man. Her stomach pains serve, then, as metaphorical signifiers of her 
lack of agency as a child. At the same time, through the effects of 
narrative prosthesis, they provide a tangible referent to the abstract 
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anxiety that haunts her narrative both as an adult and as a child.  
 The psychosomatic nature of encopresis is repeatedly suggested 
by the medical sources quoted by the narrator, which attribute 
encopredic children’s fecal soiling to emotional stress and trauma in the 
family (58-9). The treatment suggested by that literature, as mentioned 
in Georges’ graphic memoir, is as much about dealing with the physical 
symptoms as it is about working with the underlying emotional causes 
through therapy (59). The emphasis on the psychosomatic aspect of 
encopresis plays into what Susan Wendell refers to as “the Myth of 
Control,” in which the body is seen as an unruly object in need of 
taming (93). Wendell argues that the Myth of Control is often associated 
with the idea of mind over body: 
  
[t]he influence of psychoanalysis on both 
medicine and popular culture has contributed the 
concepts of psychosomatic illness and imagined 
illness to the myth of control, and it has 
strengthened the older and vaguer notion that the 
mind can control the body. (98)  
 
In the page quoted previously (Figure 8), the narrator claims that 
encopresis can have “both emotional and physical causes,” the most 
common being constipation (58). If, as the chapter about the stomach 
pains suggests, constipation occurs because the character refuses to go to 
the bathroom, and later in the narrative she appears to do so due to 
emotional stress, the distinction between physical and emotional causes 
becomes blurred. Wendell argues that  
 
diagnosis of psychosomatic illness props up the 
myth of control in two ways. First, it contributes 
to the illusion that scientific medicine knows 
everything it needs to know to cure us [. . .] 
Second, it transfers responsibility for controlling 
their bodies to the minds of [. . .] patients. (100)  
 
In this context, the narrative in Calling Dr. Laura reiterates the notion of 
the mind controlling the body in its representation of encopresis.  
 The narrative’s portrayal of the stomach pains, for example, is 
framed by a medical discourse that categorizes the illness as 
psychosomatic. The “one thing” the narrator reveals to the reader, as the 
title of the chapter indicates (Figure 8), is precisely the emotional causes 
of encopresis in children, suggesting that the stomach pains were more 
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than a child’s whim of avoiding the toilet. The juxtaposition of the 
medical text along with images of her childhood, as discussed 
previously in this chapter, suggests that the emotional stress being 
referred to by the narrator is related to her mother. The implication is, 
then, that the child, in this instance Nicole, manifests those conflicts in 
her life by internalizing them, which culminates in encopresis. 
Ultimately, the unruliness of her body as a child is chalked it up to 
herself, as she internalizes and embodies the non-conformity of her 
home life. In other words, in accordance with Wendell’s notion of the 
“Myth of Control,” by establishing the psychosomatic roots of 
encopresis, the narrative transfers the responsibility of controlling the 
body, at least partially, to the young character.   
 Paradoxically, however, even though the adult narrator brings 
forth medical discourse—supported by the definition of encopresis and 
the recommendations of the American Academy of Pediatrics—to 
define encopresis, as well as implications of treatments and therapy, she 
acknowledges that no formal diagnosis was ever made. In the same 
chapter referencing the medical definition of the illness, the narrator 
states that “[n]o Encopresis treatment or subsequent therapy would come 
my way,” which suggests that this understanding about her stomach 
pains is connected to her perspective as an adult in the process of re-
constructing that experience (60). The narrative in this chapter appears 
to contradict itself, as the mention of there being frequent doctor’s visits 
conflicts with the narrator’s statement that there was no formal 
diagnosis. One is left to wonder from where the diagnosis of encopresis 
came, then, if not from the doctors following her case, since its 
repercussions, both physical and metaphorical, are put in evidence so 
prominently throughout that chapter. In this apparent self-diagnosis done 
in retrospect, the narrator “borrows” the “authority” of medical language 
to classify the experience of bodily deviance as a child. The evocation of 
medical literature is used to put into words something that had hitherto 
remained invisible or that was unrepresentable. Borrowing Ann 
Cvetkovich’s term, the illustration of medical references to encopresis 
works as “technologies of memory,” in the sense that they represent 
“material objects connected to lost pasts that they serve as the site of 
dense and often unprocessed feeling” (118). The experience of the 
young character’s stomach pains is, therefore, re-framed and re-
constructed by the adult narrator through the Myth of Control into 
encopresis. This process instills medical discourse with an aura of 
authority, despite the narrator’s own indications of doctors’ omissions, 
while simultaneously transferring the responsibility of bodily deviance 
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to Nicole herself.  
 However, as much as encopresis is featured as a metaphor, the 
materiality of the stomach pains is just as significant in Nicole’s 
account. As the narrator tells of extremely painful experiences resulting 
from encopresis, for example, the tangibility of the autobiographical 
subject is brought to the fore (64). A different passage (Figure 9) 
illustrates the concreteness of Nicole’s disability in the narrative. Unlike 
Figure 8, where the symbolic status of encopresis is emphasized, in 
Figure 9 the narrator focuses on the reality of pain that resulted from the 
illness.  
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Figure 9: Calling Dr. Laura (64) 
 
 If in previous pages the narrator mentions having used the 
stomach pains as an excuse for missing school, in the quoted passage 
she concentrates on the times in which the pain was actually debilitating 
(63, 64). The first frame of the page starts with this distinction, in the 
narrator’s view, between fictional and real pain: on the one hand were 
the pains the young character created (“while most days I was straight 
up faking”), on the other were the pains that could not be discursively 
controlled (“I do need to mention the times when I genuinely couldn’t 
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go to school”) (64, my emphasis). This passage works as a reminder of 
the materiality of the experience for the protagonist, even as that 
experience may be imbued with other symbolic meanings within the 
narrative.  
 Here lies the paradox concerning the concept of narrative 
prosthesis in non-fiction works: Nicole’s deviant body both is and is not 
a narrative ploy to convey the nuances of the story. Encopresis is 
represented in the narrative as a metaphor for the unruliness of her home 
life; framing it only as such is, however, reductionist, as it fails to 
account for the material implications of her disability as a child. As 
shown in the previous paragraphs, Calling Dr. Laura conveys the 
polysemic characteristic of the representation of disability in the 
narrative through the continuous contrast between symbolic and material 
implications of encopresis. This back and forth of signifiers continues as 
each new depiction stresses a different aspect, in a process that 
reverberates throughout the narrative without ever achieving closure for 
the reader.  
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2.3. Fun Home: “It was a self-soothing autistic loop” 
 
 Alison Bechdel’s graphic memoir tells the story of the author’s 
relationship with her father, of coming out as a lesbian, and of how the 
discovery of the father’s closeted homosexuality may or may not have 
led to his suicide. The fragmented narrative goes back and forth to 
retrace her parents’ relationship—how they met, got together and 
eventually started a family in a small town in Pennsylvania after the 
Second World War—and the narrator’s realization of her own queer 
sexuality and gender identity. Throughout the narrative, the presence of 
her father, Bruce, is prominent, both as a main character and as an 
influence in her life as a child.  
 Bruce is described throughout the narrative as a volatile person, 
prone to tantrums and violent outbursts directed at anyone or anything in 
the proximity. He is depicted as someone obsessed with details, focusing 
most of this energy in renovating and refurnishing the historical home 
they live in (9). Throughout the narrative, the “Gothic revival house” 
works as a metaphor of the haunting presence of the father in their lives 
(8). The house seems to reflect the personality and characteristics of 
Bruce—it is excessive, labyrinthic, enigmatic, and oppressive to the 
other inhabitants: “His shame inhabited our house as pervasively and 
invisibly as the aromatic musk of aging mahogany. In fact, the 
meticulous, period interiors were expressively designed to conceal it” 
(20). The narrator retraces its history back to 1867, when the house was 
built in the brief economic boom of their small town in Pennsylvania 
(8). When Alison’s parents bought the house, the narrator states, it was 
only a shadow of its original self, something that Bruce spent the 
following 18 years trying to restore (9). This historical restoration was 
not a job or even a mere hobby, “it was his passion [. . .] in every sense 
of the word. Libidinal. Manic. Martyred” (7).   
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Figure 10: Fun Home (17) 
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 In the quoted page (Figure 10), the narrator, however, warns the 
reader against the simple metaphorical reading of her father and his 
relation to the house: “It’s tempting to suggest, in retrospect, that our 
family was a sham. That our house was not a real home at all but the 
simulacrum of one, a museum” (17). The metaphor is there; the house is 
represented as a trope within the narrative, “yet [they] really were a 
family, and [they] really did live in those period rooms” (17). The 
narrator’s metacomment relates to the discussion about the implications 
of such metaphors in non-fiction works. The visual discourse 
accompanying the text on Figure 10 is emblematic of the narrator’s 
metacommentary, for example. The page is divided into four frames 
illustrating scenes of the family’s domestic life: going to church, taking 
a family picture, and sitting at home. Throughout the frames, the conflict 
of appearances versus reality stands out as the images of a picture-
perfect family are undermined by the text. The questioning of the idea of 
the “picture-perfect family” is specifically emphasized as they are 
portrayed, in the second frame, posing for a photograph, with the 
narrator’s voice describing how it would be tempting to suggest that the 
“family was a sham” (17). Jennifer Lemberg suggests that the contrast 
between staged family photo and the mess of their actual daily lives, 
seen in the last frame of the page, “reminds us of the ability of comics to 
depict the life behind formal pictures” (133). As the visual narrative 
stages the staging of a photograph that, on its turn, pretends to capture 
the (deceptive) idea of that family, (perceived) reality and (alleged) 
illusion become inextricably intertwined.  
 The following frame on the page portrays a close-up of the 
interior of a room in the gothic revival house, with shining furniture, a 
candlestick, a mirror, and some paintings on the wall, in a composition 
almost resembling a still-life work of art. The stillness of the image is 
contrasted with the frame directly below it, showing a wider shot of the 
same room, only now populated by the members of the family going 
about their daily lives. As Lemberg points out, the latter image, “which 
invites the reader to linger over its length and assorted details, stands to 
counter several others preceding it, where the family presents a more 
perfect appearance” (133). The two frames visually represent the 
conundrum brought forth by the narrator: in a lot of ways the house 
could be seen as a simulacrum, a flamboyant sign with no referent; in 
others, however, as the actual home the narrator grew up in. They are 
both images of the same situation, only from two different yet coherent 
perspectives: the stillness of the house versus the lively family routine 
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within that same house. The third frame is a section within the fourth 
one, indicating that even though there were many layers to their lives, 
the need to appear perfect at the surface was somehow integrated to the 
imperfectness of everything else. In the narrative, thus, this sequence of 
frames underlines the ambivalence of tropes, such as the Gothic revival 
house, within autobiographical works.  
 Alison’s questioning of the reality/façade of her family 
resonates Jean Baudrillard’s words on simulacra: “it is no longer a 
question of imitation, nor of reduplication, nor even of parody. It is 
rather a question of substituting signs of the real for the real itself” 
(167). What would be the real in this case, then? The perfect stillness of 
the house in one frame is as real a sign as the messy day-to-day lives of 
the people within it in the other. The perspectives of both frames are 
valid and yet, somehow, conflicting, which suggests that they are “signs 
of the real” within the narrative (167, my emphasis).  
 In contrast, the narrative points to Bruce Bechdel as someone 
obsessed with recreating signs of the real and not the real itself. 
Baudrillard argues that “[t]o dissimulate is to feign not to have what one 
has. To simulate is to feign to have what one hasn’t” (167-68). The 
narrator states, in a previous page, that her father “used his skillful 
artifice not to make things, but to make things appear to be what they 
were not” (16). Creating the illusion of the ideal family living in the 
ideal house seemed important to him, as that would, in theory, steer 
people’s looks away from his hidden queer sexuality. He is portrayed as 
simulating to have the perfect family, while, at the same time, 
dissimulating a non-normative sex life. The matter is, however, more 
complicated than that, as Baudrillard contends when questioning the 
ontological real and defending that “only simulacra exist[s]” (169). If, as 
the French theorist argues, “[t]he transition from signs which 
dissimulate something to signs which dissimulate that there is nothing, 
marks the decisive turning point,” Bruce’s attempts at simulation and 
dissimulation only really convey that there is no perfect family to imitate 
from and that there is no model of normative sexuality to begin with 
(170).   
 Just like Alison’s family in the period rooms of the Gothic 
revival house, at one point in the narrative an illness experienced by the 
protagonist can be seen through the ambivalence of narrative prosthesis 
in autobiography. The narrator describes how, at one point, the need for 
control, a characteristic extensively attributed to Bruce in the narrative, 
becomes an issue for the child Alison as well: at the age of 10 she 
develops an Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD)—“my actual 
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obsessive-compulsive disorder began when I was ten” (135). Alison’s 
OCD is characterized as an extrapolation of the family’s intrinsic 
propensity to isolation and creative introspection. In a previous page, the 
narrator comments on the resentment she felt towards her parents’ 
“creative solitude” and the way they would immerse themselves each in 
their own craft, leading to a perceived feeling of neglect for her as a 
child (133). Her response was to emulate that behavior and find her own 
way of immersing (Figure 11). 
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Figure 11: Fun Home (134) 
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 In the “artists’ colony” that is her house, as the narrator points 
out, she learns to relate creativity with isolation and compulsion (134). 
The time lapse from the top two frames, where the protagonist appears 
to be a small child, to the last frame, where Alison and her brothers 
seem to be in their teens, indicates isolation as an ongoing factor while 
the character was growing up. The third and larger frame of the quoted 
page (Figure 11) depicts the recurrent motif of the house, now as the 
space that encapsulates the family members in their solitary endeavors 
(134). They are distributed like separated units in the house, each 
assigned to a different room and each dedicated to a different activity: 
miniature modeling, guitar playing, drawing, piano playing, and 
decorating. The characters in the frame are portrayed as silhouettes 
against a white background, as if when immersed in their creative 
projects they would be mere shadows of their selves, as absorbed one-
dimensional artists. The caption in the frame states that “in this 
isolation, our creativity took on an aspect of compulsion,” further 
emphasizing the connection between art and solitary obsession, in the 
narrator’s perspective (134, my emphasis).  
 As the adult narrator recalls, the first signs of her OCD involve 
lots of counting, such as the number of times a faucet drips, or the 
number of edges and lines in a threshold (135) (Figure 12). The 
compulsive behavior eventually escalates: “then came the invisible 
substance that hung in doorways” that had to be avoided at all costs, 
mostly through the repetition of gestures and rituals (135). The narrator 
describes how those rituals turned her life at the time into “a laborious 
round of chores,” with exact procedures to be followed at every daily 
task: such as undressing in a particular order, lining up her shoes in a 
perfectly symmetrical position, or even the precise order in which each 
stuffed animal was to be kissed before bedtime (136-37). If any of those 
tasks was mishandled or done in the wrong order, the whole ritual had to 
be started from scratch.  
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Figure 12: Fun Home (135) 
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The visual narrative portrays the dedication required to go through each 
of those tasks and invites the reader to focus on the details as much as 
the character does. The first and second frames of the quoted page, for 
example, depict the 10-year-old counting drops of water in the bathtub. 
The arranging of sequential numbers on the thought balloons in each 
frame directs the reader’s attention to the emotional involvement of the 
counting of each drop, as well as the ominous multiple of thirteen 
mentioned by the narrator. The third frame in the page, on its turn, 
places the reader in the first person’s perspective of the child Alison 
while crossing a threshold. The following frame is a close-up of the 
former one, showing the possibilities of subdivision within that same 
entrance. A frame within a frame goes even further and displays the 
grooves in the metal strip of the doorframe as seen through a magnifying 
glass. The last frame on the page references the “invisible substance,” 
indicated through the empty space in the character’s line of sight (135). 
Overall, the sequence of frames invites the reader, in a way, to 
participate in the character’s compulsion. As emblematic of narrative 
prosthesis, Alison’s desire for evenness can be seen as a reflection of her 
father’s own obsession with order: her obsessions mirror, in a way, his 
obsessions. This mirroring is emphasized by the fact that the narrator 
uses similar wording to characterize both characters throughout the 
narrative—Bruce is “monomaniacal” to Alison’s “compulsive” (4, 135). 
However, if the reader is invited to participate in Alison’s experience of 
compulsion, Bruce does not get such empathy from the narrator when it 
comes to his own propensity to obsess over details.  
 The character’s unusual behavior eventually catches her 
mother’s attention, as the following page indicates (Figure 13).  
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Figure 13: Fun Home (138) 
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Similarly to Nicole Georges’ young character, Alison as a child is 
portrayed as having difficulties articulating the causes of her strange 
behavior. When her mother questions her about feelings of guilt—
already assuming and suggesting they were related to her parents—the 
image depicts Alison blatantly denying, though allowing for the 
possibility in secret to herself. It is only then that she feels curiosity 
towards her own behavior, the narrator tells us. Much like the narrator in 
Calling Dr. Laura quoting a clinical book on encopresis, authority in 
terms of children’s behavior comes, for the child Alison, not from her 
own experience but from a medical source: she is shown looking Baby 
and Child Care by Dr. Benjamin Spock, a famous pediatrician and 
personality at the time. Dr. Spock’s book had a “section on compulsions 
[that] came closest to describing [her] symptoms,” from the obsessive 
counting to the need to do things in a specific order (138). The last 
frame in the page depicts an excerpt from the book with a list of 
compulsive behaviors remarkably similar to those enacted by the young 
character on earlier pages. The caption in the frame—“So close, in fact, 
that I wonder if perhaps that’s where I picked them up”—is a rather 
revealing statement (138). The present tense employed in “I wonder” 
suggests that this is a reflection being made by the narrator, as an adult 
re-telling her story, not one she had as a kid reading the book while 
dealing with those compulsions. The sequence of frames suggests that 
the image of the character reading Dr. Spock’s book, in the third frame 
of the page, occurs right after the second frame, but the text suggests 
another possibility, as an event that could have happened earlier in her 
life. Visual and written discourse point to two likelihoods in relation to 
her symptoms: Dr. Spock’s book could have either described them or 
the book itself could have originated them.   
 In the following page (Figure 14), young Alison continues to 
read in the midst of an argument between her parents.  
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Figure 14: Fun Home (139) 
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All four panels portray her in the same position: sitting down, eyes 
focused on the book, clearly (trying to) isolating herself from all else. In 
the top three panels of the page, she is seen at the bottom right of the 
frames, almost out of the image in the last two of them, while in the 
background her mother and father yell at each other. The domestic scene 
that begins with Alison’s mother preoccupied with her, in the previous 
page, is disrupted by the arrival of the father, ominously announced by 
one of her brothers. His presence in the house is at first indicated by a 
silhouette in the background and, in the following frames, emerges 
occupying more and more space at the center of the panels, while the 
mother is relegated to the back. Just as her parents’ argument 
systematically takes over most of the space within the frames, the 
written narrative contradictorily states how “the explanation of repressed 
hostility [from Dr. Spock’s book] made no sense to me” (139). As visual 
and written narratives conflict, the structure of the page seems to 
emphasize precisely what it explicitly tries to deny, i.e. the repressed 
hostility towards the father.  
 Using a narrative prosthesis lens, Alison’s compulsive 
behaviors seem emblematic of the “lingering anxiety” of living in an 
unstable family environment and resenting it (149). The narrator claims 
to have dismissed the possibility of her compulsions being a result of 
repressed hostility, as though that possibility was not “concrete” enough 
(139). The excerpt of Dr. Spock’s book portrayed in Fun Home 
illustrates the symptoms the narrator describes having, while 
conveniently omitting most of the section in which the author refers to 
repressed hostility. The following excerpt of Dr. Spock’s book5 shows 
the passage in full: 
Compulsions may be a response to anxious 
feelings. One source of anxiety might be hostile 
feelings towards parents. Think about the 
childhood saying, ‘Step on a crack, break your 
mother’s back.’ Everyone has hostile feelings at 
times toward the people who are close to him, but 
his conscience would be shocked at the idea of 
really harming them and warns him to keep such 
thoughts out of his mind. And if a person’s 
conscience becomes excessively stern, it keeps 
nagging about such unacceptable thoughts even 
after he has succeeded in hiding them away in his 
                                               
5 Taken from the revised 9th edition (2012).  
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subconscious mind. He still feels guilty, though he 
doesn’t know what for. It eases his conscience to 
be extracareful and proper about such a senseless 
thing as how to navigate a crack in the sidewalk. 
(211)  
 
 The abstract language with which Spock refers to compulsion—
emphasizing the play between the conscience and the subconscious, for 
example—fails to describe the character’s very tangible experiences 
with behavioral issues as a child, the narrator claims. The narrator’s 
refusal of Dr. Spock’s hypothesis could also indicate the inadequateness 
of seeing her OCD strictly as a metaphor of her father’s compulsions. 
Both suggestions, repressed hostility and the narratological device of 
narrative prosthesis, lack the concreteness of the experience for the 
narrator. Nevertheless, the adult narrator evokes Spock’s definition of 
repressed hostility towards the parents, even as she attempts to dismiss 
it, placing that explanation of OCD under erasure, as a sign that is 
“inadequate yet necessary” (Sarup 33).  
 Unlike Calling Dr. Laura, where the narrator makes use of 
medical literature to define her past experience with illness, the narrative 
in Fun Home does not take these scientific sources at face value. The 
ineffectiveness of any language to define the character’s experiences is 
underlined through the conflicted versions brought forth by past and 
present selves: the adult narrator supposes that perhaps the child self 
materialized symptoms after reading about them, even though the 
former claims the latter dismissed the book’s hypothesis in the first 
place. Comparatively, medical literature is brought up in this sequence 
of frames more as a prop than as an authoritative source of information, 
unlike the narrative in Calling Dr. Laura.  
 In a metacomment that could be read as about the 
autobiographical effort itself, the narrator concludes that reading Dr. 
Spock’s theories was a “curious experience in which [she] was both 
subject and object, [her] own parent and [her] own child” (139). The 
feeling of being both a subject and an object of looking is a recurring 
one in life narratives (Chute 2). As authors try to re-create narratives 
they themselves lived, they go through the rhetorical exercise of placing 
themselves as characters in their own lives. In the context of comics, this 
representation occurs also through the visual (re)creation of the self as a 
character on the page, a process Hillary Chute refers to as the work of 
“retracing—materially reimagining trauma” (2). In Fun Home, this 
“retracing” surfaces in multiple layers throughout the narrative. On one 
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level, for example, the narrator tells us that the child Alison went 
through the experience of being both subject and object as she read 
about her symptoms in Dr. Spock’s book. On another level, the 
experience of “retracing” also occurs throughout the narrative as a 
whole, as the author is involved in the pictorial recreation of the events 
of her own story. The narrator refers to the feeling of being both object 
and subject of her story as a “self-soothing, autistic loop,” which again 
could be read as a metacommentary about the feeling associated with the 
autobiographical impulse that drives the production of the graphic 
memoir itself.  
 The final frame of page 139 (Figure 14) portrays the family 
once again encapsulated within the house, with each member solitarily 
framed by a window, in a re-reading of the “artists’ colony” shown in 
the final frame on page 134 (Figure 11). The narrator explores the 
connection between both images: “if our family was a sort of artists’ 
colony, could it not be even more accurately described as a mildly 
autistic colony? Our selves were all we had” (139). Creativity, isolation, 
and compulsion are reaffirmed as intrinsic to one another, in the 
narrator’s point of view, through the play of words between artists and 
autistic’s colonies and the similarities between both frames. The frame 
referring to the autistic colony, differently from the other one, does not 
show the characters as one-dimensional shadows of their selves. Instead, 
the characters here are portrayed going on about their daily lives, as if, 
in comparison, the autistic colony was the real place and the artists’ 
colony indeed a simulacrum.  
The narrator makes the connection between autobiographical 
impulse and OCD in a more explicit manner in the subsequent page: “at 
some point during my obsessive-compulsive spell, I began a diary” 
(140). The first entries, as the narrator recalls, were written on a wall 
calendar from one of the funeral home’s suppliers, a gift she received 
from her father, followed by his instructions of “Just write down what’s 
happening” (140). Some critics, such as Jared Gardner, attribute the 
causal relation of OCD and diary keeping to Bruce, reading his initiative 
to encourage her to start writing as a way to “help discipline [Alison’s] 
mounting compulsions and anxieties” (Gardner 2). The “retracing”—
now borrowing Chute’s term—taking place in this section of the 
narrative suggests, in fact, a causal relation between the character’s 
OCD and diary keeping, as though one were the outcome of the other. In 
another frame, the narrator again correlates the two: “then there’s my 
own compulsive propensity to autobiography” (140, my emphasis). In 
sum, Fun Home characterizes the onset of autobiographical writing for 
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the author as intrinsically associated with the onset of her obsessive-
compulsive behavior.  
 Obsessive-compulsive disorder in the narrative can, therefore, 
be seen through a myriad of lenses: it can stand for a repressed hostility 
towards the character’s parents, as Dr. Spock’s book suggests and 
Alison’s mother seems to agree with; it is representative of the family’s 
innate propensity to creativity, isolation, and compulsion, as indicated 
by the artists and autistics’ colonies frames and references; and, finally, 
it can be seen as another metanarrative element within a graphic memoir 
that, in a lot of ways, is about the craft of the graphic memoir in itself. 
Fun Home is particularly rich in terms of metacommentary about 
autobiographical writing, comics, and drawing, for, as Julia Watson 
defines it, as “memoir about memoirs, memory, and acts of storytelling, 
Fun Home is at all times an ironic and self-conscious life narrative” 
(27). The character’s OCD plays a prominent role in the self-conscious 
characteristic of the graphic memoir, for, as I will argue next, as much 
as it is attributed to the spark in the narrator’s autobiographical drive, it 
is also credited as the source for the constant questioning of the veracity 
of the facts being narrated as autobiographical.  
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Figure 15: Fun Home (141) 
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 Alison’s compulsive inclinations are also responsible for what 
the narrator calls an “epistemological crisis” (141) (Figure 15). At the 
same time that she embraces the passion to record her daily life in 
journals, she also embraces an anxiety towards the written record of 
those daily events, the narrative indicates. She describes her diary 
entries filled with the phrase “I think,” for around that time, the narrator 
recalls, she began to question the veracity of her own experience: “How 
did I know that the things I was writing were absolutely, objectively 
true?” (141). The narrator ascribes those concerns to the child Alison, as 
she was dealing with the symptoms of OCD, but the specter of this 
questioning echoes throughout the graphic memoir, as the narrator 
questions the efficacy of language and of her own recollection of events, 
even as she was writing them. OCD is signaled as the beginning of this 
questioning, and the beginning of a distrust in things deemed not 
concrete or objective. In that sense, the narrator’s metacomment could 
be seen as a dismissal of the symbolic significance of her experience 
with OCD within the narrative, for metaphor is decidedly not 
“absolutely, objectively true”. But then again, nothing is, as the narrator 
eventually realizes.  
 One of the facts that best symbolizes this realization, and an 
example of this echo of OCD in the narrative, is the open-ended account 
of her father’s suicide. Every time the narrator offers a version of the 
events that lead to Bruce’s death, one can almost feel the “I think” that 
follows it:  
 
Maybe he didn’t notice the truck coming because 
he was preoccupied with the divorce. People often 
have accidents when they’re distraught. But these 
are just quibbles. I don’t believe it was an 
accident. [. . .] 
I have suggested that my father killed himself, but 
it’s just as accurate to say that he died of 
gardening. [. . .] The truck driver described my 
father as jumping backward into the road ‘as if he 
saw a snake.’ And who knows. Perhaps he did. 
(28, 89) 
 
The narrator never provides closure for the reader on that issue, but 
shares, through the constant questioning and revisionism, how even 
actual events can often feel unreal and how a person’s perspective of 
them cannot achieve the status of being “objective”.  
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 Furthermore, the young character’s notes in her diary question 
the arbitrariness of language and the stability of connections between 
signifier and signified: “All I could speak for was my own perceptions, 
and perhaps not even those [. . .] My I thinks were gossamer sutures in 
that gaping rift between signifier and signified” (141-42). The narrative 
suggests a repudiation of the Saussurean concept of language, as a 
closed and fixed system, in which there is room for a speech that could 
ever be considered “absolutely, objectively true” (141). The character’s 
epistemological crisis favors, in turn, a Bakhtinian dialogic view on the 
heteroglossia of language, one in which “it is possible to give a concrete 
and detailed analysis of any utterance, once having exposed it as a 
contradiction-ridden, tension-filled unity of two embattled tendencies in 
the life of language” (Bakhtin 272). The anxiety of being confronted 
with the “living utterance”—defined by Mikhail Bakhtin as the way 
“any concrete discourse (utterance) finds the object at which it was 
directed already as it were overlain with qualifications, open to dispute, 
charged with value, already enveloped in an obscuring mist” (276)—
resonates in the narrator’s words: “[m]y simple, declarative sentences 
began to strike me as hubristic at best, utter lies at worst” (Bechdel 141). 
Language, according to the narrator, was always already inadequate at 
the function of representing reality for the young character. As Alison 
delves further into her OCD, the compulsive questioning of the written 
record of her own life becomes as “onerous” as the other daily rituals 
she developed around that time (142).  
 Visual narrative, on its turn, defies that questioning, in a way: 
just as the narrator points to how “most sturdy nouns faded to faint 
approximations under my pen,” in the final frame of the page (Figure 
15), the image portrays the writing of a journal entry. The word 
“popcorn” is featured in the frame and a hand is writing “I think” right 
next to it, confirming the narrator’s suggestion of the frailty of simple 
nouns in her early autobiographical efforts. The last image is a close-up 
of the section of her diary shown in the second frame, on top of the 
page. The questioning of the noun “popcorn” is, however, apparently 
undermined by the very concrete image of popcorn being made by the 
character, in the third and largest frame of the page. Visual narrative 
defies the “I think” placed next to the sentence “I made popcorn;” it 
suggests that popcorn was indeed made by the character, whether she 
questioned it in her writing or not. The cross-discursive tension within 
the page suggests that the epistemological crisis the narrator refers to 
was more about the (in)stability of language and its authority to register 
events than it was about the actuality of those events per se. Where 
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written discourse seems insufficient, visual language offers singular 
insight within the narrative. However, as Gardner points out, the 
narrative’s suspicion of the written word is not to be read as a simple  
 
rejection of language in favor of images. Images 
(postcards, polaroids) are no more trustworthy in 
the truths they share. Instead, what develops over 
the course of her diary, as Bechdel records it in 
Fun Home, is an increasing sense that text and 
image are each alone inadequate to the task, and 
that some merger of the two is required to tell the 
story of the truth, and the truth of the story. (3) 
 
Fun Home places visual language as self-consciously occupying some of 
what the narrator calls the “troubling gap between word and meaning,” 
while, simultaneously and continually, questioning whether that gap 
should be occupied at all (Bechdel 143). In a testament to graphic 
memoirs as a genre, the re-creation of complex past experiences that 
defy the ineffectiveness of written language, such as trauma, is, thus, 
complicated by a denaturalization of the reliability of such images. In 
the reference to the popcorn, for example, the image of the young 
character making popcorn apparently contradicts the failure of 
“popcorn” as an episteme in her OCD journal entry, in the adjacent 
frame. The question remains, though, whether the “I thinks” experienced 
in her early autobiographical records extend to the supposedly 
concreteness portrayed in visual narrative.  
 The escalation of her OCD-led epistemological crisis, in the 
narrative, leads the character to develop an abbreviation of “I think”:  
 
Matters worsened in my diary. To save time I 
created a shorthand version of I think, a curvy 
circumflex. Soon I began drawing it right over 
names and pronouns. It became a sort of amulet, 
warding off evil from my subjects. Then I realized 
I could draw the symbol over an entire entry. 
Things were getting fairly illegible [. . .]. (142-43)  
 
Gardner argues the entrance of the curvy circumflex symbol marks a 
turning point in the character’s autobiographical process; it marks the 
“first addition of image to text in her diaries” (3).  Indeed, even though 
the curvy circumflex is something very much connected to the 
character’s writing, the narrator does use the word “drawing” to describe 
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it. At the same time that the created sign relates to written text—as a 
stand in for the “I think” phrase—it surpasses structural limitations of 
traditional language in its defiance of lines and space in the page. 
However, the turning point represented by the curvy circumflex seems 
to be, more than anything, with its power over language. It is a graphic 
speech act that effectively does something to language; it is 
performative in its questioning.  
 The curvy circumflex pronounces the written language 
unreliable; more specifically, it pronounces autobiographical writing 
unreliable—and, by extension, the whole of the graphic memoir 
narrative of Fun Home unreliable. Just as the narrator recalls her young 
self crossing over entire journal entries with the shorthand curvy 
circumflex, the narrative also suggests, for the reader, that the entirety of 
the work should be put under erasure. The autobiographical pact is, thus, 
subverted, as the presence of the curvy punctuation mark signals to the 
reader that This is what happened. As I remember. Perhaps. I think. In 
this particular metanarrative note, the character’s doubts about essential 
Truths in recording her own life as a child with OCD end up subverting 
the idea of authenticity and Truth in autobiography in a larger context, 
that of the graphic memoir itself.   
 The character’s OCD and the questions represented by the 
curvy circumflex become irrevocably entangled in the narrative. OCD is 
a point of departure for the autobiographical impulse at the same time 
that it is pivotal in the epistemological crisis that followed it. Given the 
rhetorical importance of the character’s epistemological crisis to the 
overall tone of the autobiographical work, narrative prosthesis appears 
particularly prominent in Fun Home. Obsessive-compulsive disorder is a 
polyvalent metaphor within the narrative, as it could be read through a 
myriad of lenses: as an emulation of her father’s own compulsions; as a 
manifestation of the family’s inclinations to artistic obsessions and 
isolation; as a psychosomatic stress-related illness resulting from the 
tension within the family; as the point of departure to the narrator’s 
suspicions of language; and so on.  
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VISUAL METAPHOR 
 
 Taking as starting points the discussion and analyses of 
narrative prosthesis and graphic memoir, as seen earlier in this 
dissertation, this section will explore the wider implications of the use of 
metaphor in autobiography, in general, and of visual metaphor, more 
specifically, in the construction of disability in graphic memoirs. In the 
previous section I analyzed instances in graphic memoirs where one 
could read disability as metaphor, in conjunction with Mitchell and 
Snyder’s theory of narrative prosthesis. This section is dedicated to 
graphic memoirs that do not necessarily use disability as a metaphor in 
their narratives, but that employ visual metaphor as a technique of 
representation of disability.  
 
3.1. (Visual) Metaphor in autobiography — Ceci n’est pas un self 
 
 As explored in the last section, David Mitchell and Sharon 
Snyder’s concept of narrative prosthesis has, at its core, the idea that 
disability is often employed as a metaphorical trope in literature (47). 
This chapter shall begin with a brief introduction of the use of metaphor 
in autobiographies and how it is tied in with assumptions about 
representations of the self, entailed in the genre.  
 Leigh Gilmore, in Autobiographics: A Feminist Theory of 
Women’s Self-Representation (1994), discusses at length the subject of 
metaphor in autobiography and the way this figure of speech is tied to 
critics’ understanding of representations of the self in autobiographical 
writings. Going back to the 1970s, Gilmore points to how metaphor was 
one of the main tropes under discussion when scholars such as James 
Olney, Paul de Man, and Philippe Lejeune tried to bridge the notions of 
the real and its representation in autobiography (65). In Metaphors of 
Self (1972), for example, Olney argues that the autobiographer creates a 
metaphor of the self in their writing (qtd. in Gilmore 65). In 
“Autobiography as De-facement” (1979), de Man, in his turn, opts for 
prosopopoeia as the rhetorical device that at the same time enables and 
constrains the self in autobiographical narrative: “prosopopeia is the 
trope of autobiography, by which one’s name [. . .] is made as 
intelligible and memorable as a face. Our topic deals with the giving and 
taking away of faces, with face and deface, figure, figuration and 
disfiguration” (de Man 926, original emphasis). Lastly, Philippe 
Lejeune, in “The Autobiographical Pact” (1975), foregrounds the 
importance of the name for the definition of autobiography: “the author 
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(whose name refers to a real person) and the narrator are identical”  
(Lejeune 4). All those authors mentioned by Gilmore conceive the 
autobiographical subject as corresponding, through different rhetorical 
devices—metaphor being one of them—to the writing I.  
 The question of the metaphor in autobiography, thus, is directly 
related to assumptions surrounding the representation of the self. From 
the mentioned dialogue revolving around the construction of the self in 
autobiographical works, Gilmore claims that the technologies of 
autobiography, as she defines them, are mostly about “the relationship 
between autobiography’s privileged signifier of identity, the name, and 
autobiography’s simulation of real life” (65). These technologies deal 
with concerns over representation and the real, as well as the naturalized 
assumptions related to the written and the writing Is. As technologies of 
autobiography are grounded in discourses of truth and identity, she 
argues, the assumption of cohesion is reiterated through a series of 
narrative techniques. Gilmore criticizes the fact that while the debate 
around these technologies tries to pin down what makes 
autobiographical writing unique, or, rather, what makes it different or 
similar to fiction in its narrative, it unwittingly reinforces the “discourses 
and practices that construct truth and identity” as stable and 
unproblematic (66). In other words, such perspective “depends upon 
taking autobiography’s ‘realisms,’ its representations of identity and the 
real, as identity and the real themselves” (65, original emphasis). Even 
though autobiographical texts carry the signifier of non-fiction, it is 
important, nevertheless, to distinguish between representation of reality 
and reality itself. Thus, appropriating René Magritte’s famous line in 
“La trahison des images,” the autobiographical text should be read under 
the caveat of “Ceci n’est pas un self.”  
 Gilmore relies on the works of “Michel Foucault (who 
described sex as a technology) and Teresa de Lauretis (who analyzed the 
technologies of gender)” to indicate how technologies of autobiography, 
through their principles of identity, produce and represent the 
autobiographical subject at the same time that they represent it (18, 25). 
If, as Gilmore points out, the technologies of autobiography ground this 
type of narrative to a (constructed) materiality of the self and of reality, 
they still allow room for a myriad of ways to disrupt it. Focusing on self-
representational narratives written by women, Gilmore locates instances 
in which those technologies are used in order to subvert discourses of 
identity and truth. Autobiographers, she claims, could find in the 
contradictions inherent to the technologies of autobiography a way to 
enact performative agency through a rhetorical self-awareness (25).   
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 Teresa de Lauretis, when discussing technologies of gender, 
refers to the concept of the space-off as the locus of those inherent 
contradictions in hegemonic discourse. She proposes that the subject of 
feminism should appropriate the space-off available:  
 
those other spaces both discursive and social that 
exist, since feminist practices have (re)constructed 
them, in the margins (or ‘between the lines,’ or 
‘against the grain’) of hegemonic discourses and 
in the interstices of institutions, in counter 
practices and new forms of community. These two 
kinds of spaces are neither in opposition to one 
another nor strung along a chain of signification, 
but they coexist concurrently and in contradiction. 
The movement between them, therefore, is not 
that of a dialectic, of integration, of a 
combinatory, or of différance, but is the tension of 
contradiction, multiplicity, and heteronomy. 
(Lauretis 26, original emphasis) 
 
Both Gilmore and Lauretis think about the possibilities of rupture in the 
technologies of autobiography and gender, respectively, in spatial terms. 
Lauretis suggests the idea of the “space-off” to indicate the gaps and 
cracks of contradiction within discourses (26). Gilmore, in her turn, 
professes that in order to “locate women’s self-representation” and its 
relation to the technologies of autobiography, she “discovered that a 
map for finding women’s autobiography became a map for getting lost,” 
since the territory is “largely unmapped” (3, 5). 
 In the genre of graphic memoir one could think of several 
spaces wherein a rupture of hegemonic discourses may happen. Some of 
those sites of subversion were explored in the analyses of graphic 
narratives in the first section of this dissertation, such as the competing 
visual and verbal discourses present in comics. As visual and verbal 
discourses contradict each other within the same space, within the same 
frame even, they subvert the idea of a single stable narrative. This 
constant contradiction is especially subversive in terms of 
autobiographical texts that are always already under the constraints of 
this presupposed stability of the narrating I.  
 The gutter could also be seen as a potential site of rupture 
within the page, as visual narrative in comics is itself structured around 
gaps between frames. The white space separating frames sets the rhythm 
of the narrative while, at the same time, being absent from it. Scott 
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McCloud defines the gutter as a limbo wherein  
 
human imagination takes two separate images and 
transforms them into a single idea. Nothing is seen 
between the two panels, but experience tells you 
something must be there. [. . .] closure allows us to 
connect these moments and mentally construct a 
continuous, unified reality. (66-7, original 
emphasis) 
 
McCloud’s definition presupposes the existence of a stable, unified 
reality, which is then reconstructed by the comics reader within the 
space of the gutter. Other scholars, such as Hillary Chute, for instance, 
depart from the assumption of an attainable closure in comics and the 
stable reality McCloud’s concept entails. Chute reads the gutter as a 
space to create “disjunction between narration and image” and, 
ultimately, as a place wherein the author can compose a “complex 
autobiographical fabric” (141). Thayse Madella, for example, argues 
that the gutter is employed by Marjane Satrapi, in Persepolis, as a 
narratological device in the construction of diverse and complex 
identities that reflect the character’s social and historical background. 
The gutter could be seen, then, as the comics genre’s space-off, 
borrowing de Lauretis’ term, in its potential weaving of multiple 
contradictory meanings.  
 Besides the gutter and the cross-discursiveness of comics, I 
propose that visual metaphor can be seen as a narratological device 
within autobiographical comics with the potential to denaturalize 
realism within the narrative.  
 The concept of visual metaphor is seen differently by critics in 
the fields of linguistics, semiotics, and films studies, and, as such, the 
following section of this chapter shall explore some of the definitions of 
scholars in these fields and how best they can be used in the study of 
visual metaphor in the context of graphic memoirs. Most authors 
associate visual metaphor to the “main tenets of conceptual metaphor 
theory,” which involve instances where metaphoric thought occurs (El 
Refaie “Understanding visual metaphor” 80-1). Mostly, these studies 
stem from George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s theory that metaphor 
pervades our daily lives, “not just in language but in thought and action” 
(Lakoff and Johnson 3). Basically, they argue, “human thought 
processes are largely metaphorical,” in the sense that human experience 
is itself formed through the understanding of one thing in terms of 
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another, which is the basis of metaphor in their definition (5-6).   
 Although Lakoff and Johnson use problematic terms such as 
“universal” to describe experiences associated with the formation of 
what they call “primitive metaphors,” their model for conceptual 
metaphor is particularly relevant to this research (258). They establish a 
correlation between the use of metaphor, bodily experience, and 
physical interaction with the environment. Metaphors, they argue, “are 
shaped and constrained by our bodily experiences in the world, 
experiences in which the two conceptual domains are correlated and 
consequently establish mappings from one domain to another” (247-8). 
Bodily experience and culturally based frames, thus, inform the 
construction of conceptual metaphors (258). Thus, if graphic memoirs 
depict disability in metaphorical terms, in what ways is this connection 
being explored? More specifically, for the purposes of the analyses in 
this section, in what ways is this metaphor being visually laid out within 
the narrative?  
 Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of conceptual metaphor pertains, 
primarily, to the study of verbal metaphors and, although some scholars 
see visual metaphor as belonging to the same structure and rules, others 
focus on seeing visual metaphor as its own phenomenon. Before 
attempting to answer the questions concerning the use of visual 
metaphor to represent disability in graphic memoirs, a small detour is 
needed in order to try to understand the concept of the visual metaphor 
in itself and its particularities.  
 Noel Carroll differentiates the visual metaphor from the verbal 
metaphor through what he refers to as “homospatiality,” or, in other 
words, a fusion of ideas within the same space (190). In the visual 
metaphor, he argues, two “discrete elements coexist in the same space, [. 
. .] and call [. . .] to mind different concepts or categories” (191, 193)6.  
Another element of the visual metaphor, for Carroll, is that the image at 
hand must be “physically noncompossible,” which means that the 
viewer should understand those elements in the same space not as “a 
representation of a physically possible state of affairs, but as an 
opportunity to regard one of the categories as providing a source for 
apprehending something about the other category” (199). In sum, he 
understands visual metaphor as the fusion of two distinct images (or 
                                               
6 Coincidentally or not, Carroll cites the sixteenth-century painter Hieronymous Bosch (1450 - 
1516) as an artist prolific in the use of visual metaphor (197). Bosch would later become a 
major influence for Pieter Brueghel, whose work, as seen in the previous section, represents a 
turning point in the depiction of disability as a metaphor (Cahan and Riley 9). 
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ideas) that on its own should not be interpreted at face value, but as a 
clear use of visual metaphor on the part of the artist. Visual metaphors 
are, for him, therefore, highly contextual, both in terms of production 
and of reception.  
 This particular aspect of the visual metaphor in critical texts, its 
deliberate noncompossibility, is somewhat problematic as we move to 
the study of literature, for it inevitably incurs in the intentional fallacy of 
assuming what the author, or in this instance the image-maker, has in 
mind when designing her art. Carroll states, for example, that “in 
determining whether the elements in an array are physically 
noncompossible, [. . .] we need to consider the context in which the 
image is presented and the intentions of the image-maker in presenting 
it” (208, my emphasis). Other scholars seem to follow the same logic.  
 Charles Forceville, who has written at length about pictorial 
metaphor, understands it as a phenomenon in which a visual 
replacement of expectations occurs (El Refaie “Understanding visual 
metaphor” 80). For him, context is also highly relevant, but in terms of 
the management of expectations, both from artist as well as from reader: 
“For a pictorial representation to be called metaphorical, it is necessary 
that a ‘literal,’ or conventional reading of the pictorial representation is 
felt either not to exhaust its meaning potential, or to yield an anomaly 
which is understood as an intentional violation of the norm rather than 
as an error” (64). As Forceville sets forth to lay out his model of 
pictorial metaphor, he establishes that it “is important to be able to 
assess with a fair degree of certainty what is the intention of the maker 
of a pictorial metaphor,” which, for his research, implies “a corpus of 
non-artistic ‘texts,’” namely advertisements” (Forceville 65, original 
emphasis). The emphasis on the author’s intentions is, therefore, 
intrinsic  both to Forceville’s model of visual metaphor as well as 
Carroll’s.  
 Despite having pronounced the author as dead, Roland Barthes, 
in “Rhetoric of the Image,” chooses to work with advertisement images 
because of their “undoubtedly intentional” signification as well (33). 
Barthes’ theory on visual language is focused, in its turn, on what he 
calls anchorage and relay (38). As images are polysemous, the reader 
must choose between a “floating chain of signifieds,” a choice facilitated 
by the linguistic message which acts as an “anchorage” (38). The 
stability of the linguistic message prevents the multiplication of 
connoted meanings and effectively (and ideologically) “directs the 
reader” to the preferred readings (40, original emphasis). “Relay” is the 
other function seen in interaction between verbal and visual language, 
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and “cartoons and comics strips” are genres prolific in it (41). In the 
relay, visual and verbal language “stand in a complementary relationship 
[. . .] and the unity of the message is realized at a higher level, that of the 
story,” with one or the other taking precedence as detainers of the 
“informational charge” (41).  
 While all three authors mentioned underline the necessity of 
understanding the author’s intentions when dealing with visual metaphor 
and visual language, they point to different analytical models of 
iconography. A point of contention among scholars is the rate in which 
concepts about verbal metaphor could be transferred to the study of 
visual metaphor.  
 Francisco Yus, for example, in an article about political 
cartoons, defends that “interpreting visual metaphors does not differ 
substantially from verbal metaphor comprehension” (167). His analysis 
indicates that the reader has to decode the image in a number of 
“subsequent interpretive steps” similar to the “kind of conceptual 
adjustment that takes place in the interpretation of verbal metaphors” 
(168). Also writing about political cartoons and visual metaphor, 
Elisabeth El Refaie argues, on the other hand, that  
 
because of the logo-centric history of the study of 
metaphor, many researchers still tend to assume 
that theories from the domain of linguistics can be 
applied to visual metaphors in a simple and 
straightforward way. This assumption is often 
based on the idea that images are fundamentally 
representational, which would imply that the 
visual can be seen simply as expressing the same 
meanings as language, albeit in a more imprecise 
form. (“Understanding visual metaphor” 84) 
 
El Refaie concludes her text asserting that while theories on verbal 
metaphor may offer some insight into the study of visual metaphor, it is, 
however, important that researchers in this field be aware of the 
“thoughts or concepts that appear to underlie it” (90). The differentiation 
between an image seen as literal and an image seen as metaphor will be, 
therefore, highly contextual and will depend on the discourse of a 
certain culture (90). In this context, it seems that Magritte’s axiom in 
“La trahison des images,” “Ceci n’est pas une pipe,” is again relevant to 
our discussion, as one has to be careful with naturalizing assumptions of 
images and their correspondence to language.  
 Going back to the basis of Lakoff and Johnson’s Conceptual 
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Metaphor Theory and its alleged universality of embodied experiences 
in relation to the construction of metaphors, El Refaie explores, in a later 
study, the extent to which social and cultural contexts impact a reader’s 
comprehension of visual metaphors in political cartoons. She argues 
that: 
 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory is based on the 
proposition that metaphor derives from our bodily 
experience and is thus an essential part of our 
everyday patterns of thinking. This suggests that 
most instances of metaphor will be understood in 
similar ways by all members of a language 
community. But in fact it is becoming increasingly 
clear that the choice and interpretation of 
metaphors is partly dependent upon the 
participants’ social and cultural background [. . .], 
as well as on the specific contexts. (“Metaphor in 
political cartoons” 174) 
 
Despite the evident contributions of Conceptual Metaphor Theory to the 
understanding of metaphor in our daily lives, therefore, the inadequacy 
of conceiving any type of human experience as universal becomes clear 
as individual responses to visual metaphor are explored.  
 Without incurring in the universalist aspect of Conceptual 
Metaphor Theory, therefore, I propose an analysis of visual metaphor 
that takes into consideration bodily experience as part of the 
construction of that metaphor. Most of the studies brought forth in this 
brief review of literature about verbal and visual metaphor focus on its 
more formal qualities and tend to choose objects of study based 
primarily on the clearness of their authors’ intentions (advertisements 
are intended to sell whereas political cartoons are geared towards 
political commentary, for example). In this respect, I must agree with 
Roland Barthes (in “Death of the Author,” that is) when he argues that 
the effort to “decipher” a text, to search for the author’s intentions, is 
“quite futile” (147). As such, I will not pretend to grasp any of the 
author’s intentions in the analyses that follow, though I will make use of 
author’s statements in interviews if I find them pertinent to the text. I do 
not intend to follow one specific model of visual metaphor, but rather 
keep this dialogue in mind when analyzing depictions of disability in the 
selected graphic memoirs.  
 The works chosen for analysis in this chapter are what G. 
Thomas Couser refers to as “somatographies,” or, autobiographical 
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narratives that deal with disability related to a close person to the author 
(Signifying Bodies 2). In other words, they are graphic memoirs of 
experiencing disability through a proxy, i.e. a third party perspective. 
This choice of corpus is deliberately done in order to complicate the idea 
of self-representation in graphic memoirs about disability. If we see the 
phenomenon of “some body memoirs” as a way for people to represent 
their own experiences with disability and appropriate the discourse that 
is usually used to stigmatize them, as Couser argues, narratives about 
somebody else’s disability raise some relevant questions (18). This is 
especially true in circumstances where the person is unaware or unable 
to represent herself or to actively participate in the construction of that 
representation (18). These graphic memoirs are, therefore, at the same 
time works of self-representation and texts that represent an Other in 
terms of disability. 
 One issue to be considered is the ethical dilemma involved, 
since in some cases informed consent may be challenging. The family 
member or partner may be unable to give consent to their story being 
told in this public fashion, or, in some instances, he or she may even be 
already deceased. The two sides to this dilemma involve the benefits of 
representing disability  
 
as it is actually experienced by particular human 
beings [and] the risk of misrepresenting them, 
speaking about them without speaking for them 
(that is, advocating for them) or even speaking 
with them (that is, consulting them to learn their 
desires). (19, original emphasis)  
 
Couser suggests guidelines inspired in the fields of “biomedical ethics 
and the ethics of anthropology, especially of ethnography” to avoid such 
pitfalls (19). Under those guidelines, such stories would be in a better 
position to distinguish “between subjects’ rights and their interests” (19, 
original emphasis).  
 Couser appears to regard somatography as a memoir of the 
person with disabilities, written by a close family member or partner, 
and, consequently, his concerns with the dangers of exploitation and the 
distinction of these subjects’ rights versus their interests guide his 
writing on the topic (19). While I share those concerns, I see the graphic 
body memoirs analyzed in this chapter more in the perspective of 
memoirs of people that had to deal with disability in their lives, albeit 
not first-hand.  
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 Tangles: A Story about Alzheimer’s, my Mother, and Me 
(2012), by Sarah Leavitt, for example, is not the story of the author’s 
mother, told through the author’s perspective, as Couser’s concept of 
somatography would imply. It is an account of her own experiences as 
the daughter of someone with Alzheimer’s, with no pretense to speak for 
her mother, nor to be her mother’s voice as dementia progressed. 
Similarly, in Epileptic (2005), by David B., it is his brother, Jean-
Christophe, who must deal with epilepsy, but the narrative is focused on 
David’s experiences and the way in which the illness impacted all their 
lives. Despite these distinctions, I do maintain the use of the term 
“somatography” throughout this section as a way to indicate 
autobiographical works dealing with a disability of someone close to the 
author.  
 I have chosen these works, Tangles and Epileptic, for the way 
in which disability of an other in the family is conveyed through visual 
metaphor. In both narratives, disability is at the core of the story and I 
intend to analyze how it figures in such texts, where it is constructed as 
apart from the self of the narrating I.  
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3.2. Tangles: “Like I ever wanted to be so familiar with her body”  
 
 As the title of Sarah Leavitt’s graphic memoir indicates, 
Tangles: A Story about Alzheimer’s, my Mother, and Me revolves 
around the author’s mother’s discovery and subsequent development of 
Alzheimer’s. The work starts with an introduction in prose, in which the 
narrator explains the reasons for choosing to write about her mother’s 
disability and how it impacted the family:  
 
I’ve always had a really bad memory. So when my 
mother got Alzheimer’s disease, I knew that I had 
to record what was happening to her and to our 
family. I wanted to be able to look back over my 
notes and remember all the moments of craziness, 
beauty, and tragedy—and not lose any of them. 
(7)  
 
By starting her text with an allusion to her own memory issues, the 
narrator is already signaling to the reader that the story is as much about 
herself as it is about her mother. At the same time, her initial remarks 
also question the stability of memory in her own autobiographical 
account. She further emphasizes this point in the final paragraph of the 
introduction: “This is the story that I have pieced together from my 
memories, my notes, and my sketches. Other people in my family may 
remember things differently. In the end, this is only my story: the tangled 
story of my mother, and me, and Alzheimer’s” (7, my emphasis). 
Leavitt’s graphic memoir, thus, unsettles some traditions of the 
autobiographical genre by contesting an implied ownership of the truth 
in her narrative. 
 The dilemma of writing about someone else’s disability is also 
foregrounded in the introductory chapter:  
 
I often felt like Harriet the Spy, or, in darker 
moments, like a vulture hovering and waiting for 
Mom to say or do something that I could record 
and preserve, even as she slipped away from me. 
Sometimes she would pull on the page or grab my 
pen as I tried to write. The pen would skid and 
make a mark and I’d label the mark: ‘Mom moved 
my pen.’ I wanted to keep every trace of her. (7, 
my emphasis) 
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This description places Sarah in a predatory position, as a metaphorical 
vulture, while assigning the role of prey to her mother. By owing up to 
the possibility of objectifying the mother though this type of 
autobiographical impulse, the narrative advances some of the ethical 
problems inherent in this scenario.  
 The importance of visual discourse in Sarah’s account is 
evidenced in her commentary of choice of medium: 
 
During Mom’s illness, I started using some of my 
notes to write stories and essays about what was 
happening. I imagined writing a book. [. . .] I 
chose a small number of drawings and notes, 
compiled them into a booklet, and made a few 
colour copies. I realized that instead of writing 
prose about my mother I wanted to do a graphic 
memoir, and I spent the next four years writing 
and drawing this book. (7)  
 
The specificity of visuality is brought to the fore, as it appears to be 
paramount in her choice of graphic memoir versus prose. As such, the 
ways in which visual metaphor are employed in the narrative are 
particularly of interest to this research.  
 The first relevant use of visual metaphor in Tangles occurs in 
the frame where her mother’s doctor is seen presenting Sarah and her 
father, Robert, with Midge’s diagnosis (Figure 16). As seen from the 
quoted page, Leavitt’s style is very minimalistic, with an abundance of 
empty space in the frames, what Ian McGills calls “deceptively 
sophisticated” (McGills). Her style also stands out for a lack of balloons 
in her dialogues and for an absence of gutters, or empty space between 
frames. The page in question is divided into eleven frames. The upper 
part of the page, with its six symmetrical frames, portrays the family 
anxiously interacting with the doctor. As father and daughter are asked 
to leave, they are depicted as shadows, alone in the frame. The following 
two frames recreate this loneliness and the sense of time taking a long 
time to pass, as well as the range of emotions going through them: from 
disappointment, to anger, to sadness. The biggest frame of the page is 
dedicated to the visual metaphor of the ground crumbling beneath their 
feet as they hear the confirmation of their worst fears in the doctor’s 
announcement.  
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Figure 16: Tangles (37) 
 
 The line representing the ground does not go all the way to the 
end of the panel, which, along with a lack of gutters in the visual 
narrative, tricks the reader into thinking the frame is actually smaller 
than it is. It is only by following the line until the end that one realizes it 
does not represent the border of the frame. It is, rather, the ground on 
which the characters should be standing. Except that father and daughter 
are not, in fact, standing on that ground. In comparison with the doctor, 
whose feet are firmly placed on the ground, they are slightly above, as if 
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suspended in disbelief.  
 The visual metaphor of the ground crumbling stems from the 
known verbal metaphor of the same content. Lakoff and Johnson’s 
definition of conceptual metaphor and its relation to bodily experience is 
fitting here, for the idea of losing one’s ground seems directly related to 
that of falling down unexpectedly in a hole, for example. This particular 
instance of visual metaphor is centered on the other family members’ 
experience with Alzheimer’s, rather than Midge’s. They are the ones to 
receive the diagnosis, whereas the actual subject of that diagnosis is 
absent from the frame altogether. The image suggests that the ground 
crumbles for the family of a person diagnosed with Alzheimer’s, while 
not necessarily for the person herself. This is emphasized by the contrast 
with the frame directly below, with Midge unaware of the drama of the 
situation, smiling after the appointment. In her perspective, the narrative 
suggests, the stability of the ground is not an issue (it does not even 
figure in the frame), and she is simply glad the doctor was so nice. The 
implication of that visual metaphor is misleading, however, since the 
person with Alzheimer’s, though not always aware of the situation, does 
comprehend the severity of their illness as it progresses. Midge is 
portrayed, for example, several times showing frustration with the 
illness: “I hate what’s happening to me,” she says (42). The visual 
metaphor seen on the quoted page is a good example of the potential 
problems in appropriating someone else’s story of disability. As the 
perspective shifts from the person with disability to the person telling 
the story, so does the focus, which could lead to a silencing of the 
former’s experience in favor of the latter.  
 The visual metaphor of receiving the diagnosis in Tangles is 
closely associated with the historically constructed myth and stigma 
surrounding Alzheimer’s. The historicity of the perception of 
Alzheimer’s is the main topic of Jesse F. Ballenger’s book, Self, Senility, 
and Alzheimer's Disease in Modern America: A History (2006), for, as 
he points out, “[. . .] it is ironic that our public discussion of a disease 
that robs individuals of their memories proceeds with so little 
appreciation of its past” (3). Through the process of retracing that past, 
one could see how in the eighteenth century, for example, dementia and 
old age were not the subject of the nightmare they eventually came to be 
in late twentieth century (4). Despite having been officially “discovered” 
in the turn of the twentieth century, it was only during the 1980s, 
Ballenger states, that Alzheimer’s emerged as “a major disease entity 
and public issue,” frequently described as an epidemic for an 
increasingly aging population (8). Around that time, through a series of 
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government, mass media, and advertising campaigns, the idea of old age 
became disconnected from that of senility or dementia in favor of a 
glorified concept of retirement (9). This shift had the paradoxical effect, 
however, of “intensif[ying] the stigma of senility. As the meaning and 
purpose of old age was reduced to maintaining one’s health and activity 
levels, disease and dependency grew even less tolerable” (9-10). In this 
rather utilitarian capitalist model, the work force had to be continually 
replaced, making the golden years supposedly the best period of one’s 
life, when one could enjoy the rewards of a lifetime of hard work; 
senility, in its turn, represented the opposite of the ideal surrounding the 
retiree’s context (9). In this scenario, an aging body was not supposed to 
entail an aging mind, gerontologists affirmed (9). 
 The idea of the senile person, struggling with dementia, was at 
odds with the independence expected of modern times and of this 
modern old age (9). The notion of selfhood was also tied to the 
expectations of the times:  
 
Selfhood was no longer an ascribed status but had 
to be carefully and willfully constructed by every 
individual [. . .] In light of these changes, the loss 
of the ability to independently sustain a coherent 
self-narrative—a loss that dementia entails—has 
come to be considered the most dreadful of all 
losses. (9)  
 
Medical and popular discourse, then, constructed the anxiety around old 
age that culminated with the panic of senility, dementia, and, finally, of 
Alzheimer’s.  
 As Susan Sontag argues, “nothing is more punitive than to give 
a disease a meaning,” and Alzheimer’s seems riddled with it (58). 
Sontag focuses primarily on what she calls “master illnesses,” such as 
cancer and tuberculosis, in which the illness is not only fatal, but also 
surrounded by mystery, granting it a quasi-mythical aura (61, 72). She 
states that  
 
[a]ny important disease whose causality is murky, 
and for which treatment in ineffectual, tends to be 
awash in significance. First, the subjects of 
deepest dread (corruption, decay, pollution, 
anomie, weakness) are identified with the disease. 
The disease itself becomes a metaphor. Then, in 
the name of the disease (that is, using it as a 
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metaphor), that horror is imposed on other things. 
The disease becomes adjectival. Something is said 
to be disease-like, meaning that it is disgusting or 
ugly. (58, my emphasis)  
 
These master illnesses are constructed, then, as reflections of a socio-
economical context in which the individual is in crisis with society, 
“with society conceived as the individual’s adversary. Disease 
metaphors are used to judge society not as out of balance but as 
repressive” (73). Surrounded by mystery since its “discovery” in 1901, 
Alzheimer’s disease has become a metaphor in many ways.   
 With Alzheimer’s, meaning has been culturally constructed 
around the metaphor of losing one’s mind, of “losing one’s selfhood,” as 
a “synonym of ‘losing control’” (Johnstone 26). A study about 
metaphors and Alzheimer’s disease collected data from news media, 
film, documentaries, and professional and academic literature and 
separated the metaphors most commonly used in three categories, 
following Sontag’s model: epidemic metaphors, military metaphors, and 
predatory thief metaphors (Johnstone 33). In the study, Megan-Jane 
Johnstone concluded that Alzheimer’s disease has “primarily been 
conceptualized and represented in a metaphorical rather than a literal 
way in public and professional debate [. . .]” (24, original emphasis). 
Drawing from the works of Lakoff and Johnson on metaphor and of 
Susan Sontag’s on illness as metaphor, Johnstone argues that the 
Alzheimer metaphor influences the way people think about the disease, 
and, most importantly, the way people dehumanize and affect 
constructed “notions of personhood” of people living with it (24).  
 Throughout Tangles, the trope of losing one’s sense of 
personhood is visually depicted in the drawings of Midge’s eyes and 
expression. At the beginning of the narrative, Midge is portrayed as her 
regular self, always composed and interacting with the other members of 
the family in a familiar way. She is drawn always with her glasses on, 
and those become an emblem of her state of mind as the narrative, and 
Alzheimer’s, unfurls. As episodes of dementia become more and more 
frequent, visual narrative suggests that the character is distancing herself 
from her family through the portrayal of a blank expression: Midge’s 
glasses are still on, but no discernable expression is seen on her face. 
Midge’s visual characterization is taken over by a sort of blank stare that 
dehumanizes her, stripping her of subjectivity and playing into the 
metaphor of “losing one’s identity” frequently associated with 
Alzheimer’s. The prosthesis of the opaque glasses becomes the signifier 
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of Alzheimer’s in her character, visually indicating her deviance from 
the norm.  
 An example of this transition into the blank stare can be seen in 
the following page (Figure 17), taken from the chapter “Cut My Life 
Into Pieces.” The first half of the page is marked by the handwriting of 
the narrator’s journal, signaling the archival aspect of the text 
accompanying the images and setting it apart from the narrative up until 
that point. The division between frames on the top part of the page also 
differs from the rest of the narrative, with wavy lines instead of the usual 
straight ones. The excerpt from her journal begins by situating the 
context of its writing: “Dec 21, 2001. Waiting for Mom to finish in the 
bathroom, so I’m just writing for a while... Like I ever wanted to be so 
familiar with her body, her bad breath, her smelly underarms, her skinny 
body huddling in the bath as she looks at me wide-eyed” (85). The 
frustrations of having to deal with the corporeal needs of her mother are 
illustrated by the portrayal of Midge as particularly vulnerable, 
uncertain, and in need of assistance in even the most common bath 
routine procedures. The loss of personhood is not only characterized 
through Midge’s depiction, but it is a phenomenon clearly noted by her 
caregiver and narrator:  
 
It gets hard to see someone as a person when 
they’ve become a list of needs: BATH, 
CLOTHES, BRUSH TEETH, WALK, FOOD, 
ETC. If you just think about that list, then you’re 
not as sad… until one night you’re giving her pills 
and she starts pretending to be a monster… and 
she’s a person again and you don’t only love her, 
you like her. (85) 
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Figure 17: Tangles: A Story about Alzheimer’s, my Mother, and Me (85) 
 
In her lucid moments, Midge is seen as a person again, according to the 
narrator’s journal excerpt. In those moments, exemplified here by 
frames seven and nine, when Midge reclaims her personhood from 
Alzheimer’s, her expression is clearly conveying some sort of emotion 
and she is seen obviously interacting with an interlocutor. Frame eleven, 
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on the other hand, depicts a completely different Midge.  
 Devoid of any status of personhood, Midge is portrayed as an 
empty self: her expression is empty, her eyes kept hidden behind the 
glasses. In a powerless position, unable to lift herself up from the toilet, 
she is reasserted and essentialized as a person with Alzheimer’s, instead 
of the person she was just two frames earlier in the narrative. Rosemarie 
Garland-Thomson, in Staring: How We Look (2009), argues that staring 
is part of how we communicate in our daily lives:  
 
staring affords a spontaneous moment of 
interpersonal connection, however brief, during 
which two people have the opportunity to regard 
and be known to one another [. . .] Staring, in 
other words, makes things happen between 
people. (33) 
 
The blank stare, on the other hand, is classified as an “improper” way of 
looking, one that entails an alienation characteristic of society’s outcasts 
(22). In our scripted social interactions, the blank stare becomes 
unreadable, shutting the person out and making her the subject of 
stigmatization (34). The depiction of the blank stare as a visual mark of 
the progression of Midge’s Alzheimer’s effectively situates her as an 
improper person, someone outside the domain of the subject.  
 The quoted page shows the distinction between both statuses, as 
Midge appears in her familiar self—lovingly returning her daughter’s 
gaze and interacting with her, as her daughter remembers it—and her 
constructed Alzheimer’s self directly below it, blankly staring and 
unresponsive. The juxtaposition of the two reinforces the dichotomy of 
personhood and non-personhood in the narrative. The visual metaphor 
of the empty stare works, therefore, as a visual signifier throughout the 
text of the progression of the illness that slowly removes Midge from the 
midst of the family and corroborates the common verbal metaphor of 
“losing’s one’s identity” due to Alzheimer’s.  
 The visual clue of the blank stare emerges only after a certain 
point in the narrative. For a while, in the early stages of her illness, 
Midge is still having lots of lucid times, interacting with her family, and 
they are just starting to notice some of the signs classically associated 
with Alzheimer’s. During those parts of the narrative, she is still 
depicted with a familiar expression in her eyes, without the blank stare 
that would accompany her later on. Other visual metaphors are used, 
then, to convey the repercussions of Alzheimer’s within the narrative. 
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The quoted page (Figure 18), from the chapter entitled “Taste and 
Smell,” illustrates the visual metaphors employed to represent the trope 
of the distancing of mind from body, noticed by the narrator in her 
mother.  
 The chapter starts with a description of what the family later 
came to realize was one of the first symptoms of Midge’s Alzheimer’s: 
 
One of the first things that happened to Mom 
when she got sick was that she lost her sense of 
smell. This can be a sign of Alzheimer’s. But that 
was before we even suspected something serious. 
She just couldn’t smell. Of course later we 
realized: it was one of the first steps in her 
separation from the world. (59, my emphasis) 
 
Visually, Midge is represented as a silhouette within a confined black 
space, with clear borders separating her from the rest of the frame. She 
does not have the blank stare that eventually characterizes her in the 
narrative, so the reader can infer that she is still lucid, as the written text 
confirms. Nevertheless, she appears locked within this space. In the 
fourth frame, Midge is portrayed again inside the black space, only now 
making a motion to leave, touching its borders, while outside a whole 
world of smells and tastes tempts her, apparently unreachable. The 
seventh frame of the page portrays the breaching of those walls. 
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Figure 18: Tangles: A Story about Alzheimer’s, my Mother, and Me (59) 
 
 Emulating a reptilian tongue, Midge is depicted as breaking the 
barrier of the confining black space with the help of sugar: “But as her 
sense of smell diminished, she seemed to discover the pleasure of 
sweetness of the tongue. She began to grab at sugar” (59). For those 
watching her, such as her daughter, the attitude seemed uncharacteristic, 
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since Midge had a history of healthy eating that did not go hand in hand 
with the intake of large amounts of processed sugar. The discrepancy 
between the idea of the loved one and the reality being witnessed 
generates a crisis for the narrator. Visually, the more the two notions of 
Midge clash, the more the character appears dehumanized in the 
narrative. Following the frame where Midge grabs at sugar with a 
reptilian tongue, she is represented as someone torn in two, head on one 
side and body on the other, with each of the parts trapped in its own 
black confining space. The written narrative corroborates the split 
imagery: “Mom forgot more and more of herself. She didn’t know that 
she thought sugar was evil. She only knew it tasted good. I used to hide 
candy so I wouldn’t get in trouble. Now I hid it so she wouldn’t eat it 
all” (59). The visual metaphor suggests that Midge’s subjectivity is 
concentrated on her head, which is being kept apart from her body, now 
in charge of her actions. Midge’s actual self, as her daughter saw it, was 
locked away in a black space, unable to access the reality everybody else 
seemed to share. The metaphor of the split body would later in the 
narrative conjoin with the metaphor of the blank stare into composing 
the notion that Midge as someone with Alzheimer’s was inherently 
disconnected from the person Midge.  
 As Johnstone argues, “situating persons with Alzheimer’s 
disease as being ‘non-persons’, ‘already dead’, ‘not human’, and so 
forth, is not innocent” (43). The use of such metaphors “risk[s] 
negatively influencing the way people behave and think about the 
disease and its treatment options, including the administration of pre-
emptive and pro-active euthanasia” (48). It is not the purpose of this 
research to debate the ethics of euthanasia or its moral justifications, but 
rather to point out the problematics of discussing the value of life or the 
quality of life when the lives of those subjects are being systematically 
discursively dehumanized. The consequences of such dehumanizing 
discourse on people with Alzheimer’s can be seen throughout the 
narrative, but specially in the chapter entitled “Unreal” (Figure 19).  
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Figure 19: Tangles: A Story about Alzheimer’s, my Mother, and Me (67) 
  
 The chapter begins with the account of an acquaintance’s 
suicide and the indication that it might have been related to Alzheimer’s. 
The first five frames are dedicated to that story and illustrate, in a very 
static fashion, the deceased, the method, and the alleged reason for it: 
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“She was a wealthy, elegant old lady. They found her in her car in the 
closed carport with the engine running. She had left a medical book on 
her coffee table. It was open to the chapter on Alzheimer’s” (67). The 
detached, almost journalistic, tone of these first frames is contrasted 
with the rest of the chapter, which has a much more intimate and 
domestic feel. The remaining part of the chapter portrays telephone 
conversations between Sarah and both her parents that occurred on the 
day she heard about the suicide and on the following day. One frame 
stands out in the page, with a complaint Midge makes to her daughter: 
“I’m not a real person anymore!” (67). The jagged lines of the balloon 
indicate the intensity of the statement, at least for the listener, and the 
blackness surrounding it suggests that it was enough of a shock to block 
everything else from sight for Sarah. The juxtaposition of the two 
stories, the acquaintance’s suicide and Midge’s complaint, establishes a 
connection between them, while, at the same time, placing in evidence 
the metaphor of ‘losing oneself’ or ‘losing personhood,’ commonly 
associated with Alzheimer’s. Throughout the chapter, with the exception 
of the suicide account in the first few frames, the visual narrative 
focuses primarily on the narrator’s perspective: her side of the 
conversation is the only one being portrayed, for example. In the 
following page of the chapter (Figure 20), Sarah discusses the 
repercussions of her mother’s confession with her father, again over the 
telephone.  
 111 
 
Figure 20: Tangles: A Story about Alzheimer’s, my Mother, and Me (68) 
 
On this page, one particular frame stands out in the same manner as in 
the previous page: black space filling the panel, jagged lines contouring 
the balloon. It presents the culmination of a conversation between Sarah 
and her father, where he concludes: “I think she wants to kill herself but 
she isn’t capable of it now” (68). The connection between these two 
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frames further corroborates the construction of the notion of non-
personhood associated with Alzheimer’s and euthanasia as the 
supposedly logical conclusion for those with that status. Johnstone states 
that “whereas Alzheimer’s disease has emerged as a synonym for losing 
ownership and control, euthanasia has emerged as its antonym, that is, it 
has come to symbolize gaining ownership and control” (145, original 
emphasis). Apparently a part of the discursive phenomenon described by 
Johnstone, the chapter “Unreal” is riddled with assumptions about 
suicide and Alzheimer’s. Despite the absence of a suicide note, the 
narrative suggests a direct causal relation between the wealthy lady 
killing herself and the book opened to the chapter on Alzheimer’s on the 
coffee table. Later, in their telephone conversation, Rob indicates to 
Sarah his suspicions about Midge’s thoughts of suicide, a conjecture 
based only on his own reading of her actions. Actually, as far as the 
narrator informs us, Midge’s explicit complaints were very specific and 
related the way she was being treated like a child by her husband, as 
well as the desire to be on her own (67). Midge has to deal with the 
social stigma related to Alzheimer’s, even in her own family, and 
internalizes the metaphors of the disease, as evidenced by the statements 
“I’m a nobody” and “I’m not a real person anymore!” (67). Rob and 
Sarah, on the other hand, jump to conclusions about her complaints (and 
about the old lady’s suicide) based on their own notions of personhood 
and agency in relation to Alzheimer’s.  
 Throughout the narrative, the marked representation of Midge 
with Alzheimer’s competes with and shares space with the more familiar 
Midge. The latter, however, begins to slowly disappear from the 
account, replaced by the former. Up until a certain point in the narrative, 
the two doubles coexist, in a balance of some sort. At one moment, 
however, a shift occurs and the balance between the two Midges 
eschews. The marked Midge, who at first appeared only episodically, 
begins to completely eclipse the familiar Midge. The turning point 
occurs in the chapter entitled “Bird Brain” (Figure 21). 
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Figure 21: Tangles: A Story about Alzheimer’s, my Mother, and Me (73) 
 
The one-page chapter recounts a particular episode between Sarah and 
her mother, in which the latter tries to call the attention of her daughter 
to the birds at the feeder. Midge is portrayed trying to interact, but 
unable to elaborate on her thoughts, something that frustrates Sarah. The 
episode has no date to contextualize it and, at first, appears to be just 
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another anecdote of Midge’s Alzheimer’s. The chapter, however, marks 
a turning point in the narrative: it is the representation of the moment 
Sarah loses track of who she considered to be her mother. From that 
moment on in the narrative, Midge is depicted predominantly as the 
subject of Alzheimer’s. The chapter also stands out for the momentous 
use of visual metaphor in the portrayal of Alzheimer’s.  
 The visual metaphor puts Midge out of reach, her daughter’s or 
anybody else’s, flying away oblivious to any other mundane concerns. 
For Sarah, it symbolizes the moment of letting go, mostly of the idea of 
her mother. The narrator writes: “I had a vision of myself as a child, 
trying to grasp her leg as she fluttered away to join the birds. I couldn’t 
hold her here on earth with me, no matter how hard I tried” (73). While 
the metaphor of the blank stare corroborates a lot of assumptions and 
stigma surrounding Alzheimer’s, as previously argued in this chapter, 
the visual metaphor of the bird flying away from reach goes against that 
grain. Johnstone concludes her argument on the implications of 
Alzheimer’s metaphors to the discourse of euthanasia suggesting the 
necessity for  
 
a new language and new metaphors [to be found, 
in order to] enable the constructive representation 
of the complex issues associated with the 
increasing prevalence of Alzheimer’s disease and 
the need to appropriate resources to be provided to 
ensure and enable that those diagnosed with the 
disease are properly cared for from diagnosis to 
death. (48) 
 
In this sense, Tangles falls into the two sides of the debate. On the one 
hand it portrays the person with Alzheimer’s as a non-person in a lot of 
ways. The written narrative establishes this in Midge’s own words, 
while the visual narrative portrays Alzheimer’s as a dehumanizing 
feature through the blank stare, the reptilian tongue, the self divided 
from the body, and so on. On the other hand, the visual metaphor of the 
bird flying away, which marks a turning point in the narrative, makes 
use of a different symbology, one that is not dehumanizing, in spite of 
its non-human characteristics. The bird metaphor suggests that, although 
out of reach, flying away from her daughter’s grasp, Midge maintains 
some of her subjectivity, albeit in a different self.  
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3.3. Epileptic: “I have prevailed over the disease that stalked me”  
 
 David B.’s Epileptic (2005), published originally in France as 
six individual volumes entitled L’Ascension du Haut Mal (1996-2003), 
is also a work abundant with visual metaphors of illness throughout its 
narrative. Like Tangles, it is an autobiographical account of illness by 
proxy, or what Couser refers to as a somatography: in this instance, it 
refers to the author’s brother, Jean-Christophe, and epilepsy. The book 
retraces the lives of the Beauchard family, from the early 1960s till the 
late 1990s, as they deal with the increasing severity of Jean-Christophe’s 
illness. As Matthias Wivel puts it, in a interview with the author, “Jean-
Christophe is [. . .] the crux around which not only the narrative, but, as 
we come to understand, the fate of the whole family turns, and on this 
axis David builds and constitutes his identity” (103). Epileptic does not 
propose to tell Jean-Christophe’s story, but rather how David 
experienced it and was also affected by his brother’s disability, from 
their childhood together till their adult lives. As such, as Stephen 
Tabachnick points out, “we never see what Jean-Christophe sees when 
he seems to be transported to another world during a seizure. [We] see 
from the outside” (107, my emphasis). From the outside, therefore, we 
only have access to David’s perceptions of his brother’s disability and, 
again, to his own impressions of the toll taken on by all of his family. In 
fact, as the analysis of this chapter will demonstrate, as much as the 
reader is kept on the outside of Jean Christophe’s experience with 
epilepsy, she is also kept on the outside of Jean Christophe as a 
character in the narrative, making him appear one-dimensional at times. 
Little insight is given into Jean Christophe’s state of mind, outside of his 
brother’s perceptions and how those shaped David’s own process of 
growing up as an artist, as this analysis will demonstrate. In the author’s 
words:  
 
With Epileptic, I didn’t want to create a 
reconstruction of my family’s real life, I wanted a 
reconstruction of the way it imprinted my 
imagination and the way I used all of that to build 
up my imagination. That was what interested me. 
Transcribing, to a large extent, impressions rather 
than reality—how to represent an epileptic 
seizure, for example. I could have represented it 
clinically, detailing all the symptoms of the 
disease, or do it symbolically—how it affected me. 
(Interview 105-06, my emphasis) 
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 One of the most striking uses of visual metaphor in David B.’s work is 
precisely the representation of his brother’s epilepsy, as the author 
himself points out. Some critics, such as Andrew Arnold, claim that 
David B.’s main characteristic is precisely his ability to “visualize the 
invisible,” the graphic skill to “find visual metaphors for such elusive 
concepts as dreams, forces of history, and illness” (Arnold). The 
following page (Figure 22) illustrates the representation of illness 
through visual metaphor in Epileptic. 
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 Figure 22: Epileptic (77) 
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 For the child David, the visual narrative suggests, the enigmatic 
nature of his brother’s epileptic seizure is baffling to the point of 
fantasy. The abstract brusqueness and violence take, then, concrete 
features in the shape of a dragon-like creature that accompanies Jean 
Christophe everywhere and attacks him regularly. The dragon is 
depicted going through Jean Christophe, merging the two bodies 
together. In the quoted page, the two boys, their sister and their father 
are returning from seeing their grandfather and father, respectively, in 
his death bed and as soon as Jean Christophe steps out of the car he has 
a massive seizure that puts him in the hospital. In the car, with them, is 
the representation of the deceased grandfather’s ghost, another instance 
of the pervasiveness of visual metaphor in the narrative besides the 
dragon of epilepsy. The ominous presence of the grandfather’s ghost in 
the car, at the center of the frame, looking directly at the reader, sets the 
tone for the following frames.  
 The page is divided into six frames of the same size, with Jean 
Christophe’s seizure occupying the better part of five of them. The 
second frame is particularly relevant, as it shows the transition between 
realist and metaphorical styles of narrative within Epileptic. On the left 
part of the frame, the reader can still make out the features of a house in 
the background, with detailed parts of the architecture, such as windows, 
bricks, and rooftops. The right side of the frame, however, is already 
taken over by a darkness, emblematic of the folkloric creature of the 
illness. The dragon appears to mischievously sneak up on Jean 
Christophe from behind, in a classic predatory fashion culminating in 
the killer move in which it bites him in the head. As Jean Christophe 
falls suddenly with a seizure, he is engulfed by darkness and twisted by 
the dragon. The convulsions of a seizure are represented as twists and 
knots made by the dragon, as it tries to consume Jean Christophe. 
Within the context of the predator metaphor being presented, Jean 
Christophe is a victim, a prey to the monster that haunts him. This 
simplification of a complex situation seems congruent with a child’s 
perspective; however, as this analysis will evidence, the process of 
victimizing Jean Christophe goes beyond childish Manichaeisms in the 
narrative.  
 Tabachnick argues that, in David B.’s narrative, “we do not 
need long prose descriptions of how a seizure actually looks, because in 
Epileptic we see seizures” (106, original emphasis). While the seizures 
are shown at times in a more realistic style, they are mostly portrayed 
through visual metaphors, such as the dragon. In an interview, David B. 
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explains: 
 
[w]hen I was a little boy and my brother would 
have a seizure, I would ask myself lots of 
questions about that. It was something I didn’t 
understand, something evil in my family, and I 
would frame it in my own mind in terms of good 
and evil, of suffering, of pain … of joy and the 
sudden eruption of an illness that wiped out all the 
peace of mind we might have been enjoying. It 
was really the eruption of evil, which I represent 
as a dragon, the classical representation of evil in 
mythology. (106) 
 
According to the author, thus, from a child’s perspective, the epileptic 
episode comes as an evil disturbance of their daily lives and this is 
reproduced in Epileptic through visual metaphor. In the graphic memoir, 
the representation of the dragon is, therefore, the epitome of that naïve 
Manichaeism. As Lakoff and Johnson claim, metaphor is a way of 
making sense of the events in our lives (5-6), which seems congruent 
with David’s rationalization of the invisible force that had such an effect 
on his older brother. In contrast with the highly allegorical imagery in 
the visual discourse, the written narrative is more direct and descriptive. 
The adult narrator’s voice, set in the “present,” focuses on retracing the 
events and making sense of them, whereas the visual narrative, mostly 
set in the “past,” encapsulates the problems the young character had 
when trying to grasp complex issues. Paradoxically, despite portraying 
Jean Christophe’s epilepsy as something illegible to his child self—an 
illegibility manifested by the recourse to fantasy—David B. comments, 
in an interview, that in his brother’s seizures there was something to be 
“read,” after all (109). The way in which this “reading” is done changes 
over the course of the narrative. As Jean Christophe gets older, for 
example, his attitude towards his illness changes, as well as David’s 
perception of it and of his brother: “1970 draws to a close. This is the 
year my brother revolts. He’s fourteen years old. I’m twelve, Florence, 
eleven” (113) (Figure 23).  
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Figure 23: Epileptic (113) 
 
 As the characters mature and grow older, so does the representation of 
Jean Christophe’s epilepsy. In the quoted page, we see the mentioned revolt in 
conjunction with the growth of the dragon, which now engulfs the entire family 
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in its power. In the first and larger frame of the page, the dragon has a firm grip 
on Jean Christophe’s legs and head, besides going through his torso. The dragon 
delimits the entire space of the family in the frame; in fact, the dragon is the 
frame in which they are confined. Each family member and their position in the 
frame is a component of the visual metaphor at hand. Florence is portrayed all 
alone on the left upper edge of the space, disconnected from everybody else, 
frightened—the closest person to her is Jean Christophe and even he has his 
back on her. Father and mother are directly above the dragon’s head, on the 
bottom right corner. He is presented with a rather aggressive stance, fists 
clenched, while her body language is more towards the defensive side, 
somewhat crouching and holding her heart as she looks at the eldest son. David 
is depicted in full body armor on the upper right side, appearing ready for battle.  
 Earlier in the story, the narrator tells how, at the time, he had become 
obsessed with warriors and knights, reading lots of history books, and 
relentlessly drawing battle scenes (19). At one point, he envisions being a 
soldier in one of them:  
 
I need them. I feel like I’m under siege, here in 
our faraway home. [. . .] I slip a suit of armor 
under my skin to remain standing. For greater 
safety, I build myself a real one with medicine 
bottles and the tops of tin cans. A jug on my head 
and I’m ready to go. (82) 
 
In Figure 23, David appears to be at war not only with his brother’s disability, 
but also with his brother himself, a theme that becomes pervasive throughout 
the narrative as the two drift further and further apart. Jean Christophe is seen 
here as the dominant force in the family, bigger than all, occupying the center of 
the frame while unleashing his wrath and bitterness on all of them. The visual 
metaphor is evident in its implication that all the family members have become 
wrapped up in the dragon, now not only exerting its power onto Jean 
Christophe, but also through him and onto them. The last two frames also 
indicate this progression of the dragon’s influence over the family. In earlier 
parts of the narrative, the dragon could be seen as a figure sitting at the table 
with them, having its own chair, always around somehow, following Jean 
Christophe (79). In these two frames, we can see that the creature has doubled 
or tripled in size, in comparison with earlier versions, its magnitude surpassing 
the size of the frames. They also indicate the idea that Jean Christophe, around 
this time, according to the narrator, has stopped collaborating with the healers 
he was being sent to.  
 After the first signs of epilepsy, the narrator tells us, Jean Christophe is 
subjected to a series of tests and, after giving up on Western medicine, the 
family, as a whole, goes through a pilgrimage of healers that lasts years. These 
healers are presented, for the most part, as quacks, or at best as “false cures” 
(Tabachnick 112). Throughout the narrative, they try a number of alternative 
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methods to traditional medicine: “macrobiotics, spiritualism, magnetism, 
Rosicrucianism, Swedenborgianism, Kabbalah, the tarot, Steinerism, and the 
Arica group” (112). The narrative evidences the shortcomings of traditional 
medicine, but, at the same time, offers the same critique towards so-called 
alternative medicine. Each time they attempt a new “cure,” not only is Jean 
Christophe affected, but the entire family is affected, as they go to the lengths of 
relocating for entire periods at a time to be closer to the esoteric method or guru 
du jour. Regardless of all the attempts, however, Jean Christophe’s disability 
continues to impact his life, until eventually it takes over his entire person, as 
the narrator describes it (Figure 24).  
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Figure 24: Epileptic (142) 
 
 The visual metaphor on the quoted page indicates that, in the 
narrative, Jean Christophe has merged completely with the dragon. 
 124 
Visually, they are now one being. The written discourse corroborates the 
visual narrative: “His illness has taken over. He is now handicapped, 
destined to live in a handicapped universe” (142)7. This moment marks a 
turning point in the narrative: Jean Christophe, who was up until now 
being portrayed as a victim of epilepsy—in every sense of the word, as 
he is a helpless prey to the stalking dragon—starts being represented as 
a willing victim—as someone who embraces his tormentor. At the same 
time that the character is given agency, the moment when he is no 
longer a powerless prey to the monster dragon, that agency only works 
to place him in the abject position of “handicapped,” of someone using 
his disability for his own convenience, in the narrator’s view. The 
category of “handicapped” is used in the narrative in a derogatory sense, 
indicating Jean Christophe’s inability to return to the supposedly 
“normal” status they shared as children. As seen on the quoted pages 
thus far, the reiteration of this constructed dichotomy is pervasive in 
Epileptic, particularly in relation to David and Jean Christophe’s 
portrayal.  
 As Robert McRuer argues, in “Compulsory Able-Bodiedness 
and Queer/Disabled Existence,” the construction of able-bodiedness 
functions in a parallel manner as the construction of compulsory 
heterosexuality, borrowing Judith Butler’s theories on the performativity 
of gender (304). As such, able-bodiedness is contingent on the constant 
reiteration of its performance and the production of clear deviations of 
the norm, i.e. disabled bodies (304). A normative embodiment is, 
therefore, produced through the constitution of the types of bodies it 
rejects, which are then confined to the domain of the abject. David, both 
as narrator and as character in his own story, performs able-bodiedness, 
and he does so most effectively through the production and reiteration of 
his brother as the abjected disabled subject. The fourth frame in this 
page is emblematic of this process: Jean Christophe is represented as 
monstrosity personified, whereas David’s young avatar, in juxtaposition, 
is produced as the supposedly “normal” sibling, or, as what Rosemarie 
Garland-Thomson refers to as “the normate” (Extraordinary Bodies 8).  
 According to Garland-Thomson, the normate corresponds to a 
                                               
7 Here and in other parts of the text that use the same terminology, there appears to be a 
translation issue that resulted in a much more reductive and discriminatory statement made by 
the narrator in the English version. In French, the term “handicapé” is widely used as a 
substitute for the English “disabled” (a simple Google check can verify that). The same term in 
English, however, has fallen into disuse and is considered paternalistic and offensive (Linton 
165). Regardless of that, this dissertation relies on the English text, and as such, I have 
proceeded the analysis taking into consideration the translated version.  
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collection of assumptions, as well as their cultural value in a given 
society at a given time, that create a type of ideal bodily position, a 
position erected on a foundation of denial of the marked signs of bodily 
deviance (8). The normate is, therefore, a somewhat fluid social 
construct; it changes over time, according to the continuous influx of 
shifting values assigned to specific markers of deviance. In Epileptic, 
David is repeatedly portrayed as the normate through the constant 
comparison between him and Jean Christophe, who, in his turn, is 
depicted as the embodiment of bodily deviance, such as seen in Figure 
24. If, as Garland-Thomson states, the “term normate usefully 
designates the social figure through which people can represent 
themselves as definitive human beings,” Jean Christophe’s portrayal as 
the animal-like embodiment of his illness effectively reasserts David as 
the normate one and, consequently, as the actual human being of the two 
(8, original emphasis). The normate needs the boundaries provided by 
the deviance of others to establish itself in a higher hierarchical position, 
and, throughout the narrative of Epilepic, Jean Christophe is portrayed 
as the character that continually provides these boundaries to the 
construction of David as the narrating subject.  
 At the point in the narrative where Jean Christophe is 
represented as one with the dragon (Figure 24), he is being sent to a 
“center for handicapped people” in Brittany, the first time that he goes 
away from his family (141) (Figure 25). This move and Jean 
Christophe’s attitude upon arrival there—along with his refusal to say 
good-bye to his family—are emblematic of the growing distancing 
between him and his family. From the narrator’s perspective, Jean 
Christophe’s desire to be away from the familial environment and 
among others like him signals the takeover of disability in his life. In the 
previous page, for example, a frame where Jean Christophe pushes the 
family away, saying “leave me alone!,” and joins a group of people 
playing cards around a table is placed immediately above another one 
where Jean Christophe is sitting at the same table, only now by himself, 
playing with the representation of the ghost of their grandfather and the 
dragon. It is noteworthy how, from one frame to the next, the students 
sitting at the table with Jean Christophe are effectively replaced by the 
ghosts that haunt David’s family. The caption to the latter frame reads 
“Mother is disconsolate. In the space of a single year she’s lost her 
father and her son” (141). Similarly to what happens in Tangles in the 
“Unreal” chapter, analyzed earlier, this episode in Epileptic seems filled 
with assumptions about Jean Christophe’s state of mind that silence his 
own perspective while privileging others. In this particular scenario, 
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how inconceivable is it really to imagine that the fourteen-year-old 
would rather interact with other peers with disabilities than to be with 
his family? Besides being a very adolescent thing to desire, it seems 
particularly harsh to equate the grandfather’s death with Jean 
Christophe’s decision to be away at the school.  
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Figure 25: Epileptic (141) 
 
The episode is emblematic of the ableist gaze that both situates 
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and reinforces Jean Christophe as disabled within his family. As Fiona 
Kumary Campbell argues, in Contours of Ableism (2009), the “able 
imaginary” is fueled by the belief in an able-bodied community that, on 
its turn, is composed primarily of idealized individuals (4). Similarly to 
McRuer’s notion of compulsory able-bodiedness, Campbell posits 
“ableism” as the process in which the imagined views around certain 
desired bodies actually “set up a binary dynamic that is not simply 
comparative but rather co-relationally constitutive” (6, my emphasis). In 
other words, the ableist gaze locates difference at the same time that is 
produces it. As such, Jean Christophe’s refusal to remain at home can 
also be perceived as a refusal to continue to participate in the gaze that 
so frequently marks him as deviant, even within his own family. His 
refusal of family ties, as narrated in Figures 24 and 25, and the supposed 
“normalcy” of family life, along with the embracing of his epileptic 
deviancy, exposes the fallacy that any of them could ever belong to that 
“normal” category in the first place. That is perhaps why they are 
portrayed as having so much difficulty in grasping the notion that Jean 
Christophe should wish to abandon the comfort of their care: David is 
depicted furiously hacking away at a block of wood (a custom he 
developed to alleviate stress at home, the narrator informs earlier in the 
narrative8) while their mother is dramatically described by the narrator 
as “disconsolate” (141). The mother “is unable to finish the work of 
grieving,” claims the narrator in the following page—a statement that 
once more suggests a conflation of the losses of her father and Jean 
Christophe’s desire to remain at the school (143).  
 Going back to the previously quoted page (Figure 24), two 
distinct voices are presented in the bottom three frames where Jean 
Christophe is merged with the dragon: the narrator’s adult voice and the 
adolescent voice, the latter interacting with the reader directly from 
within the frame. It is through his teenage avatar that comes the 
suggestion that “This may be the moment when [Jean Christophe] gives 
up the idea of ever getting well” (142). Again the narrative reaffirms a 
set of binary distinctions, such as wellness and sickness, health and 
disease, normalcy and deviancy, ability and disability. The young 
character’s words suggest that, for him, the choice of remaining in the 
school for children with disabilities would mark Jean Christophe for life, 
representing a de facto abdication of any non-deviant status. As Irving 
Goffman points out, stigma is often associated with the “not quite 
                                               
8 “When my rage spills over, I take the saber my great-grandfather brought back from 
Indonesia and I go down into the woods. There I take a tree stump and chop it to bits” (134).  
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human” status of the person who bears it, which is then discursively 
distanced from the conceived idea of normalcy (132). Thus, stigma 
“results in a special kind of downward mobility,” in which the status quo 
is maintained through social control and the social distancing of 
stigmatized subjects (Coleman 142, 145). The visual metaphor of Jean 
Christophe merged with the dragon, in Figure 24, reflects the fear of his 
being permanently marked by his illness, as someone who would 
perpetually be relegated to this “not quite human status” (Goffman 132). 
In sum, Jean Christophe’s choice of negating his family and staying at 
the school for children with disabilities is presented as symbolizing the 
character’s embracing of his stigma.  
 The weight of Jean Christophe’s decision on his brother is 
conveyed through young David’s prophetic-sounding statement, in the 
sixth frame of the page: “Now [Jean Christophe]’s going to use his 
illness to avoid dealing with life” (142). The ableist logic presented in 
this sequence of lines reiterates a “military metaphor” of illness, in 
which one can beat or be beaten by it, leaving no option for dealing with 
an illness and choosing to face life concomitantly (Sontag Illness 65). 
Campbell states that  
 
ableist discourses proclaim quite emphatically that 
disability is inherently negative, ontologically 
intolerable and in the end, a dispensable remnant. 
This casting results in an ontological foreclosure 
wherein positive signification of disability 
becomes unspeakable. (12, my emphasis)  
 
Visual narrative consistently portrays Jean Christophe as the 
ontologically intolerable in the frames analyzed, whereas written 
discourse is more nuanced in the tenor of its depiction of disability. The 
teenage character appears to give voice to the resentment felt at the time 
towards his brother, whereas the adult narrator is more reserved in 
pointing out how Jean Christophe must have felt angry that none of the 
treatments tried thus far had worked. Nevertheless, both voices, adult 
and adolescent, reflect an inherently negative portrayal of disability, 
albeit on different levels. The adult one seems to victimize Jean 
Christophe more than anything—placing epilepsy as the active agent in 
face of a passive Jean Christophe, such as in the comment “His illness 
has taken over” (142). The adolescent voice of David’s avatar, unlike 
the narrator’s, situates Jean Christophe as the active subject in his 
relationship with epilepsy, but it does so in order to assign responsibility 
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to what David perceives, unapologetically, as a failure in life.  
 The narrative as a whole oscillates between these two types of 
representation of Jean Christophe’s relation with disability, 
victimization and blame. Going back to G. Thomas Couser’s questions 
on the ethics of somatography—and how the works in this category run 
the risk of appropriating a person’s story, when telling it from someone 
else’s perspective, as was explored earlier in this chapter—we can see 
some of the dangers of misrepresentation in Epileptic, and, more 
specifically, in this particular page. Couser was more concerned with the 
writing of memoirs of disability from a third party perspective, which is 
not exactly the context in Epileptic. As the analysis in this chapter has 
pointed out, David B.’s graphic memoir is the story of David, not the 
story of Jean Christophe told through David. That being said, David’s 
story is very much enmeshed with Jean Christophe’s, even though the 
latter’s voice is absent from the narrative. The othering of Jean 
Christophe starts with the fantastical representation of his epilepsy and 
is enhanced by his portrayal as someone defeated by illness—as seen in 
the frames where the dragon takes over his life, in Figure 24.  
 In a lot of ways, David appropriates Jean Christophe’s disability 
in the process of telling his own story. The reader only gains access to 
David’s perception of Jean Christophe’s feelings and intentions, never to 
the latter’s own. In a book entitled Epileptic, Jean Christophe, the person 
with epilepsy, is only seen through David, the actual protagonist of the 
account. Considering that Florence, David and Jean Christophe’s other 
sibling, has her own space in the narrative, through a Foreword and an 
Afterword written by her, Jean Christophe’s own take on the story is, 
however, glaringly absent. Furthermore, the narrator states that Jean 
Christophe likes to write as well, though his writing never actually 
surfaces in the narrative—it is only alluded to from time to time. 
Towards the end of the book, for example, the narrator mentions having 
found Jean Christophe’s texts one day: “I stumble across a passage on 
his life in Paris. I’m moved, and frightened. He speaks of his despair and 
loneliness and the words might as well have come from my pen” (317). 
The referred text is not presented to the reader. Instead, the narrator 
translates his brother’s feelings into his own in order to convey them. 
Jean Christophe’s writings are, thus, appropriated and become a 
metaphor for David’s.  
 In the process of representing Jean Christophe’s disability, the 
narrative frequently makes use of militaristic metaphors. According to 
Susan Sontag, military metaphors were first used in relation to illnesses 
in the 1880s, with the correlation of bacteria to the infiltrated agents of a 
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disease (66). Allusions to sieges, enemies, armies, and war are 
particularly abundant in Epileptic, as the narrative posits disability as 
something monstrous to be defeated. The possibility of living with 
epilepsy outside of this binary equation is not suggested by the narrative. 
On the contrary, the perspective conveyed is that Jean-Christophe has 
surrendered to epilepsy, perhaps even “enjoying his illness” (176). One 
of the metanarrative moments of the text, in which David is portrayed 
talking to his mother about writing Epileptic, is revealing of this 
perspective: 
 
Orléans 1997. 
David: You remember one day Jean-Christophe 
told us he’d been chosen to be sick because it 
suited him? 
When do you think that happened? 
Mother: It’s hard to say. 
There’s one weakness Jean-Christophe has had 
since he was very little. He’s always been 
extremely lazy.  
And, in fact, he’s had an insane fear of facing life. 
The responsibilities of adulthood terrified him. 
He must have been hiding behind epilepsy. (213) 
 
The rationalization is that Jean Christophe has withdrawn from the 
battle, choosing instead to hide behind his disability, as the passage 
indicates. The military metaphor is emphasized in the narrative, 
constantly suggesting a battle against disability in which one either 
comes out a winner or a loser. In fact, if anybody comes out a winner of 
this metaphorical battle in the narrative, it is David, as the quoted page 
implies (Figure 26).  
 132 
 
Figure 26: Epileptic (165) 
 
 Militaristic metaphors abound in both visual and written 
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discourses in Figure 26. The page is divided into three uneven frames; 
the first and larger one portrays a teenage David in full body suit, the 
same armor depicted in previous parts of the narrative, such as the one 
seen previously in Figure 23 (113). He appears as the ruler to an army of 
skeletons, the “ghosts that [he had] succeed[ed] in taming,” the narrator 
refers to in the previous page (164). The dragon is a menacing presence, 
but it no longer dominates the entirety of the frame; it is fragmented: tail 
to the left and head to right. The figurative dismemberment of the 
dragon is made literal in the following frame, on the bottom left, where 
the silhouette of the warrior David stands triumphant over the severed 
pieces of the creature. The written narrative is clear in its militaristic 
tone of victory: “I’ve won the war. I have not been defeated. I have 
prevailed over the disease that stalked me” (165). Visually, David is the 
conqueror—pictured exultantly in a mostly white frame—and, in 
contrast, the following darker frame presents a version of the same 
David, only now completely dominated by the creature that used to 
afflict his brother. In the latter frame, David’s whole body appears 
pierced by the dragon while the creature gnaws at his head, just as it did 
with Jean Christophe. The sequence of frames is emblematic of 
Campbell’s definition of the place of the disabled body, “a place in 
liminality to secure the performative enactment of the normal” (12). 
Visual narrative posits the two scenarios—conquering or being 
conquered by disability—side by side. Visual metaphors consecrate the 
former as the “enactment of the normal” whereas the latter is relegated 
to the negative liminal space shared only by the creature that haunts him.   
 The first frame of the page—a page that opens the fourth 
installment of the original French edition—starts with the narrator 
explaining the significance of his name change, from Pierre-François 
Beauchard to David B. The narrator begins by associating the meaning 
of changing his name with the outcome of the imagined war waged on 
his brother’s illness: “As 1970 comes to an end I decide to change my 
first name. Though I don’t realize it at the time, it’s a symbolic act. I’ve 
won the war” (165, my emphasis). A few pages earlier, the narrator 
mentions having heard from his mother that his parents had considered 
naming him David before he was born, but dismissed the idea because 
his grandfather thought it “sounded too Jewish” (170). Earlier in the 
narrative, he explains that his fascination with battle scenes and war 
stories is fuelled both by the inner turmoil at home and by family history 
(82). However, if at first his hero is Genghis Khan, as he grows up and 
researches history, particularly World War II and the Holocaust, he 
eventually changes his perspective, as the narrator recounts: “It was 
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disturbing. It became clear to me that the Genghis Khan I loved so 
dearly was not so far removed with his massacres of Peking, of 
Samarkand, or Urgendj, of Merv, Nishaput, Bamiyan, Heart” (173). 
After learning about the Jewish Holocaust and looking at the pictures 
from the war, he comes to a realization:  
 
Suddenly, this first name, David, takes on an 
enormous importance, far beyond my brother’s 
disease. It becomes a way of staking out a 
position. I was on the side of the glorious Indians 
against the lowly, shabby cowboys. I’d be on the 
side of the skinny Jews against the fat Nazis. (173, 
my emphasis)  
 
For Pierre-François, becoming David has to do with identification and 
agency; it is a way of owning up to his life narrative. In the context of 
autobiography, Leigh Gilmore sees in the name, a “potential site of 
experimentation,” one that could challenge assumptions about Truth and 
truth-telling, while, at the same time, subverting the autobiographical 
pact in favor of disenfranchised subjects (93, 101). In Epileptic, 
however, this renaming occurs as part of an ableist gaze that locates Jean 
Christophe, not David, as the colonized and disenfranchised subject. The 
narrator claims his change of name is symbolic of winning the war 
against the brother’s disease, but it could be seen as symbolic of David’s 
putting himself as the protagonist of the story, instead of Jean 
Christophe.  
 Over the next few pages, the character David is depicted as 
being increasingly aggressive towards Jean Christophe, as if trying to 
continually reassert his dominance against his brother, which has the 
discursive effect of reinforcing the military metaphor (176, 77). 
Paradoxically, the adult narrator tells the reader of his fantasies of 
heroism at the time:  
 
Armed with my newfound strength, I fantasize 
that I could take on my brother’s disease if a 
resourceful scientist were to transfer it into my 
skull. Then I’d have epileptic seizures. I would 
feel them coming inside my head. But my strength 
would enable me to neutralize them before they 
flared up. My brother would be cured and 
everything would be like before. Was there a 
before? (168) 
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The values of strength, success, and heroism claimed by David in this 
passage are emblematic of the ableist gaze that produces him as the 
idealized able-bodied subject in relation to his brother’s deviance. On 
the one hand, written narrative tells of delusions of heroically saving his 
brother; on the other, visual narrative portrays the character David 
beating Jean Christophe while the latter is unconscious during a seizure: 
“In the middle of the day he’ll have another seizure. If I’m with him I’ll 
see his seizure coming on and I’ll brace him as he falls. I’ll slap him 
under the pretext of getting his seizure to stop. I throw in a few kicks” 
(178, my emphasis). David’s claim of identification with the oppressed, 
symbolized by his renaming, is undermined, thus, through the 
continuous oppression of his own brother.  
 If the dragon represents epilepsy for David as a child, in the 
narrative this perspective of disability evolved as he grew up, as the 
author himself explains: 
 
In Epileptic, I made it evolve to reflect that I was 
growing up, that as I grew older, the symbol of the 
dragon no longer matched my feelings. So I 
translate that by marking up my brother’s face, I 
create this network of illness, something more 
abstract, because that’s how I perceive him at the 
time [. . .] I was an adolescent and I was well 
aware that it was less a matter of good and evil 
than, in fact, a clinical problem. It was a more 
abstract way of translating evil. (Interview 106) 
 
Though lessened somewhat in relation to the beginning of the narrative 
and the depiction of epilepsy as a dragon, the dichotomy of good versus 
evil is still being brought forth as a metaphor for disability, as the 
author’s remarks indicate. Lerita Coleman points out how infantilization 
can be seen as an aspect of stigma, especially since “many stigmatized 
people are not encouraged to develop or grow, to have aspirations or to 
be successful” (147). As such, the only part of the person’s identity that 
develops is the one related to the stigmatized part of the self (147). In 
the narrative, Jean Christophe is increasingly represented as a caricature 
of his former self as time progresses: he is portrayed telling “pathetic 
little stories,” obsessing about Hitler and other dictators, looking for 
friendship with children well under his age, etc (129, 190, 258).  
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Figure 27: Epileptic (272) 
 
 In the quoted page (Figure 27), we see an example of how the 
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representation of epilepsy in the narrative develops over time. The 
dragon is absent, but it is clear to the reader that Jean Christophe 
remains under the symbolic influence of the illness, for his face is 
altered. Darkness is a relevant visual signifier and Jean Christophe is 
engulfed in it, as opposed to David, who is wearing white and has no 
clear lines of expression on his face, suggesting a racialized dynamic 
that naturalizes ableism. Whenever Jean Christophe appears in the 
frame, his side is occupied by blackness, such as in the central frame. 
This passage occurs at the height of a particularly violent period in Jean 
Christophe’s interactions with his family, when they, for the first time, 
seriously consider committing him because of his aggressive outbursts 
(262).  
 The passage also shows that Jean Christophe’s violence is 
portrayed as particularly directed at David and, more specifically, at his 
art. At one point in the narrative, David’s young avatar asks his fellow 
ghosts: “I wonder if I didn’t smother [Jean Christophe] a little with my 
endless outpouring of work” (231). This competitive issue is reminiscent 
of the militaristic metaphor of disability and it resurfaces in the scene 
where Jean Christophe is not only being aggressive, but also threatening 
to ruin David’s drawings. Jean Christophe threatens his brother under 
the pretense of a revolt of the “handicapped,” reinforcing the discourse 
of disability being opportunistically “used” by the disabled. The 
dichotomy between “handicapped” versus “normal” people is 
reestablished, once again, this time through Jean Christophe’s own 
words in the narrative: “I’m handicapped [. . .] we’ll shoot normal 
people in the legs” (272, my emphasis). However, when confined by this 
binary system, Jean Christophe claims the category of handicapped for 
himself, the narrative indicates (“I’m handicapped, I am. [. . .] Us 
handicapped folks gotta stage a revolt”). Compared to the beginning of 
the narrative, where Jean Christophe identified himself as “sick” rather 
than “handicapped” (as seen in Figure 21), this claim seems particularly 
relevant, for it reveals a sense of belonging to a larger community. At 
the same time, however, David tries to re-signify the category and argue 
that his brother has no place in it (“But you don’t have a physical 
handicap. You can walk, you can move! If you’d just put your mind to it 
you could start things, turn your life around”) (272). David’s point of 
view exacerbates a normative discourse that legitimates physical over 
mental illness and disability, and the body/mind dichotomy on which it 
relies.  David, as an able(ist) character, sees disability as inherently 
negative and, accordingly, dismisses his brother’s identification as a 
person with disabilities. As Tobin Siebers points out, people usually 
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have no difficulty identifying someone who is different from them, “but 
[they] rarely acknowledge the violence of their perceptions” (“Disability 
in Theory” 174). Well-meaning as David may be, or as he is portrayed 
to be, his suggestion to Jean Christophe is violent in its attempt to 
“normalize” the latter. 
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Figure 28: Epileptic (342) 
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 Towards the end of the narrative, those dichotomies are 
solidified in a page (Figure 28) filled with visual metaphors that 
summarize the narrator’s conflicts about his brother. Against a black 
background stands the enlarged face of Jean Christophe, wearing the 
resurrected dragon of epilepsy as his brow, with the scars and marks of 
the illness painfully evident (as the narrator explains on the very first 
pages of the book, he has no front teeth, due to the constant falls, and he 
is bloated because of the medication) (342, 2). The image presents only 
two versions of Jean Christophe: the one in the background, of the 
marked adult, and one in which he is a kid, accompanying his brother 
while wearing matching armor suits. Only two versions of Jean 
Christophe are portrayed: the marked adult and the child before 
epilepsy. In contrast, several versions of David populate the frame, both 
as a kid and as an adult.  
 Visual narrative reinforces the two essentialized dimensions of 
Jean Christophe’s character presented throughout the narrative: 
victimized subject and willing stigmatized deviant. The child in the 
frame represents the victimized subject, once full of potential, while the 
adult version of Jean Christophe, in its magnitude, represents the willing 
stigmatized deviant, confessing sadly “It’s true, I chose to be sick” 
(342). David’s several avatars voice his ongoing conflict regarding his 
opinion about his brother. On the one hand, he wants his brother to be 
“normal,” which he sees as the only alternative to being “sick”: “I’ve got 
this notion that we shouldn’t see him as a sick person but treat him as a 
normal one” (342, my emphasis). On the other, David wants them to 
fight epilepsy together, conjuring once more the militaristic metaphor of 
disability: “I wanted both of us to face up to his disease, the older 
brother and his younger sibling. My Genghis Khan side, once again. 
Knowing his illness as he did, he would have told me what to do and I 
would have helped him” (342). Neither of these things happens, as Jean 
Christophe proudly claims the category of “handicapped” for himself. 
The fact that Jean Christophe chooses to see himself as someone with a 
disability is considered a failure and a betrayal on his part by David: 
“When he gave up the fight I felt that he had abandoned me” (342, my 
emphasis). For David, giving up the fight meant letting go of a healthy 
normate life, as he conceived it; however, from a political perspective 
one could regard the situation in opposite terms: by embracing his own 
status as disabled, Jean Christophe has actually chosen to fight the 
violence that accompanied the attempt at normalcy. That, perhaps, could 
be the perspective brought forth if Jean Christophe’s insight was 
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actually included in the narrative. But, alas, that is the not the case, as 
the analyses in this chapter have pointed out, and Jean Christophe’s 
voice is silenced in detriment of his brother’s.  
 Unlike Tangles, which employs visual metaphor in ways that 
can be regarded as both objectifying and non-objectifying (such as the 
difference between depictions of the blank stare and the flying bird, as 
seen in the previous chapter), the narrative in Epileptic systematically 
reduces Jean Christophe to his disability—a narrative process repeatedly 
emphasized through the use of visual metaphor. The recurring silencing 
of the person with disability is, however, noted in both works as their 
narrators try to relay the experience of disability from their own points 
of view.  
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3.4. Bitter Medicine: “This is supposed to be the end of the line for 
people with no money” 
 
 At this point I would like to bring another work as an example 
of the alternatives to this form of representation of disability in others: 
Clem Martini and Olivier Martini’s Bitter Medicine: A Graphic Memoir 
of Mental Illness (2010)9. Similarly to Epileptic, Bitter Medicine 
recounts the story of two brothers and their relation with a mental 
illness, albeit in very different ways. The two brothers in the latter 
narrative—Clem and Olivier—compose the graphic memoir in 
conjunction, telling their family’s struggle with schizophrenia: first as 
their youngest brother was diagnosed and, later, as Olivier learned he 
himself had the illness as well. The two are shown as two distinct voices 
in the narrative: Clem primarily does the written prose sections, while 
Olivier is in charge of the visual part. Similarly to the narrators in 
Tangles and Epileptic, Clem expresses in his part of the narrative a 
feeling of resentment towards his youngest brother Ben as well as 
towards the illness that affected them:  
 
Here is how I justified leaving the country. I felt I 
had been consumed by the experience of first 
identifying Ben’s mental illness and then 
somehow arranging that he receive treatment at a 
hospital. I felt betrayed, if not by Ben, then by life. 
Something had stolen my younger brother and 
mysteriously replaced him with a complete 
stranger. I felt rejected, by Ben and by the health 
care system. There seemed to be no place in the 
process for me. (37) 
 
Later, after Ben commits suicide, this feeling of betrayal is replaced by 
one of guilt, as the narrator Clem informs the reader. One can locate the 
same sentiments in Tangles, for example, when the narrator says “I was 
sick of trying to fill the gaps in her speech. I was sick of helping her. I 
was sick of her being sick” (Figure 21) (73). In Epileptic, David conveys 
                                               
9 I actually struggled with the decision to include Bitter Medicine in this dissertation. The 
chapter seemed big enough as it was and it would mean an imbalance with the previous one 
about narrative prosthesis, where I analyzed only two graphic memoirs. Besides that, Bitter 
Medicine is not as prolific with the use of visual metaphor as Tangles and Epileptic, which is 
why I initially rulled it out of the corpus. However, it became clear, as I worked through the 
analyses in this chapter, that Bitter Medicine could point to different and promising ways of 
representing disability in others that were not explored in the other graphic memoirs.  
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the feeling of being dragged by his brother’s epilepsy: “We’re all sick 
with his illness” (192). As family members trying to deal with a loved 
one’s disability, all of these narrators struggle with the balance of 
accounting for someone else’s emotions while conveying their own.  
 Olivier’s perspective on his brother Ben’s story, at first, is more 
contained if compared to Clem’s. The visual narrative does not portray 
feelings of resentment towards the youngest brother, focusing on a more 
matter-of-fact retelling of events. The two voices, Clem’s and Olivier’s, 
contrast each other, both in their presentation as well as in the contents 
of their narration. Clem’s written narrative is confined by typographical 
standards of prose, such as columns and paragraphs; Olivier’s narrative 
is sometimes purely visual while at others is similar to comics in its 
cross-discursiveness. The following quoted pages, portraying each 
narrator’s version of Ben’s suicide, illustrate the distinction in their 
styles (Figures 29 and 30).  
 
 
 
Figure 29: Bitter Medicine: A Graphic Memoir about Mental Illness 
(42) 
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Figure 30: Bitter Medicine: A Graphic Memoir about Mental Illness 
(43) 
 
Clem is more prolific with details of his account (Figure 30), whereas 
Olivier’s narrative is more concise (Figure 29). Clem’s text is ordered 
whereas Olivier’s drawings are erratic. The constant juxtaposition of 
both autobiographical voices sets them apart, representing them at the 
same time that it constructs them as two distinct subjects: the former as 
able-bodied while the latter as disabled. In that sense, the overall 
narrative produces able-bodiedness through the discursive establishment 
of disability, similarly to Tangles and Epileptic.  
 On the other hand, as the narrative departs from Ben’s story and 
turns to Olivier’s first hand experience with schizophrenia, Clem 
appears more careful in representing his own role. As the latter describes 
the experience of seeking psychiatric care for the former, Clem notes: 
“It occurs to me that, because I’m writing these words, my role sounds 
larger than it really was” (71). As one of the narrators and a participant 
in the story, Clem expresses his own perspective of his brothers’ 
illnesses, but, unlike the narrators in Tangles and Epileptic, he is 
cautious not to put that perspective at the center of the narrative. Later in 
the narrative, Clem comments on his relationship with his brother: 
“Sometimes he tells me that I don’t understand the way things are. And 
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I’m certain that sometimes he’s right. How could I? He’s lived an 
experience that I have only observed” (243, my emphasis). For instance, 
when describing a time when Olivier was unresponsive, not engaging in 
conversation for days on end, Clem mentions devising a new approach 
at communicating with his brother: he tries to write him a letter, 
including a self-addressed stamped envelope within (93). As Clem 
relates the success of his initiative, what stands out in the passage is the 
inclusion of Olivier’s response in the narrative:  
 
A week later I picked a letter out of my mailbox. 
It was my stamped, self-addressed envelope. A 
single wrinkled piece of foolscap was folded 
roughly in the envelope. Liv’s spidery 
handwriting crawled across the page, but his prose 
was spare.  
‘Dear Clem,’ he wrote. ‘I don’t hallucinate 
anymore, but now I don’t feel much of anything. 
The drugs have flattened or erased every emotion 
I had. I don’t know how to live like that, feeling 
nothing.’ (93). 
  
Olivier does not convey this information in his own part of the narrative, 
but his voice is preserved, rather than appropriated, through his brother’s 
account. In contrast, the narrator in Epileptic mentions Jean Christophe’s 
writings only in passing, without ever including them as part of the 
narrative, solidifying David’s account as dominant over his brother’s. 
Similarly, the effects of the medication on Jean Christophe are described 
more than once, but not through his own perspective or outside of 
David’s dream sequences.   
 In Bitter Medicine, the effects of the medication in Olivier’s life 
are discursively emphasized in both visual and written narratives. 
Clem’s written narrative, besides borrowing Olivier’s own voice through 
his letter, goes through the side effects of the anti-psychotics in 
painstaking detail in several passages of the narrative:  
 
The medication in Liv’s life has played such a key 
role in treatment—positively and negatively—
that’s almost possible to plot the coordinates of 
my brother’s existence based solely on the drugs 
he’s been prescribed. (169)  
 
Clem cites each drug, how long it was prescribed for, its side effects, 
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what led the doctors to discontinue treatment with it as well as the 
implications of those side effects on Olivier’s social and professional 
life in detail throughout the narrative.  
 Olivier’s visual narrative, on its turn, alludes to the role of 
medication in a dual manner: explicitly, such as in the depictions of his 
conversations with doctors about his prescriptions and in the drawings 
of the drug tablets that invariably become part of his life, and implicitly, 
in the incorporation of the side effects as part of his drawing style 
(Figures 31 and 32).  
 
 
 
Figure 31: Bitter Medicine: A Graphic Memoir about Mental Illness 
(174) 
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Figure 32: Bitter Medicine: A Graphic Memoir about Mental Illness 
(175) 
 
One of the most prevalent side effects affecting Olivier is related to 
Stelazine, a drug he took for more than fifteen years, which caused 
“tardive dyskinesia—a disorder that manifests itself in involuntary, 
repetitive movements. In Liv’s case, it also included restless tongue, 
rigidity, and tremors” (173). These are not just alluded to, but 
incorporated in his drawing style, which changes according to the type 
of side effects experienced by Olivier in the course of his treatments. 
Figures 31 and 32, for example, are situated in opposing pages, 
evidencing to the reader how the medication directly affects the 
aesthetics of Olivier’s self-representation. If in other works a 
juxtaposition of able-bodiedness and disability is done to construct a 
character as belonging to either of those categories, in Bitter Medicine 
the comparison of Olivier’s self-portraits complicates the naturalization 
of these categories as cohesive and authoritative.  
 Olivier’s representation of his multiple selves does not make 
use of visual metaphor as a narratological device, such as Tangles and 
Epileptic do. Instead of focusing on the stigmatizing features of 
disabilities and reinforcing that stigma through visual metaphor, 
Olivier’s narrative explores the potential of the graphic memoir to 
expose the construction of that stigma in the first place. Whereas most of 
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his narrative is drawn in a more realistic style, the chapter “Interlude: 
The Circles of Hell” is populated with visual metaphors. Clem describes 
these circles, in his part of the narrative, as a “Mental Health Hell [. . .] a 
series of spiraling circles. The circles curl one into the other. Each 
represents an increasing torment” (133). The circles represent the 
hurdles a person with mental health issues goes through in a society that 
does not provide adequate medical care, alternatives of employment, and 
social support, which culminates in either incarceration, homelessness or 
death. The first circle is the discovery or onset of the mental health 
issue; the second is the difficulty in keeping a job under these 
circumstances; the third is the alienation of family and friends; the 
fourth is homelessness due to the lack of income and family support; the 
fifth, and final, circle is incarceration (133-43). The visual narrative 
illustrating these circles portrays the subjects, able or disabled, as devils, 
each enacting their own part in their hellish roles (Figure 33).  
 
 
 
Figure 33: Bitter Medicine: A Graphic Memoir about Mental Illness 
(136) 
 
Figure 33, for example, illustrates the second circle. It portrays two 
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figures in hierarchical positions, with the one in charge announcing to 
his subordinate that he “won’t be calling [him] again” (136). In earlier 
chapters, the reader learns that when Olivier had his first episode of 
schizophrenia he was working at a print shop; a job he lost soon after 
(77). His depiction of the second hell is, therefore, riddled with 
metaphorical tones in relation to his own story. In this way, his private 
story becomes emblematic of a public problem affecting countless 
others. Unlike Epileptic, where visual metaphor is used to represent 
disability, in Bitter Medicine visual metaphor is employed to portray the 
social conditions that afflict a disabled person’s life. At the same time 
that Olivier’s narrative uses religious motifs of hell and devils, it does 
not demonize or sanctify any particular position, as all subjects are 
portrayed in the same manner as devils. Figure 33, for example, portrays 
both ‘Olivier’ and his boss as devils, albeit in different power positions. 
As a result, the narrative moves away from Manichaeisms in 
representing the circles of hell as a complex social problem shared by all 
in society. The following page is also an example of this rather 
democratic representation of subjects, in which disability or able-
bodiedness is not automatically discernable, if at all, in any of the 
characters portrayed (Figure 34). 
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Figure 34: Bitter Medicine: A Graphic Memoir about Mental Illness 
(140) 
 
The quoted page illustrates the transition between third and fourth 
circles of hell, between alienating family and friends and becoming 
homeless. The relation among the characters portrayed is not clear, and 
the reader is left wondering where to place the “I figured as much” 
uttered by the sitting devil: it can be seen as referring to the third circle 
or the fourth circle (140). The unclear subject position from hence it is 
spoken can also be read with different connotations: it could indicate a 
friend or family member’s derogatory remark about a person with 
disability, or even the resigned statement from someone shunned from 
previous social ties. The line from the second figure, “This is supposed 
to be the end of the line for people with no money,” appears to engage 
the reader directly. In this chapter, the dual narrative is focused on the 
collective aspect of the oppression of people with disabilities. Clem’s 
narrative reinforces this sense of collective responsibility by also 
addressing the reader directly: “[u]nable to hold on to your home, you 
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become homeless. You no longer have an illness. Instead, you find 
yourself transformed into an inconvenient, and largely ignorable, social 
condition” (141). Besides criticizing the neglect with which 
homelessness is regarded in society, written narrative puts the reader 
herself in the position of displacement due to disability.  
 Overall, Bitter Medicine combines visual and written discourses 
exploring the political potential of the autobiographical representation of 
disability in ways that Tangles and Epileptic do not. Rather than 
characterize disability as an Other through visual metaphor, visual 
narrative in Bitter Medicine reserves that rhetorical device to the 
passages in which it criticizes the social oppression related to the 
experience of disability. Furthermore, instead of relying in visual 
markers of stigma, the narrative employs visual metaphor to underline 
the complexities inherent in the construction of that abject subject 
position. Finally, the negotiation between private and public is also 
conveyed through visual language, as Olivier’s story, in the chapter 
about the circles of hell, becomes imbued with a more collective sense 
of the experience of disability rather than a personal one.   
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(RE)FRAMING THINGS UP 
 
“An art object is a body that makes other bodies feel.”  
(Tobin Siebers “The Art of Disability”)  
 
“The display of these pictures makes us spectators, too.” 
(Susan Sontag Regarding the Pain of Others) 
 
4.1. The tensions between metaphor and metonymy 
 
 Throughout this research, the issue of metaphor and disability 
has been central to the investigation, first as narrative prosthesis was 
examined in the non-fictional context of the graphic memoir, and, 
second, in the investigation of how the visuality of comics could 
contribute to understandings of representations of the disability of others 
via visual metaphor. Metaphor, therefore, as a figure of speech, has 
guided this inquiry from the start. I would like, however, to propose a 
different insight into the subject through the recourse of metonym, 
following Leigh Gilmore’s theories on metonym and autobiographical 
narratives.  
 As discussed in the second section of this dissertation, metaphor 
is a figure of speech particularly favored by critics in autobiography 
studies to refer to the construction of the self that occurs in such texts. 
Historically, in this field, therefore, the written I is conceived as a 
metaphor for the writing I. Gilmore, however, elaborates on how a 
feminist perspective favors the trope of metonym as opposed to 
metaphor when it comes to discussions about the construction of the 
self:  
 
[m]etaphor depends for meaning upon a relation 
of identity, and although it may be sustained in a 
text, the rightness of that relation depends upon its 
being grasped in an instant. Metonymy, however, 
depends upon a sustained patterning for meaning 
and therefore extends temporally in a way 
metaphor does not. (68-9, my emphasis) 
 
Metaphor, in this sense, is dependent on a clear equivalent, whereas 
metonymy relies on a continued construction of meaning. As figures of 
speech go, metaphor is stable in its binary hierarchy of meanings 
whereas metonymy is more fluid and contextual. The implications for 
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the study of autobiographies is that 
  
[w]hen autobiography studies focus on metaphor 
as the defining trope, they participate in the 
production of identity as identity; that is, as one-
to-one mirroring of an essential sameness (the 
self) in different forms (real life and 
autobiography). When autobiography studies 
focus on metonymy, they recognize the continual 
production of identity as a kind of patterning 
sustained through time by the modes of 
production that create it. (69) 
 
To think of the narrating I as the “metaphor of the self” in 
autobiography, therefore, presupposes a naturalized notion of the Real, 
one in which self-representation is unproblematically related to identity 
(79). However, if we understand identity as unfixed, continually 
contingent to its context, the metonymy of the self within this type of 
autobiographical discourse seems more pertinent, as Gilmore suggests.  
 Following the same line of reasoning, perhaps we should think 
of the metonymy of disability in graphic memoirs, rather than the 
metaphor, particularly when looking at those texts through a narrative 
prosthesis lens. As mentioned in the first section of this dissertation, the 
metaphor of disability is a central tenet in Sharon Snyder and David 
Mitchell’s concept of narrative prosthesis in literary works (47-8). 
Within the fictional context they explore as the basis for their analysis, 
the use of metaphor is justifiable, for the relations being proposed in 
literary works are of a direct connection between disability and 
idiosyncratic traits of a character within that narrative. The relation 
between blindness and a lack of (in)sight is, indeed, a metaphorical one 
in Oedipus, as they argue. However, as Gilmore clarifies, metaphor can 
be a rather limiting figure of speech, with its “one ‘proper’ 
interpretation,” and metonymy could be seen as a way to broaden the 
implications, or even to subvert the idea of the lone ‘proper’ reading, 
already present within the metaphor (79). As such, the complexities in 
looking at the representation of disability in Fun Home and Calling Dr. 
Laura through a narrative prosthesis lens, as the analyses of this 
dissertation detail, could be due to its lack of the one ‘proper’ 
interpretation entailed in the definition of metaphor. The polysemy of 
disability in these narratives is brought to the fore by their 
autobiographical context, which, in turn, complicates the analysis of 
narrative prosthesis: in such texts, disability can be seen as emblematic 
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of other elements in the narrative—symbolically mirroring family 
turmoil, for example—and yet it is more than that. Thus, because of the 
autobiographical status these works share, their portrayal of disability 
cannot be defined only through the critique of the “opportunistic 
metaphorical device” mentioned by Snyder and Mitchell (47).  
 Nevertheless, the discursive effects of constructing disability as 
symbolic are still present in autobiographic narratives. Regardless of the 
assumed anchor to materiality entailed in the narrating I of the 
autobiographical text, the self presented to the reader is still constructed 
through the course of the narrative, through discourse. As such, the 
allegorical tones of disability are presented as signifiers of deviance in a 
similar manner as in fictional texts. The body, even in autobiographical 
narratives, appears marked as a sign of abnormality, as a subject’s 
physical manifestation of non-conformity. Thus, when the narrative of 
Calling Dr. Laura portrays the young Nicole reeling with the 
disturbances in her home life as directly connected to her stomach pains, 
it is employing disability as a narratological device. Similarly, when Fun 
Home depicts Alison’s OCD as a psychosomatic response to the tension 
in her family environment, it is making use of the OCD’s symbolic 
meaning within the story.  
 Going back to the texts analyzed, one can see how this shift in 
the understanding of narrative prosthesis would work in accounting for 
the symbolic and the material aspects of disability in those graphic 
memoirs. In Calling Dr. Laura, as the analysis points out, the portrayal 
of Nicole’s encopresis can be associated with the lack of security in her 
family life during her early childhood. This metaphorical reading is 
supported by written and visual discourses throughout the narrative, 
such as in the page where the medical definition of encopresis is given, 
along with a series of visual projections of the turmoil in Nicole’s life 
emanating from her crouched body (58) (Figure 8). However, the 
tangibility of the experience is also highlighted in the narrative, such as 
when the narrator focuses on the reality of pain that made it impossible 
for her to even get up from bed (64) (Figure 9). To think of Nicole’s 
encopresis as exclusively metaphorical would, therefore, undermine that 
tangibility from the narrative. If we think of narrative prosthesis as a 
metonym of disability, however, encopresis in Calling Dr. Laura may 
be seen as a signifier whose plural meanings are continually produced 
and performed throughout the narrative. As such, the representation of 
disability is not reduced to its discursive effects in the narrative, but is 
seen as produced through the constant interaction of symbolic and 
material implications. The tension between metaphor and metonym 
 156 
results in the continued resignification of disability in the narrative. At 
times symbolic, and at times concrete, the irreducibility of disability 
becomes evident through this interaction of multiple and contingent 
meanings.  
 Similarly, in Fun Home, disability as metonym can be seen in 
the ambiguity related to the surfacing of Alison’s OCD. The first 
mention to it is related to its materiality: “My actual obsessive-
compulsive disorder began when I was ten” (135, my emphasis) (Figure 
12). The “actual” in the narrator’s line indicates its distance from 
discursive abstractions; it emphasizes the tangibility of that event. In this 
passage, the narrator conveys the experience of having OCD as a child, 
how it concretely affected her daily life. At the same time, one could 
point to the narrator’s comment on the previous page (“and in this 
isolation, our creativity took on an aspect of compulsion” (134) (Figure 
11)) as revealing of the symbolic correlation between her family’s 
artistic idiosyncrasies and OCD. Later in the same chapter (Figures 13 
and 14), this duality resurfaces when the narrator questions the origin of 
her symptoms. In the same page (Figure 13), the young character is 
portrayed performing the symptoms of OCD while, a few frames below, 
the narrator suggests that they may have spurred from reading about 
them. To regard the character’s OCD as metaphoric is plausible, for it 
does appear in the narrative as the response to the “autistic colony” in 
which she lived (139) (Figure 14). Yet, that metaphor does not account 
for the ways in which Alison’s OCD permeates the entirety of the 
narrative, for example. The discursive effects of the “epistemological 
crisis” that followed Alison’s OCD can be read as calling into question 
the authority of the autobiographical narrative as a whole, as seen in the 
analyses of the first section of this dissertation (141) (Figure 15). The 
constant interaction of meanings marks, therefore, the representation of 
Alison’s OCD and its discursive effects are felt throughout the narrative.  
 In autobiographical narratives, the self is represented at the 
same time that it is produced, or, the autobiographical text is part of the 
process producing the subject that it seeks to represent in the first place. 
As such, the subjects in graphic memoirs, such as Fun Home and 
Calling Dr. Laura, are being constructed not only through the 
autobiographical narrative, but also through disability. In this sense, 
disability’s very presence in the text can be seen as constitutive of that 
self. The subjects of Fun Home and Calling Dr. Laura are constructed, 
therefore, through a complex process of autobiographical writing that 
continuously and self-consciously plays with the interaction of symbolic 
and material meanings in relation to disability. In spite of the discursive 
 157 
features constructed around bodily deviance in the narrative, the self 
being produced through autobiographical discourse is already embedded 
in such deviances. One has to be careful, then, not to reduce the already 
tangible body of the narrating I, along with its marks of bodily deviance, 
to the discursive feature that it symbolizes.  
 It is important to point out that, differently from the works 
analyzed by Sharon and Snyder in relation to narrative prosthesis, these 
graphic memoirs are focusing on a construction of disability rather than 
ableism. While fictional works such as Oedipus and Moby Dick employ 
the metaphor of disability to convey the uniqueness of a character, as 
Sharon and Snyder argue, graphic memoirs such as Fun Home and 
Calling Dr. Laura construct disability as constitutive of the 
autobiographical self. While these graphic memoirs do make use of the 
symbolic meanings of disability, they do not incur in the objectifying 
gaze of ableism, characteristic of the fictional works analyzed by Sharon 
and Snyder.  
 In light of these factors, metonym appears to be a much more 
suitable trope as one looks at graphic memoirs and disability. Metaphor 
is just one of the ways in which disability is presented in these graphic 
memoirs, but it does not account for how it is also constitutive of the self 
that narrates it. Metonym, on the other hand, works through repetition 
and it does not provide the directness between signified and signifier 
entailed in metaphor. Disability as metonym can be seen as a process, 
rather than a direct association of signifiers. The symbolic meaning of 
disability has to be read as part of a larger system of construction of 
meaning and subjects in autobiography. Instead of the closure of 
metaphor, I propose the continued open-endedness of metonym in 
relation to disability and autobiographical narratives.  
 
4.2. Metaphor makes a comeback (in its visual form) 
  
 The second section of this dissertation explores how the 
redeeming characteristics of autobiography—in terms of enabling a self-
representation of bodily deviance—are appropriated by narratives 
employing a visual spectacle of disability as an other. Both Tangles and 
Epileptic portray disability through the able-bodied perspective of their 
narrators, Sarah and David, respectively. As such, unlike the narratives 
of Fun Home and Calling Dr. Laura, the subject being represented and 
produced through autobiographical discourse is not the one with a 
disability in the narrative. Visual metaphor is employed in these 
narratives as part of the discursive process that others the characters with 
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disabilities while, concomitantly, reestablishing the autobiographical 
subjects as able-bodied protagonists.  
 The characters of Midge and Jean Christophe, in Tangles and 
Epileptic, respectively, do not have the agency to claim the 
representation of their disabilities for themselves. Their stories are told 
by a third party and they have no say in the way in which they are 
portrayed. Midge accepts being interviewed and even participates in her 
daughter’s recording of her disability. She does give consent, and does 
so in a lucid state of mind, but one has to wonder if that consent would 
go so far as embracing representations where she is portrayed naked and 
powerless on the toilet (Figure 16), for example. Jean Christophe, in his 
turn, does not collaborate or give consent to his brother telling his story 
in any way throughout the narrative. He is represented as having his 
agency doubly removed by his disability: first, through the narrative of 
him as a powerless child in the face of the monster of epilepsy; and 
second, as someone without any input in how that illness is portrayed to 
begin with.  
 If, as Tobin Siebers argues, “aesthetics tracks the emotions that 
some bodies feel in the presence of other bodies,” the employment of 
visual metaphor as a trope to represent disability is a deliberate attempt 
to evoke such emotions on the reader (“Disability Aesthetics” 542). 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, in their turn, define metaphor 
precisely through its sensory effects on the body (235). For them, 
metaphors help people coherently create connections between each 
other, a process that is not merely a question of intellect or language, but 
one involving individuals’ common-ground connection with the material 
dimensions of the world and its sensory-motor domains (232-3, 235, 
245). Visual metaphor of disability, in Tangles and Epileptic, therefore, 
surfaces primarily as a catalyst of these emotions and senses.  
 One of the catalyzed responses brought forth by the visual 
metaphor of disability in the graphic memoirs Tangles and Epileptic is 
the impetus to stare. As Rosemarie Garland Thomson defines, the stare 
is the individual’s response to the unfamiliar, that which is out of the 
ordinary, illegible (3). In these graphic memoirs, the disabled body is, 
thus, discursively emphasized through visual metaphor in a process that 
reinforces the staring often associated with deviant bodies. The stare 
performed through graphic memoirs is one that can be done 
anonymously by the reader, without concern for reciprocity or judgment 
from others, allowing an unabashed scrutiny of someone else’s deviancy 
(68). Garland Thomson comments on the two-way nature of the stare, as 
it is “as inauspicious to starers as it is to starees, both of whom stand to 
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lose status in the exchange” (71). Specifically due to graphic memoir’s 
visuality, these narratives play on the potential of this forbidden stare. 
The non-fictional status of graphic memoirs also adds to the spectacle 
being offered. If manuals of etiquette discourage the stare, specifically 
of people with disabilities (71-2), these visual portrayals of disability 
seem to invite it.  
 One passage in Epileptic explicitly deals with the issue of the 
stare and disability, as Jean Christophe falls with a seizure in a public 
space (Figures 35 and 36).  
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Figure 35: Epileptic (235) 
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Figure 36: Epileptic (236) 
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The excerpt is particularly focused on Jean Christophe’s disability as an 
object of staring, which, in turn, puts the narrator David in the 
uncomfortable situation of having to share that position with his brother. 
As Garland Thomson argues, the “appearance of disability in the public 
sphere makes [. . .] for a stareable sight,” and visual narrative in Figure 
35, in the first two frames, emphasizes precisely that transition between 
casual onlookers and starers (20). At the moment that Jean Christophe 
hits the ground with a seizure, the tourists that had been preoccupied 
with architecture and history become fascinated with his disability, 
while the narrator complains: “All the tourists rush up, eager to enjoy 
this new diversion” (235). Visual metaphor in the passage portrays the 
tourists as a multitude of eyes, reducing them to the act of staring. They 
point and stare at Jean Christophe, occupying more and more of the 
frames as the seizure progresses in the narrative. Jean Christophe, in the 
third frame of Figure 35, is portrayed in gigantic proportions, unable to 
avoid the prying eyes. David, on the other hand, is obfuscated between 
the multitude of starers and his family: in the second, third, and fourth 
frames of Figure 36, he is only partially depicted, almost as if drowning 
in the sea of people and their enlarged eyes. The narrator conveys his 
disgust with the starers: “God, I despise people like that. These nice, 
normal people—their gaze is burned into my memory” (236, my 
emphasis). Again we notice the reproduction of the “normal”/disabled 
dichotomy in David’s voice. As much as the narrator condemns the 
starers that harass Jean Christophe, and the whole family by association, 
the narrative as a whole seems to invite such stares. The exquisiteness of 
the narrative’s visual style, along with its recurring use of visual 
metaphor tempts the reader to dwell on the page, to look for the details, 
to stare.  
 The figure of the dragon, then, is the ultimate rationalization of 
the child’s stare, an emblem of the indecipherability and fascination of 
epilepsy for the narrator as a kid. Children, unaccustomed to social rules 
about staring, are most prone to unabashedly stare at unusual sights or 
deviant bodies, most of the times to their mother’s despair at this blatant 
violation of etiquette (Garland Thomson 88). As a child, David is 
mesmerized by his brother’s seizures and the narrative conveys that 
through the lengthy passages presenting the dragon at work. The quoted 
page in Figure 22 illustrates, for example, how most of the frames in the 
page are occupied by the representation of this stare (77). The long 
sequence of similar frames suggests the slowness of time passing from 
one frame to the next. Time lingers as the focus is drawn to Jean 
Christophe’s convulsions, shown in detail through the dragon’s sinuous 
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movements. The black background effaces all other information from 
the frame apart from the dragon and Jean Christophe, making sure the 
reader’s attention is focused solely on the latter’s seizure. In sum, visual 
narrative mimics David’s stare. The reader, in its turn, is only invited to 
share the position of starer with David, never that of staree with Jean 
Christophe.   
 Other artists have engaged in the subject of people’s desire to 
stare at disability, such as Doug Auld and Chris Rush10, cited by 
Garland Thomson: they self-consciously invite the reader or the 
observer to stare, while attempting to bring the very act of staring into 
question (79-81). That, however, does not appear to be the case with the 
staring portrayed in Epileptic. As much as the narrator criticizes the 
staring carried out in Figures 28 and 29, that concern appears to be a 
result of his own involvement in the scene. In the following page, the 
narrator recalls admonishing his mother for deserting them at the critical 
moment, only to, soon after, confess the desire to do exactly the same: 
“I’m upset with her for letting us down at that moment. But I would 
dearly have loved to do the same. I would dearly have loved to be 
elsewhere” (237). The narrator condemns the act of staring, particularly 
when he is an object of that stare, for it puts him in the opposite end of 
the binary normal/deviant so often reinforced throughout the narrative. 
On the other hand, the narrative never questions David’s own form of 
staring. The narrative, therefore, only selectively criticizes the act of 
staring.  
 In Tangles, the act of staring also assumes a central role in the 
narrative, most notably through Midge’s portrayal of the blank stare. As 
Garland Thomson defines, the blank stare is a type of vague look that 
suggests a lack of mental faculties for the person who bears it (22). As 
such, the blank stare is often used to characterize people with disabilities 
and, visually, it is employed as a marker of deviance, functioning as a 
sign of “visual impotence” for the character in a given narrative (23). In 
Tangles, Midge is portrayed, through her blank stare, as someone 
deprived of agency, as the analyses in chapter 2 have pointed out. The 
progression of Alzheimer’s is directly related to the loss of agency for 
the character, since the blank stare becomes a permanent fixture in her 
portrayal only in the later stages of the illness. It is possible to conceive 
                                               
10 Doug Auld created a series of paintings of young people with severe burn 
injuries, entitled “State of Grace,” in 2005. Chris Rush created a portrait 
series entitled “Permission to Stare,” composed of a “‘unusual children and 
adults,’ most of whom with disabilities,” in 2006 (Garland Thomson 79-81).  
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the impact of staring in Midge’s representation as twofold: first, as the 
blank stare characterizes her as a subject inherently deviant, visually 
impotent; second, as she herself becomes an object of staring, seeing 
that the narrative invites the reader to focus on the ways in which she 
slowly loses legibility as Midge.  
 The page quoted from the chapter entitled “Taste and Smell” 
(Figure 18), for example, portrays Midge as a staree within the narrative. 
In the bottom six frames, Midge is shown under the scrutiny of the 
narrator, who seems to invite the reader to join in on the inspection of 
the many symptoms affecting her mother, such as the odd choice of 
clothes, the sweating, the bad breath (59). The thirteenth frame of the 
page, in particular, in which Midge is presented carrying a shoe in her 
hand after getting dressed, is revealing of this stare. In that frame, visual 
narrative assembles a list of oddities for the reader to linger on. A 
number of arrows point to Midge’s body, visually substantiating her 
deviance in the narrative:  
 
!! Accessories and footwear carried around 
until abandoned 
!! Dressy office skirt 
!! Guatemalan hat almost always 
!! Messy hair 
!! Turtleneck even when hot (59) 
 
Similarly to Epileptic, in Tangles the visual narrative mimics the staring 
process. The arranging of arrows literally points to the ways in which 
Midge deviates from the norm, inviting the reader to dwell on the frame 
in order to take in all of the information. The final frame of the page is 
emblematic in this regard, as it portrays the young Sarah pointing at her 
mother in shame: “I was so embarrassed. It reminded me of when I was 
a teenager and I wouldn’t walk with her at the mall because she dressed 
weird” (59). The reenactment of the self-conscious embarrassment of 
her teenage years in the last frame suggests a more critical view of the 
staring being performed in the earlier frames. Or, at least, it indicates the 
narrator’s awareness of the, perhaps unavoidable, process of putting her 
mother in the position of staree.  
 Besides this questioning, Tangles offers some alternatives of 
representation that do not engage in a type of staring that objectifies the 
staree. The visual metaphor of the flying bird (Figure 20) appropriates 
the blank stare that marks Midge as a subject of Alzheimer’s in a 
liberating way, for example. As a bird flying away, Midge is still an 
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object of her daughter’s stare and is still portrayed bearing the recurring 
blank stare characteristic of her illness in the narrative. The difference 
from this to other depictions throughout the story is that in this particular 
frame she does not appear constrained by that stare. In comparison, the 
frame at the bottom left of the page presents a more ‘realistic’ portrayal 
of the event, for the narrator, and in that frame Midge is seen staring 
down, with a sad countenance—a representation confined to the limits 
of her blank stare. As both types of representation are juxtaposed, one 
can see the potential of visual metaphor when it is not employed in the 
reiteration of stigmatizing features.  
 Overall, however, what the analyses of Tangles and Epileptic 
suggest is that graphic memoirs that deal with the representation of 
disability of someone other than the narrator run the risk of 
appropriating that person’s story in the process of telling their own. 
Visual metaphor, with a few exceptions (such as the flying bird in 
Tangles), emphasizes the spectacle of disability in others, adding to an 
already alienating process of stigmatization related to the representation 
of that disability. If disability has historically been associated with the 
impetus to stare, the visual metaphor of disability embraces that stare. 
One wonders, then, about the possibilities of representation of disability 
in others that, though inviting such a stare, do not objectify its starees.  
 Although not abundant in its use of visual metaphor as the other 
works analyzed in this dissertation, Bitter Medicine serves here as an 
example of a narrative in which the representation of disability cannot 
be characterized by an ableist gaze. In Bitter Medicine, the very 
aesthetic properties of the visual narrative are a metaphor for Olivier’s 
disability. His wavering drawing style becomes imbued with signifiers 
of his disability: as it fluctuates so does the reader’s perception of his 
symptoms and of how they affected his experiences as an adult living 
with schizophrenia. The narrative as a whole is not exempt from 
criticism for, despite being jointly composed, Clem’s written narrative is 
still given precedence in most of the work while Olivier’s is, at times, 
merely illustrative of the former. Bitter Medicine does, however, offer 
some insight into the potential of graphic memoirs as a genre wherein 
one can represent disability polysemically and not just as a narrative 
device in the establishment of able-bodied autobiographical subjects.   
 If the impulse to stare at disability is embraced, as the analyses 
in this dissertation have suggested, this embrace can be done critically. 
Olivier’s juxtaposition of self-portraits, for example, invites the stare of 
the reader, but it does so in order to visually perform a criticism on the 
impact of drugs in the life of someone dealing with schizophrenia. 
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Epileptic attempts a similar criticism when describing the myriad of side 
effects the medication has on Jean Christophe’s body (2). This criticism, 
however, invites an uncritical stare of the reader into his body; it 
perpetuates an objectification that elsewhere the narrator claims to 
denounce (Figures 22 and 35) (235-6). Tangles, on the other hand, is 
somewhat more ambivalent: the narrative invites the reader to stare at 
Midge’s transformation into deviance due to Alzheimer’s, while, 
concomitantly, conveying a sense of self-criticism for joining in that act 
of staring (Figure 17) (59).  
 David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder claim that the constant 
representation of disability in literature “establishes a conundrum: while 
stories rely upon the potency of disability as a symbolic figure, they 
rarely take up disability as an experience of social or political 
dimensions” (48). While the graphic memoirs analyzed throughout this 
dissertation do portray some of the social dimensions of disability, be 
through first-person accounts or by proxy, mostly they fail to approach it 
through a political lens. However, if one thinks of the feminist axiom of 
“the personal is political,” then these graphic memoirs gain very specific 
political contours. By bringing personal experiences with disability to 
light, these narratives are literarily working on the visibility of those 
experiences.  
 Hillary Chute argues that graphic memoirs have a distinctive 
way of materializing history; she claims “the field of graphic narrative 
brings certain key constellations to the table: hybridity and 
autobiography, theorizing trauma in connection to the visual, textuality 
that takes the body seriously” (4, my emphasis). However positive or 
problematic the representation of disability may be within the narratives 
analyzed, one cannot, indeed, question the seriousness with which they 
regard the body. Be it through the metonymy of narrative prosthesis or 
through the visual metaphor of disability, the body assumes a central 
role in the works analyzed. More specifically, the materiality of that 
body is brought to the fore through the production of an aesthetics 
centered on the polysemy of disability, as a material and symbolic 
signifier within these autobiographical narratives. 
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4.3. Identity politics of disability in graphic memoirs (and its lack 
thereof): future avenues of research 
 
 Throughout the research done for this dissertation, the absence 
of an explicit identification of the characters with the identity category 
of “people with disabilities” is noteworthy. In fact, the word “disability” 
itself is rarely used, if at all, in the majority of the graphic memoirs 
investigated. Despite dealing with disability as a subject matter, these 
narratives tend to steer clear of identity politics related to people with 
disabilities. As Simi Linton sums up, the category of disability “is best 
understood as a marker of identity [. . .] used to build a coalition of 
people,” and, as such, it has as much to do with mental or physical 
impairment and the discrimination associated with them as it does with 
its political potential as a group (162, my emphasis). In general, the 
graphic memoirs analyzed focus on the individualized medical condition 
of the characters in their narratives, rather than a sense of community for 
those with disabilities within their stories. The concern of the majority 
of those narratives is related specifically to the individual and how that 
individual fares when forced to deal with disability, be it a temporary 
one, such as in Fun Home or Calling Dr. Laura, or a loved one’s, such 
as Tangles and Epileptic. Even Bitter Medicine, which dedicates a good 
deal of its narrative trying to convey the hurdles people with mental 
health issues have to go through to find adequate support in the 
Canadian health system and the importance of a community for those 
subjects, does not use the term “disability” in its text.  
 In Fun Home and in Calling Dr. Laura, for example, the 
experience of disability appears relegated to the past, as part of a 
childhood fraught with many other difficulties. As such, those narratives 
could be seen as participating in what Linton refers to as “the 
overcoming rhetoric,” in which an account of disability is presented only 
to reinforce how it no longer impacts the life of the narrator or even 
how, through the person’s will power, she was able to beat it (165, 
original emphasis). Instead of a sense of community, the overcoming 
rhetoric directs attention to the individual, focusing on “personal 
triumph over a personal condition” (165, my emphasis). Accordingly, 
Alison is portrayed as setting deadlines for herself to abandon her 
compulsions, which, with her mother’s help, eventually works and she 
“recovers” from OCD (149). Nicole, on her turn, lives with encopresis 
throughout most of her early childhood, “scrubb[ing] and hid[ing it] as a 
shameful secret,” until she simply outgrows it, or at least that is the 
entailed assumption, for the narrative just drops the issue altogether after 
 168 
a certain point (60). Both graphic memoirs portray OCD and encopresis, 
respectively, as an alienating factor in the relationships among family 
and friends. Personal experience and strategies for passing are 
emphasized, whereas the stigma constructed around those illnesses is 
reinforced rather than questioned.  
 Tangles also focuses on a very personal experience with 
disability, rather than a shared one imbued with political potential. The 
only reference to others dealing with Alzheimer’s beyond the narrator’s 
mother occurs at the beginning of the “Unreal” chapter, in which the 
suicide of an acquaintance is linked to the illness (67) (Figure 19). The 
prevalence of medical discourse in the narrative is evident in its very 
title Tangles: A Story about Alzheimer’s, my Mother, and Me: first, as it 
establishes a connection between a diagnosis (Alzheimer’s) and an 
individual’s experience (and Me); second, as it dubiously employs a 
metaphor (Tangles) in relation to the clutters of hair collected by the 
narrator and in relation to the known characteristic of Alzheimer’s in the 
brain, the way it creates “densely twisted bundles of neurofibrils, or 
neurofibrillary tangles” (Ballenger 42).   
 The notable exceptions to this premise are Epileptic and Bitter 
Medicine. David B.’s narrative explores, in several passages, the shared 
identity and interests of people with disability. However, the category of 
“handicapped,” as it is referred to in the work, is brought forth mostly in 
a particularly derogatory manner, by the narrator. In Epileptic, 
“Handicapped” people stand in the opposite end of “normal” people, 
reinforcing a set of binaries that situate legibility only within the latter. 
As such, David is portrayed fighting against his brother’s identification 
as “handicapped,” for that would mean an embrace of illegibility in the 
former’s frame of mind (as seen in Figures 24, 25, and 28). Jean 
Christophe, on the other hand, proudly claims the identity of 
“handicapped” for himself, as someone part of a larger group of people. 
His embrace of “handicappedness” represents his refusal to continue 
trying (and failing) to fit in the “normal” category. Despite that, the 
narrator does not acknowledge the legitimacy of his brother’s 
identification. Bitter Medicine, in its turn, focuses much more on the 
importance of a community of people with shared experiences of 
disability at the same time that it denounces how members of that 
community are often neglected by the health care system and by the 
State. As much as Olivier’s personal experience with schizophrenia is 
conveyed, this portrayal is not done through an “overcoming rhetoric,” 
as the narratives of Fun Home and Calling Dr. Laura are prone to.  
 Both Tangles and Epileptic, as works that deal with a loved 
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one’s disability, are presented with the opportunity to come out as “crip” 
narratives, a category that, similarly to “queer,” challenges assumptions 
and essentialisms and subverts the dichotomies of able-bodied and 
disabled subjectivities, according to Robert McRuer’s definition of the 
term (Crip Theory 35). Differently from Fun Home and Calling Dr. 
Laura, in which bodily deviance is part of the protagonist’s first hand 
account, the narrators in Tangles and Epileptic deal with disability 
through someone else’s experiences, a process that could offer particular 
insight into possibilities of coalition and identification. That potential, 
nevertheless, is left untapped, as both works construct their protagonist’s 
subjectivities precisely through the negation of the status of disabled. 
The constant juxtaposition between Sarah and her mother and between 
David and his brother reiterate the binary, instead of subverting it. Bitter 
Medicine, however, can be seen as a crip narrative, for its dual narration 
subverts assumptions about “autosomatography” and “somatography”—
as Couser defines autobiographies about disability written by authors 
who are themselves disabled and by authors who are not, respectively 
(Signifying Bodies 2). Besides that, Olivier’s self-portraits and the 
embodiment of disability into his drawing style resignify the ableist gaze 
that characterizes other works.  
 On the other hand, if some of these works do not embrace 
‘disability’ as an identity, nor the political potential to come out as crip 
narratives, identities such as “lesbian” and “queer” are claimed by three 
of the protagonists of the graphic memoirs analyzed: Nicole in Calling 
Dr. Laura, Alison in Fun Home, and Sarah in Tangles. All three 
characters seem to grasp the political importance of coming out (and of 
identifying) as queer within their narratives. In Calling Dr. Laura, 
Nicole struggles with coming out to her mother throughout the narrative, 
but eventually decides to reveal her sexuality along with the knowledge 
of her supposedly dead father’s actual story (240). A great portion of the 
narrative is dedicated to the account of Nicole’s relationship with Radar 
and how, only after they break up, she finally manages to find the 
strength to come out to her overbearing mother.  
 In Fun Home, Alison is portrayed coming out to her parents in a 
letter, an announcement that the narrator presents as directly related to 
her father’s suicide (58-9). The first frame of the page in which she 
makes the announcement brings the written statement of “I am a 
lesbian” to the visual medium of the comics narrative. Alison is 
presented with the back towards the reader, writing the letter on a 
typewriter. Unlike other segments of the graphic memoir, in which 
excerpts of journal entries, books, and letters are portrayed from within 
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their original written genre (such as seen in Figures 13 and 15), the 
coming out announcement is depicted in its enactment, as the character 
is writing it. As such, the performative aspect of the phrase is 
emphasized, as a written speech act of sorts, borrowing Judith Butler’s 
terms.  
 In Tangles, the narrator tells of going to LGBT rallies with her 
mother even before the former realizes she herself is a lesbian. Midge 
and Sarah are both portrayed holding signs and chanting against LGBT 
oppression on the streets of Montreal after a police raid at a gay and 
lesbian party (16). During her university years, Sarah was more involved 
with political activism than with her classes, the narrator tells (16). After 
graduation, Sarah is portrayed getting more involved with feminist 
activism in particular, which, in her view, drew her closer to identifying 
as a lesbian (17). In the scene in which Sarah calls her mother to finally 
come out, the latter just replies that she thought her daughter had come 
out ages earlier: “That’s great, honey. But didn’t you already tell us?” 
(17). Sarah’s involvement with activism emphasizes her understanding 
of the political potential of identifying as queer.  
 I bring forth these examples to illustrate the centrality of 
queerness to these characters, how this identity plays into the story as 
whole, how it is continually emphasized and reinforced. The characters 
of Nicole, Alison, and Sarah are all portrayed in their narratives as 
understanding the political aspect of coming out. In comparison, the 
political dimension of their experiences with disability is downplayed. 
In Calling Dr. Laura, for example, this movement is clearly portrayed, 
as the young Nicole is depicted, in an apt metaphor, hiding the soiled 
tutu (a direct result of encopresis) in the closet. Ironically, at the same 
time that these narratives bring a literal visibility to disability, the 
political potential of that disability is kept from sight.  
 The issue of disability and identity politics in graphic memoirs 
is a complex subject and I would do it a disservice if I were to attempt at 
exhausting it here. My focus, at this point in the dissertation, is only to 
indicate other avenues of research within this topic, which I am sure will 
eventually generate entire works on their own. I hope this last part of my 
conclusion will be a nod to future researchers in the field, perhaps other 
doctoral students looking for a dissertation topic. As such, I choose to let 
go of the closure entailed in a chapter traditionally entitled “conclusion” 
and, instead, opt to finish this text with the open-endedness of “new 
possibilities of research.”  
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